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INTRODUCTION
When one thinks of how the law protects public rights in open spaces,
the public trust doctrine comes to mind. This is especially true in Chicago.
The modern public trust doctrine was born in the landmark decision in
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,1 growing out of struggles over the
use of land along the margin of Lake Michigan in that city.2 Yet Chicago’s
premier park—Grant Park, sitting on that land in the center of downtown
Chicago—owes its existence to a different legal doctrine. This other
doctrine, developed by American courts in the nineteenth century, holds
that owners of private property abutting land dedicated to a public use have
a right to enjoin deviations from the dedication. This “public dedication”
doctrine was invoked by Aaron Montgomery Ward, the famous Chicago
catalog merchant, in a series of actions from 1890 to 1910 to block
construction of a variety of structures in Grant Park.3 The body of
precedent that Ward created served for more than a century to keep Grant
Park free of significant encroachments, saving it as open space for the use
and enjoyment of future generations.
The Ward cases are an important chapter in the history of the Chicago
lakefront. In 1887, Ward and his partner, George A. Thorne, purchased
property on the west side of Michigan Avenue facing Lake Michigan from
which to operate their burgeoning mail-order business. The pair paid a
premium for the land because it allowed them to construct a building
favored with sunlight, fresh breezes, and lake views over the public land to
the east. Ward became upset, or so the story goes, when he observed
workers building scaffolding in the park to load garbage into railroad cars
for transport out of the City.4 Ward sued, claiming that this activity violated
language on a map of the original subdivision where his property was
1

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine:
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
3
City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 64 N.E.
705 (1902); Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909); S. Park
Comm’rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910).
4
See generally Transcript of Record at 8–9, 41, Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (No. 129568); LOIS
WILLE, FOREVER OPEN, CLEAR AND FREE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CHICAGO’S LAKEFRONT 71–74 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1991) (1972) (describing Ward’s reaction to goings-on in the park). The transcripts of the
record in the Ward cases are available at the Illinois State Archives in Springfield in the Supreme Court
of Illinois Case Files 1820–1970.
2
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located which stipulated that the space east of Michigan Avenue would be
“[p]ublic ground forever to remain vacant of buildings.”5 Ward was able to
show that this language created a public dedication of the land and that he,
as an abutting property owner, had standing to secure an injunction against
violations of the dedication. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Ward’s
favor in four major decisions, enjoining the construction not just of loading
platforms but also of a National Guard armory and a natural history
museum.6
In the wake of Ward’s victories, the public dedication doctrine was
wielded by generations of Michigan Avenue landowners to fend off
construction of public buildings in what became a 319-acre park. Only at
the dawn of the twenty-first century were the Ward precedents overcome.
Led by a mayor determined to bring more activity to downtown Chicago
and promote tourism, the City, in conjunction with a consortium of wealthy
private donors, constructed a $370 million project known as Millennium
Park in the northwest corner of Grant Park, directly opposite the site of
Montgomery Ward’s original catalog warehouse.7 Millennium Park
features, among other things, a 130-foot-tall stainless-steel music pavilion
designed by Frank Gehry, a multipurpose theater, a restaurant, and a pair of
fifty-foot towers emitting water from faces on giant LED screens.8 The
City obtained consents to the construction of Millennium Park from owners
of property abutting the northwest corner of Grant Park, and these consents
were held by a state court judge, in an unpublished order, to be an effective
waiver of the public dedication.9 It remains to be seen whether this bypass
of the dedication will undermine the Ward precedents or even cause them to
collapse altogether.
The public dedication doctrine is significant for reasons that go beyond
understanding the historical development of the Chicago lakefront. It also
provides a significant point of juxtaposition to the public trust doctrine,
which by a remarkable coincidence emerged at roughly the same time and
place as the Ward precedents.10 Both the public trust doctrine and the
public dedication doctrine are designed to preserve spaces dedicated to
public uses.11 The public trust doctrine seeks to preserve public spaces by
5

Ward, 169 Ill. at 402, 48 N.E. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 422, 48 N.E. at 937; Bliss, 198 Ill. at 121, 64 N.E. at 709; Field Museum, 241 Ill. at 510, 89
N.E. at 737; S. Park Comm’rs, 248 Ill. at 313, 93 N.E. at 915.
7
TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, MILLENNIUM PARK: CREATING A CHICAGO LANDMARK 159 (2006).
8
Id. at 181, 223, 251, 277, 324.
9
Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000).
10
The public trust doctrine emerged in modern form with the Illinois Central decision in 1892. See
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 800. The first Ward case was filed in 1890 and decided in 1897.
Ward, 169 Ill. at 393, 48 N.E. at 927.
11
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 724–25, 727–30 (1986) (discussing the foundation of the public
dedication and public trust doctrines).
6
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positing that certain resources are held in a restricted title that disables any
transfer of these resources into the hands of private owners.12 The public
dedication doctrine pursues the same end by recognizing the right of a
select group of landowners uniquely affected by public spaces to sue in
equity to prevent departures from the dedicated use.
Yet even if they serve similar functions, the two doctrines differ in
several important respects. The public trust doctrine is effectively confined
to land having some nexus with navigable waters; the public dedication
doctrine covers a much wider range of streets, parks, and public squares.
The public trust doctrine rests on the imputation of an imprecisely defined
trust obligation; the public dedication doctrine, which often relies on
publicly recorded maps and plats, applies to a more easily ascertained set of
resources and incorporates a clearer conception of what is prohibited.13
Perhaps most significantly, the public dedication doctrine and the
public trust doctrine are governed by very different standing rules. Under
the public trust doctrine, there are two logical standing rules: either the state
alone, through its legal officers, can sue to enforce the public trust, or any
citizen of the state can sue to enforce the trust.14 The former rule precludes
all private enforcement and leaves enforcement up to the vagaries of the
political process; the latter rule allows any person, no matter how remote
his or her connection to the resource, to invoke the doctrine, and effectively
confers enforcement authority on nonprofit advocacy groups. Under the
public dedication doctrine, by contrast, an intermediate standing rule
applies: in addition to the public authority that holds title to the burdened
land, the doctrine also confers standing on abutting landowners, typically a
moderate-sized group of individuals who have a strong interest in
maintaining the public nature of the resource.15 This group of potential
plaintiffs is large enough to ensure a variety of perspectives on whether the
dedication should be enforced, but small enough that public authorities can
attempt to secure their consent in advance of undertaking a project that
arguably violates the dedication. This intermediate standing rule arguably
strikes a better balance than either of the rules associated with the public
trust doctrine.
The public dedication doctrine, particularly as it was applied in the
Ward cases, is also significant because it allows us to evaluate the recent

12

Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 75, 76–86 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
13
See infra Part VI.B.
14
Illinois traditionally followed the rule that only officers of the State could enforce the trust. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 152–53, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896). More recently, the
Illinois Supreme Court overruled this understanding and held that any taxpayer can sue to enforce the
trust. Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 341–42, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970); see, e.g.,
Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 786 N.E.2d 161 (2003).
15
See infra Part VI.B.
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proposal to create “antiproperty” rights as a way of protecting resources
such as public parks. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have
argued that parks and other open spaces are vulnerable to capture of local
governments by interest groups seeking development opportunities.16 They
have proposed as a solution that private-property owners who benefit
disproportionately from parks and similar resources should be given veto
power over any proposal to develop these resources.17 If the holders of such
antiproperty rights are sufficiently numerous, they argue, the high
transaction costs of achieving unanimous consent to development will
effectively freeze public spaces in their current, open-space state.18 Their
proposal, in effect, exactly replicates the traditional public dedication
doctrine.
Although it is always difficult to generalize from a small number of
events, one real-world example that has played out over a significant period
of time is much more illuminating than a purely hypothetical argument.
The history of the public dedication doctrine on the Chicago lakefront
suggests that antiproperty rights can serve as a powerful form of protection
for public property. The public dedication doctrine secured most of Grant
Park’s 319 acres as open space while allowing, through the consent
mechanism, for the construction of selective improvements such as the
Chicago Art Institute and the miscellaneous structures of Millennium Park,
both of which enjoy broad public support.
There is also evidence, however, that the public dedication doctrine has
resulted in overprotection of the park as open space. It is far from clear that
Montgomery Ward’s adamant refusal to allow the Field Museum of Natural
History to be constructed in Grant Park was consistent with what most
persons in Chicago wanted. Ward’s stubbornness yielded an open space
that now features one cluster of public buildings along Grant Park’s west
and north edges (the Art Institute and Millennium Park) and another cluster
(now called the “Museum Campus”) outside the south and southeast edges;
the distance between the two clusters makes it difficult to walk between
them in a single outing. Perhaps even more strikingly, for three decades the
Ward precedents frustrated every plan for the erection of a new pavilion for
summer concerts in Grant Park.19 Presumably, abutting landowners
preferred that the park remain quiet and empty on summer evenings, but
this preference is almost certainly contrary to how the general public would
want the space to be used. Thus, the history suggests that the incentives of
abutting property owners will not always align with those of the larger
public.
16

Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2003).
17
Id. at 5–6.
18
Id. at 38–48.
19
See GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 43–77.
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This Article is organized as follows: Part I describes the evolution of
the space that is now known as Grant Park. Part II traces the origins of the
public dedication doctrine in the nineteenth century. Part III describes how
that doctrine was invoked in controversies over the use of the Chicago
lakefront before Montgomery Ward came on the scene. Part IV details
Ward’s remarkable crusade to save Grant Park as an unencumbered open
space, which created a powerful body of precedent having a lasting impact
on the use of the park. Part V describes the limits of the public dedication
doctrine that was recognized in the Ward precedents. Part VI offers some
brief observations about why the public trust doctrine eclipsed the public
dedication doctrine, compares the efficacy of the two doctrines in the
context of the Chicago lakefront, and offers some general reflections about
what this history tells us about the promises and pitfalls of recognizing
antiproperty rights to contest development of public spaces.
I. CONSTRUCTING A LAKEFRONT PARK
In order to understand the controversies that gave rise to the Ward
cases and their significance for the physical configuration of the Chicago
lakefront, it is necessary to know something about the history of the space
that is now called Grant Park. In contrast to other famous urban parks, such
as Central Park in New York City, Grant Park is almost entirely manmade
and was constructed in fits and starts over more than a century and a half.
In this Part, we highlight the major events in the evolution of the park, with
particular attention to issues arising under the public dedication doctrine.
A. The Early Chicago Lakefront
The space that is now Grant Park, like the rest of Illinois, was part of
the Northwest Territories ceded by Virginia and other states to the general
government around the time of the Revolutionary War.20 When Illinois
became a state in 1818, the only significant human presence in the place
that would become Chicago was a military outpost called Fort Dearborn,
located on the south bank of the Chicago River where the river emptied into
Lake Michigan.21 By 1833, when it was incorporated as a town, Chicago
had grown to a population of some 200–300.22 It soon began to expand at a
geometric rate, spurred by a plan to build a canal that would join the
Chicago River, which was connected via the Great Lakes and the Erie
Canal to the East Coast, with the Des Plaines River, which flows into the
Illinois River and thence to the Mississippi River and was thus connected to
20

See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 49–55 (photo. reprint 1979) (1968).
21
ROBERT P. HOWARD, ILLINOIS: A HISTORY OF THE PRAIRIE STATE 94–95 (1972).
22
Estimates vary as to how many individuals lived in Chicago at that time. The total population
certainly exceeded the 150 individuals required for incorporation as a town. PAUL GILBERT & CHARLES
LEE BRYSON, CHICAGO AND ITS MAKERS 57 (1929).
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the port of New Orleans.23 Congress granted significant federal land to
Illinois to subsidize the construction of such a canal, and in 1829 a Board of
Canal Commissioners was established under state law to sell this land, with
the proceeds to underwrite construction of the canal.24
All land in Illinois was surveyed in accordance with the rectilinear grid
established by the Land Ordinance of 1785, whereby land was divided into
square townships of thirty-six numbered sections each of which contained
640 acres.25 Congress granted to Illinois the odd-numbered sections for
two-and-a-half miles on each side of the proposed route of the canal, and
the State in turn granted these sections to the Canal Commissioners.26 One
of these sections was fractional section 15 of township 39, located in what
now includes the southeast portion of Chicago’s loop. It was bounded on
the west by State Street, on the north by Madison Street, on the south by
12th Street, and on the east by Lake Michigan. It was called “fractional”
because most of section 15 was under Lake Michigan, and everyone
assumed that the Canal Commissioners would not sell submerged land
under the lake. A map of fractional section 15 is reproduced as Figure 1.27

23

Id. at 82–84; see also Perry R. Duis, The Shaping of Chicago, in AIA GUIDE TO CHICAGO 2
(Alice Sinkevitch ed., 2d ed. 2004) (“By 1836, when work on the canal began in earnest, optimism about
Chicago’s future had boosted land prices to astronomical levels and attracted over 3,000 more
residents.”).
24
Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 659; Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 51, 4 Stat. 234; 1829 Ill. Laws
14. That board was abolished in 1833 and reestablished in 1836. 1833 Ill. Laws 113; 1836 Ill. Laws
145; HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 11–12 (Beard Books 2000)
(1933).
25
GATES, supra note 20, at 68.
26
Id. at 350; Dennis H. Cremin, Building Chicago’s Front Yard: Grant Park 1836 to 1936, at 28
(Jan. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University Chicago) (UMI No. 9917766).
27
Figure 1 is taken from the Illinois Central litigation in the United States Reports. See Ill. Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 397 (1892) (“Map B” in the statement of the case). See generally
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2 (recounting this litigation). Its origins are worth detailing. The original
map on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the Illinois State Archives, record number 491.105
Plats. Justice John Marshall Harlan’s circuit court opinion in the Illinois Central litigation contains a
stylized version of this original map (which was then housed in the Canal Commissioners’ office in
Lockport, Illinois). Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 739 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888), aff’d, Ill. Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). That version (denominated “Map B” in the circuit court opinion) contains
most of the information from the original map, whereas “Map B” as it appears in the U.S. Reports (i.e.,
Figure 1 here) is simplified. Compare id. at 739, with 146 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court Reporter,
published by West Publishing Co., contains a map closer to the version in Justice Harlan’s opinion in the
Federal Reporter than to the one in the official U.S. Reports. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 36 S. Ct.
1018, 1022–23 (1892) (foldout map).
A version of the original map can also be found in the Cook County recorder’s office. The map was
filed for recording in Cook County on June 18, 1836, with a copy made and deemed recorded on July
20, 1836, but this copy was destroyed in the Chicago Fire of 1871. After the fire, the map was
rerecorded on September 24, 1877, and the resulting copy is now found in Plats book 12, page 82, in the
Office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds.
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FIGURE 1: FRACTIONAL SECTION 15

Notice that the easternmost portion of the solid land—from Madison
south to 12th Street, save only a small block between 11th and 12th—was
not platted. The Canal Commissioners’ map designates the entire area
between the platted blocks and Lake Michigan as “Michigan Avenue.” A
commercial map from the same period labeled this area “PUBLIC
GROUND[—]A Common to remain forever Open, Clear & free of any
buildings, or other Obstructions Whatever” (see Figure 2).28 According to
28

The map in Figure 2 was published by the lithography firm of Peter A. Meisner in New York.
ROBERT A. HOLLAND, CHICAGO IN MAPS: 1612 TO 2002, at 61, 64 (2005). Its primary purpose was
probably to promote land sales to buyers on the East Coast. See Elaine Lewinnek, Mapping Chicago,
Imagining Metropolises: Reconsidering the Zonal Model of Urban Growth, 36 J. URB. HIST. 197, 199
(2010). Note that areas not yet officially platted, such as section 10 (the area immediately north of
section 15), are filled in with imagined future subdivided land (indeed, all the way east to the lake).
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testimony submitted in the Ward cases, the Canal Commissioners
represented to prospective purchasers that the land east of Michigan Avenue
would remain an open public space, and it is likely that this commercial
map (or a similar visual aid) was used by the Canal Commissioners in
marketing the land.29
FIGURE 2: COMMERCIAL MAP OF FRACTIONAL SECTION 15. “CHICAGO WITH SEVERAL
ADDITIONS COMPILED FROM RECORDED PLATS IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE (1836)”30

29
30

Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 277–78 (testimony of Fernando Jones).
On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-37310.
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Based on representations that the land east of Michigan Avenue would
remain open space, the platted lots fronting on the west side of Michigan
Avenue sold for higher prices than other land in fractional section 15.31
Soon afterward, the U.S. Army decided to abandon Fort Dearborn,
which was located in fractional section 10, immediately north of fractional
section 15.32 This area was accordingly opened for sale by the federal
government as the “Fort Dearborn Addition to Chicago.”33 A version of an
1839 map of the Fort Dearborn subdivision, which was publicly recorded, is
reproduced as Figure 3.34 Notice that the map includes a notation in the
area south of Randolph Street and north of Washington Street,
encompassing what would be Michigan Avenue and half of block 12 and
saying “public ground for ever to remain vacant of buildings.” Moreover, a
note in the margin of the original map signed by Matthew Birchard, the
federal agent who negotiated the sales and recorded the map with Cook
County officials in 1839, states as follows: “The public ground between
Randolph and Madison streets, and fronting upon Lake Michigan, is not to
be occupied with buildings of any description.”35 Again, testimony was

31

Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 244 (“Lots fronting east on Michigan avenue did sell for
more than on Wabash, and efforts were made by the canal commissioners . . . to obtain a higher price on
account of the eastern exposure on the lake.”) (testimony of Fernando Jones). Section 15 was publicized
by city promoters as having large lots and a “promenade . . . between [the lots] and the Lake, [making it]
a very desirable place for private residences.” CHI. AM., Apr. 23, 1836, at 1. Chicago experienced
much land speculation between 1830 and 1842, which affected land prices significantly. HOYT, supra
note 24, at 3–44.
32
Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 733, 753.
33
Id. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34
Figure 3 is a reproduction of Map A in the Illinois Central litigation, as it appears in the United
States Reports. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 392 (1892) (statement of the case). The
Supreme Court Reporter and circuit court opinion contain more detailed versions of the same map. See
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 36 S. Ct. 1018, 1020–21 (1892) (foldout map); Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 735.
35
Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. at 734 n.1. The original recorded copy of this map burned in the Chicago
Fire of 1871, and the map was not rerecorded after the fire. The only record on file with the Office of
the Cook County Recorder of Deeds today is an unofficial copy of a map found on page 2B of both tract
books 460A and 460B. It is unknown whether the original document containing Birchard’s comment
still exists.
Several contemporaneous maps of the area contain language of dedication similar to that of Figure 3,
including maps found in the records of the U.S. Senate. See, e.g., U.S. Senate, Maps Accompanying the
Report of Thomas Jefferson Cram in Senate Document 140, in 4 PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRINTED BY
ORDER OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH
CONGRESS (1839); Fort Dearborn Addition to Chicago, 1839, ENCYCLOPEDIA CHI., http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/10710.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
There is evidence that the restriction of land as “public ground” was demanded by local residents.
Anticipating the sale of the abandoned Fort Dearborn, local residents of Chicago adopted a resolution
supporting an application for a grant of the land, “upon the express condition” that twenty acres fronting
Lake Michigan be reserved for a public square free from buildings, with that area to revert to the federal
government in the event it were built upon. See CHI. DEMOCRAT, Nov. 4, 1835. The map restriction as
written contains no language of reversion. The Supreme Court later held, in United States v. Illinois
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offered much later in the Ward litigation that lots abutting this area were
sold at a premium based on the understanding that they would enjoy direct
exposure to Lake Michigan.36
FIGURE 3: FRACTIONAL SECTION 10

Central Railroad, 154 U.S. 225, 241–42 (1894), that the federal government retained no property rights
in section 10.
36
See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 244.
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These map and plat notations would provide the legal foundation for
the later invocation of the public dedication doctrine by owners of land on
the west side of Michigan Avenue. Otherwise, there were no legal
restrictions on how land along the lakefront might be used. There was no
zoning ordinance in Chicago in the nineteenth century; public regulation of
land use would come only much later.37
The preferred use of Michigan Avenue property, at least initially, was
for residential structures. The western side of Michigan Avenue quickly
filled with large residential structures populated by the Chicago elite.38 The
land to the east of Michigan Avenue, in keeping with the restrictions
appearing on various maps as recounted above, remained vacant of
permanent structures.39 This area, stretching from Randolph Street on the
north to Park Row on the south, came to be known as “Lake Park,” and was
officially given this designation by city ordinances enacted in the 1840s.40
There was at this time, however, no formal governmental structure for
preserving and maintaining the park.
The most pressing problem Michigan Avenue residents faced in the
1840s and 1850s was not to prevent construction in Lake Park, but to
ensure that the park did not disappear altogether.41 Severe erosion became a
significant problem along this portion of the lakefront, especially after
winter storms.42 At one point, Michigan Avenue residents had to work
through the night for fear that the water would wash away not only the
street but also the residences on its west side.43 Everyone recognized that

37

Chicago first adopted a zoning ordinance in 1923. JOSEPH P. SCHWIETERMAN & DANA M.
CASPALL, THE POLITICS OF PLACE: A HISTORY OF ZONING IN CHICAGO 17–25 (2006).
38
See HERMAN KOGAN & ROBERT CROMIE, THE GREAT FIRE: CHICAGO 1871, at 19–20, 23 (1971).
39
See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 203–04 (testimony of Jonathan Young Scammon).
Scammon, who had lived in Chicago since 1835 and was regarded as an expert on the history of the
lakefront, had died by the time the first Ward case went to trial. He had previously testified about
lakefront history in an injunction proceeding in 1869, see infra notes 199–209 and accompanying text,
and the parties in the Ward cases stipulated to the introduction of this testimony into evidence.
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 187–88.
40
The land was officially designated “Lake Park” in 1847. Chi., Ill., An Ordinance More Definitely
Designating Certain Localities in the City of Chicago, and Providing for the Naming and Numbering of
Certain Avenues, Streets, Parks, Squares, and Places § 4 (Aug. 10, 1847), in CHARTER OF THE CITY OF
CHICAGO AND AMENDMENTS WITH RULES OF COUNCIL AND ORDINANCES 76 (Chicago, Democrat
Office 1849). The City had also passed a resolution in 1844 to enclose much of the area east of
Michigan Avenue as a park. However, resolutions from that era were not officially published and the
original copy has been lost. The resolution was read into the record in the first Ward case. Transcript of
Record, supra note 4, at 103–04.
41
See Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 203–04 (testimony of Jonathan Young Scammon).
42
See id.
43
Id.

1428

105:1417 (2011)

Private Rights in Public Lands

some kind of breakwater was needed to protect the shore, but no agreement
could be reached on a mechanism for financing such a project.44
B. Entry of the Illinois Central Railroad
At this point, the newly chartered Illinois Central Railroad came onto
the scene. The railroad wanted access to the Chicago River, where grain
and other commodities were transferred to vessels for reshipment to the
East Coast.45 The railroad proposed that it be allowed to enter the City
along the lakefront and construct a terminal between Randolph Street and
the Chicago River. The City agreed, provided that the railroad would locate
its tracks outside Lake Park, on trestles in the lake, and would construct a
substantial breakwater to protect the shore.46 In deference to the interests of
the Michigan Avenue residents, the authorizing ordinance prohibited the
railroad from allowing trains to remain standing in this area and from
constructing any building or other improvements in Lake Park that might
obstruct the views from the shore.47 All the railroad’s terminal and
switching facilities were to be located either north of Randolph Street or
south of 12th Street.48
One can see further evidence of the influence of the Michigan Avenue
landowners in the revised charter of the City adopted by the state legislature
in 1861 and 1863. The charter included a section providing in part that
“[n]o encroachment shall be made upon the land or water west of [the
Illinois Central Railroad right-of-way] by any railroad company,” and
permitted any owner of a lot fronting Michigan Avenue to sue to enjoin
“any such encroachments.”49 For good measure, the charter provided that
“[n]either the common council of the city of Chicago, nor any other
authority, shall ever have the power to permit encroachments thereon,
without the assent of all the persons owning lots or land on said street or
avenue.”50 Thus, critical elements of the public dedication doctrine were
effectively codified in positive law in 1861 and 1863.
Once the Illinois Central facilities were complete, Lake Park took on
the somewhat awkward form of a series of narrow strips running north and
south (as can be seen in Figure 4). Immediately east of Michigan Avenue
44

See ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO, 1833–1872, at 91–
99 (1991).
45
See Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 SUP. CT. REV.
313, 320–21.
46
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 811–25.
47
Chi., Ill., An Ordinance Concerning the Illinois Central Railroad §§ 8–9 (June 14, 1852), in
CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 352 (George W. & John A. Thompson eds.,
Chicago, D.B. Cooke & Co. 1856).
48
Id. §§ 1, 11.
49
1861 Ill. Laws 118, 136; accord 1863 Ill. Laws 40, 96.
50
1861 Ill. Laws 118, 136; accord 1863 Ill. Laws 40, 96.
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was a narrow strip of solid land. Farther to the east was a strip of shallow
water—in effect a lagoon—which served as a harbor for small boats. Even
farther to the east was the right-of-way of the Illinois Central, with tracks
perched above the water on trestles. Just beyond the tracks (and another
thin strip of water) was the protective breakwater. Lake Park retained this
basic form from the late 1850s through the 1860s.
FIGURE 4: LAKE PARK “ROWHOUSES ALONG MICHIGAN AVENUE OVERLOOKING RIVER AND
FACTORIES, LOOKING NORTH FROM HARRISON STREET CIRCA 1865”51

In 1869, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a law that sparked
intense controversy about the future of the lakefront. The statute was
designed to resolve uncertainty about the legal title to Lake Park and
transform the Chicago lakefront with a massive new outer harbor.52 The
area north of Monroe Street and west of the railroad tracks was to be sold
by the City to the Illinois Central for $800,000. The Illinois Central would
fill the shallow water in this area and construct an enlarged passenger depot.
The area south of Monroe Street and west of the tracks would be conveyed
to the City, which would use the $800,000 to beautify the space as a proper
public park. The area east of the tracks, for a distance of one mile from
Michigan Avenue, would be conveyed to the Illinois Central for purposes

51
52

On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62330.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 860–94.
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of constructing a new outer harbor to relieve congestion in the existing
harbor, the Chicago River.53
The statute was unpopular in Chicago, primarily because $800,000 was
thought to be an inadequate price for north Lake Park, and newspapers
quickly dubbed it “the Lake Front Steal.”54 The City of Chicago refused
officially to accept the first installment of the $800,000 when it was
tendered by the railroad.55 The nation had by then entered into an economic
depression, and the railroad was in no financial condition to pursue new
improvements along the lakefront. The Act, together with the various
projects that it envisioned, was effectively dead. In an act that would give
rise to litigation resolved only decades later, the Illinois legislature formally
repealed it in 1873.56
An even more dramatic event occurred on October 8, 1871, when a fire
broke out in Mrs. O’Leary’s barn, as the story goes, on the near southwest
side of Chicago.57 Whipped by high winds, the flames spread rapidly to the
north and east, eventually incinerating a large part of the City.58 The fine
houses on Michigan Avenue were destroyed, as were many of the Illinois
Central’s facilities north of Randolph Street.59 The railroad’s tracks and
most of its rolling stock were spared, an unforeseen benefit of building a
railroad in a lake.60
The fire had several consequences for Lake Park. Massive amounts of
rubble from the City had to be buried. At the suggestion of Mayor Roswell
Mason, a former chief engineer of the Illinois Central, much of the debris
was dumped in Lake Park, in the area between solid land and the railroad
tracks. In fairly short order, all of Lake Park up to the Illinois Central
breakwater was filled in, significantly increasing the size of the park.61
When reconstruction of the City began, the character of Michigan Avenue
changed. Rather than residences, miscellaneous commercial structures—
eventually made of brick and stone to comply with the new fire code—went
up along the west side of Michigan Avenue.62 Among the most imposing of
the new structures would be the headquarters of Montgomery Ward & Co.

53

Id. at 860–77; see also id. at 863–64 (describing a requirement in the law that the Illinois Central
pay the State seven percent of gross receipts from all leases or improvements of Lake Park).
54
Id. at 854.
55
Id. at 895.
56
1873 Ill. Laws 115; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 905–12.
57
3 BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: THE RISE OF A MODERN CITY 1871–1893, at
3–8 (1957).
58
Id.
59
See KOGAN & CROMIE, supra note 38, at 92–93.
60
See JOHN F. STOVER, HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD 182 (1975).
61
Id. at 184.
62
See HOYT, supra note 24, at 102.
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The crisis created by the fire also resulted in new uses of Lake Park. In
the immediate aftermath of the fire, the City, in a desperate effort to keep
the local economy functioning, leased out a portion of Lake Park for
temporary commercial buildings.63 Once the rebuilding effort in the
downtown was underway, these structures were torn down.64 In their place,
the City in 1873 authorized the erection of a huge Inter-state Industrial
Exposition Building in Lake Park, between Monroe Street and Jackson
Street (see Figure 5). The purpose of this structure was to hold an
exhibition of Chicago goods and wares in an effort to announce to the world
that Chicago had recovered from the devastation.65 The exhibition was
sufficiently successful that it was extended for a second year, and then other
uses were found for the massive building. Eventually, the Inter-state
Exposition Building evolved into a kind of all-purpose convention center,
hosting agricultural fairs, horticultural displays, art exhibitions, musical
concerts, and even the 1884 Republican and Democratic national
presidential conventions.66 It remained a looming presence on the lakefront
until 1892, when it was demolished and replaced by the building that
became the Art Institute.67
FIGURE 5: INTER-STATE INDUSTRIAL EXPOSITION BUILDING (WITH THREE CUPOLAS);
LOOKING NORTH ON MICHIGAN AVENUE CIRCA 189068

63

Id. (discussing temporary buildings on the lakefront).
See Cremin, supra note 26, at 92–97 (discussing the construction of the Inter-state Exposition
Building).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 100–15; see also R. CRAIG SAUTTER & EDWARD M. BURKE, INSIDE THE WIGWAM:
CHICAGO PRESIDENTIAL CONVENTIONS 1860–1996, at 46–65 (1996).
67
See infra notes 76–81, 312–33 and accompanying text.
68
Photograph by J.W. Taylor (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62407).
64
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Michigan Avenue landowners did not object to any of these
developments—the landfilling of the shallow water, the temporary
commercial structures, or the Inter-state Exposition Building—in the years
immediately after the fire. No doubt the shock of the fire and the sense of
collective crisis had much to do with this. Moreover, the Michigan Avenue
owners could hardly say that these developments were blocking their view,
when their houses lay in ruins. The Inter-state Exposition Building was
understood to be a temporary structure when it was first erected, and some
of the Michigan Avenue elite were either sponsors of this undertaking or
were actively involved in the cultural activities that took place in the giant
building in later years.69 In any event, in part because of the passivity of the
Michigan Avenue owners during this period, the City in the ensuing years
permitted a variety of structures to be erected in Lake Park. Among these
were a stadium for Albert Spalding’s Chicago White Stockings Base Ball
Club (the forerunner of the Chicago Cubs), initially erected in 1877 and
then demolished and replaced by a larger stadium in 1882;70 structures to
accommodate armory buildings for two companies of state militia, erected
in 1881 and demolished in 1897;71 a passenger depot for the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad, which had obtained trackage rights from the Illinois Central,
erected in 1882 and demolished in 1891;72 and a massive temporary post
office building, erected in 1896, enlarged in 1900, and demolished in
1905.73 Eventually, as we shall see, these structures evoked multiple
objections from Michigan Avenue landowners and produced significant
litigation.74
The 1890s witnessed another event in Chicago history that would have
a major impact on the park. Chicago was selected by Congress to be the
site of the World’s Columbian Exposition, celebrating the 400th
anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s voyage to the New World. At first,
it was expected that this World’s Fair would be located in Lake Park. But
this would have required extensive landfilling to enlarge the park, and was
opposed both by the Illinois Central and by the War Department, which by
69

See Our Exposition, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1873, at 3; The Council, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1873, at 3;
Cremin, supra note 26, at 99–101.
70
See Bill of Complaint at 7–8, United States v. Chi. Base Ball Club, No. 19026 (C.C.N.D. Ill. May
27, 1884).
71
See City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 421, 48 N.E. 927, 936 (1897).
72
See Bill of Complaint at 15, Illinois v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. (C.C.N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1882); Cremin,
supra note 26, at 101.
73
3 J. SEYMOUR CURREY, CHICAGO: ITS HISTORY AND ITS BUILDERS 359 (1912); see also Ward v.
Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598 (7th Cir. 1900) (dissolving injunction against expansion of the temporary
post office).
74
A proposal to build a power house for the Exposition Building also generated a legal challenge.
Cremin, supra note 26, at 161–62. The challenge came from Warren Leland in 1889, joined later by
Sarah Daggett. Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892); see
infra Parts III and IV.B.
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then had assumed active oversight of the harbor facilities. As a result, the
fair was held in Jackson Park, on Chicago’s South Side.75
The Columbian Exposition nevertheless had a significant impact on the
future of Lake Park. One activity affiliated with the fair was the World’s
Congress Auxiliary, an ambitious program of several thousand lectures
open to the public and delivered by scholarly, literary, and religious
figures.76 The organizers decided that the venue for the lectures should be
Lake Park.77 After much jockeying, it was also decided that the Inter-state
Exposition Building would be torn down, and a new building in the
neoclassical style associated with the fair would be built in its place to host
the program.78 After the Columbian Exposition ended, the building would
become the new home of the Art Institute of Chicago.79
There was great pressure to have the new building ready for the
opening of the Columbian Exposition, and several Michigan Avenue
landowners consented to the project. Nevertheless, litigation brought by
Sarah Daggett delayed its completion.80 The issue was eventually resolved
in favor of the City and the Art Institute, and the new structure was
sufficiently complete to be used as a venue for lectures in the summer of
1893.81
The Columbian Exposition also had indirect impacts on the park. In
order to accommodate the huge number of visitors to the fair, the Illinois
Central built a new terminal south of the park, between Park Row and 12th
Street, called the Illinois Central Station.82 After the Exposition closed, this
became the Illinois Central’s principal intercity passenger depot in Chicago,
effectively ending the railroad’s quest to use north Lake Park as a site for an
enlarged depot.83 The Columbian Exposition also gave rise to new
enthusiasm for the creation of large cultural institutions in the City,
including the Field Museum of Natural History.84
One institution that emerged at this time and deserves note was the
Chicago Public Library, which was authorized to occupy space previously
known as Dearborn Park, just west of Michigan Avenue between Randolph
Street and Washington Street. This space had been included as part of the
“public ground” on the Fort Dearborn Addition map that was “for ever to
75

Cremin, supra note 26, at 129–46.
Id. at 156–64, 182–93.
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Id.
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Id.
79
Id.
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See infra Part IV.B.
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Cremin, supra note 26, at 163–65, 185.
82
STOVER, supra note 60, at 217–20.
83
After 1919, when the Illinois Central agreed to electrify the tracks north of Park Row, see infra
note 117, the north end of the park was served only by commuter trains.
84
See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
76
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remain vacant of buildings.”85 It had served for years as one of the few
green spots west of Michigan Avenue. Nevertheless, consents were readily
obtained from abutting landowners to use Dearborn Park as a site for the
library, which was constructed in the same austere neoclassical style as the
Art Institute.86
C. Lake Park Becomes Grant Park
The mid-1890s marked a critical turning point for Lake Park. In 1892,
the U.S. Supreme Court issued the first of four decisions that resolved the
legal uncertainty about the title to Lake Park.87 The Court’s most important
determination was that the State of Illinois owned the bed of Lake
Michigan.88 Thus, the state legislature had the ultimate say over how this
submerged land would be used. The Court also held that land beneath the
lake was held by the State in trust for the public, and that the State could not
dispose of the land in a way that would impair the public’s access to the
lake or free navigation on the lake.89 Collectively, the Court’s decisions
extinguished any hope on the part of the Illinois Central—or any other
private enterprise—that it could control the future development of the
lakefront.
This period was also critical because of the powerful impression that
the Columbian Exposition created on the public imagination. Under the
guiding hand of Daniel Burnham, Chicago had built a magical “White City”
in Jackson Park, about six miles south of Lake Park, featuring large
neoclassical buildings, public plazas, and monumental statuary (see Figure
6).90 Not surprisingly, after the question of title to Lake Park was resolved,
the White City served as a model for how the park might be reconstructed.
85

See supra Figure 3.
The library directors obtained consents from the owners of property that abutted Dearborn Park in
the horseshoe fronting Washington Street, Garland Court, and Randolph Street. At that time, Ward’s
property did not directly front Washington Street (it was one lot to the south), and thus Ward was not
approached to sign the consent. The Chicago Public Library has retained the consent form, along with a
list of abutting property owners detailing the lots that each owned. See Owners of Lots Abutting on
Dearborn Park (July 14, 1890), in Chicago Public Library Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park
Property 1935–1898 Box 1, available at Harold Washington Library (on file with authors). No property
owners south of Washington Street objected to this procedure, even though under the Illinois Supreme
Court’s subsequent decisions in Ward III and IV the library arguably should have obtained the consent
of all property owners along Michigan Avenue. See infra Part V.C (discussing the proper set of owners
who must consent).
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Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 176 U.S. 646 (1900); Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 184 U.S. 77
(1902).
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Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452.
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Id.
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See 1 A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION HELD IN CHICAGO IN 1893, at 134–
80, 352–53, 364 (Rossiter Johnson ed., 1897). For a popular account of the fair and its impact on the
City, emphasizing Burnham’s role, see ERIK LARSON, THE DEVIL IN THE WHITE CITY (2003).
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Chicago’s business and cultural elite proceeded to draw up numerous plans
for redevelopment of the lakefront, most of which took the White City as
their inspiration.91 The most influential of these plans, not coincidentally,
were authored by Burnham himself.
FIGURE 6: “BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF THE LAGOON AREA AT THE WORLD’S
COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION 1893”92

The culmination of this planning process was the Plan of Chicago,
published by Burnham and his designated successor, Edward H. Bennett, in
1909.93 Burnham and Bennett’s Plan was a dazzling utopian vision,
featuring a greatly enlarged lakefront park as its focal point. The park
would be flanked by huge piers reaching out into the lake, with a large oval
harbor for yachts in the middle (see Figure 7). Marshall Field had promised
to fund a splendid natural history museum, which Burnham and others
envisioned would be the centerpiece of the park. A new Crerar Library,
also funded by a major bequest, would also be added to the park.94
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Cremin, supra note 26, at 206–07.
On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62403.
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DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO PREPARED UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF THE COMMERCIAL CLUB DURING THE YEARS MCMVI, MCMVII, AND MCMVIII
(Charles Moore ed., 1909). See generally CARL SMITH, THE PLAN OF CHICAGO: DANIEL BURNHAM
AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CITY (2006) (detailing the roles of Burnham and Bennett in the
development of the Plan).
94
For the various proposals for the Field Museum and Crerar Library, see GILFOYLE, supra note 7,
at 21–30.
92
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FIGURE 7: BURNHAM’S “PLAN OF CHICAGO” RENDERING LOOKING EAST TOWARDS PROPOSED
HARBOR AND PIERS (1909)95

With the Chicago elite solidly behind the Burnham Plan,96 the Chicago
City Council enacted ordinances in 1895 and 1896 designed to make the
plan a reality, and the Illinois legislature adopted legislation confirming
these measures.97 The ordinances called for a massive landfilling project,
covering the area from the Illinois Central tracks east to the harbor line
established by the U.S. Army. Reflecting anxiety about social unrest
associated with the Pullman Strike, which had been suppressed by federal
troops bivouacked in Lake Park,98 the ordinances provided that the newly
filled area north of Monroe Street would be transferred to the State for
purposes of constructing an armory and parade ground for the Illinois
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On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-39070.
See Letter from Daniel Burnham to John B. Sherman (Apr. 7, 1897), available at http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/410027.html (“Your friend Mr. Armour, and Mr. Pullman, and
everyone else, so far as I know, is enthusiastic for its immediate accomplishment, except Joe[]
Donnersberger, who is sour, and jealous and ridiculous.”).
97
See Chi., Ill., Ordinance Providing for a Settlement of the Lake Front Park Question (Oct. 21,
1895), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR COUNCIL
YEAR 1895, at 1138–45 (1895); Chi., Ill., Ordinance Turning over the Control of a Part of the Lake
Front to the South Park Commissioners (July 27, 1896), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR THE COUNCIL YEAR 1896, at 783–85 (1896). The ordinances
were accepted by the Illinois General Assembly. See 1897 Ill. Laws 32; see also Filling for the LakeFront Park, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1897, at 6; Ready for Rapid Work, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1895, at 8.
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See DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 20–37 (1999); see also ALMONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE: THE STORY OF
A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF A GREAT LABOR UPHEAVAL 203–38 (Phoenix Books 1964) (1942).
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National Guard.99 The southern portion of the park would be transferred to
the South Park Commissioners (SPC) for development into a formal park
and sites for museums, libraries, and other civic and cultural buildings.100
Finally, in 1899, the entire area was renamed “Grant Park” in honor of
President (and one-time Illinois resident) Ulysses S. Grant.101
Armed with this authority, the SPC quickly set about filling in the lake
east of the Illinois Central tracks. Between 1896 and 1906, the
commissioners engaged in steady landfill activity, starting with about six
acres per year in the first half of the decade and accelerating to double and
triple that rate in the second half.102 By 1906, more than 128 acres of new
land had been created.103 One can get a sense of this development from
Figure 8.
FIGURE 8: “MICHIGAN AVENUE. BIRD’S EYE VIEW NORTH FROM HARRISON STREET 1913,”
SHOWING LANDFILL AND THE ART INSTITUTE AS THE ONLY BUILDING IN GRANT PARK104

As to the contemplated division between military facilities to the north
and cultural activities in the south, the plans of the South Park
Commissioners and their lead architects, Burnham and Bennett, were
almost entirely frustrated by Montgomery Ward. The first Ward case,
decided in 1897, spared the Art Institute on the understanding that all

99

See infra Parts IV.C and IV.D. For a description of proposed armory construction, see Park in
the Lake, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1894, at 1.
100
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
101
1899 Ill. Laws 328.
102
Cremin, supra note 26, at 249.
103
Id.
104
On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-18353.
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landowners had consented to its construction.105 But Ward I sounded the
death knell for all other permanent structures in the original Lake Park,
including armories, railroad depots, and post offices. Ward II, handed
down in 1902, killed the plan to use the newly filled land east of the Illinois
Central tracks for a training facility for the National Guard.106 Ward III107
and IV,108 decided in 1909 and 1910 respectively, eliminated the possibility
of using the park as a site for either the Field Museum or the Crerar Library.
The cumulative effect of the four Ward decisions was to leave a huge
vacant space in the center of the much enlarged Grant Park. Under some
circumstances, this would have caused a complete rethinking of the
lakefront’s future. But the tremendous momentum built up behind the
Burnham Plan, with its animating vision grounded in what would come to
be called the “City Beautiful Movement,” could not be deflected.109
Implementation of the Burnham Plan moved ahead under the guiding hand
of Edward Bennett, but the multiple cultural institutions contemplated for
the center of the park were relegated to the periphery. A site for the Field
Museum was secured on 12th Street, just south of the area protected by the
Ward cases.110 A site for the Crerar Library was found on the west side of
Michigan Avenue, again just outside the protected area.111 Other museums
and cultural buildings—the Public Library, the Auditorium Building,
Orchestra Hall, the Shedd Aquarium, the Adler Planetarium—would all be
erected just outside the perimeter of the park, either on the west side of
Michigan Avenue or south of 12th Street. One of the piers contemplated by
the Burnham Plan was eventually constructed—the enormous 3000-foot
Navy Pier, north of the park area. One of the offshore islands contemplated
by the plan—the so-called Northerly Island—was created and eventually
became an airport and then a nature preserve.112 In a direct echo of the
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City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 421, 48 N.E. 927, 937 (1897) (“The only permanent
building, perhaps, that is excepted from the injunction is the Art Institute, and all the property owners
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Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 705 (1902).
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Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909).
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original plan, two yacht clubs were allowed to locate at the foot of the park,
with their boathouses perched on pilings in the lake.113
The otherwise vacant park was landscaped in accordance with the
neoclassical dictates favored by Bennett, a graduate of the École des Beaux
Arts. Like the gardens at Versailles, the park was divided into large
rectangles joined by long walkways. Eventually the rectangles were filled
in with trees, shrubs, neoclassical concrete balustrades, fountains, and
statuary. Other than the Art Institute, which exploited the original consents
given by the Michigan Avenue landowners by continually expanding to the
east, no buildings graced the park other than a few comfort stations and a
solitary band shell. In the summer, the park served as a gathering place for
collective celebrations, such as Fourth of July pageantry, an art fair, and
free concerts. But for most of the year, it stood relatively empty.114
Nature is said to abhor a vacuum. If the huge space that was Grant
Park could not be occupied with buildings, it could be filled with
automobiles. Over the course of the twentieth century, Grant Park was
crisscrossed by multilane roadways. Lake Shore Drive and Columbus
Drive ran through the park north and south; Monroe Street, Jackson Street,
Congress Parkway, and Balbo Avenue ran east and west through all or part
of the park. The landfill area east of the railroad tracks and north of
Monroe Street, which was slated in the 1896 ordinance to become a
National Guard armory and training ground, became a vast outdoor parking
lot.115 After World War II, the parking gradually moved underground;
eventually much of Grant Park would be perched on top of four huge
underground parking structures.116 Like much of the rest of America, Grant
Park was created by the railroad but came to be dominated by the
automobile.
The transformation of Grant Park from a railroad-centered to an
automobile-centered space received its legal imprimatur in the so-called
Lake Front Ordinance of 1919.117 This law reflected an agreement worked
113

See McCormick v. Chi. Yacht Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N.E. 418 (1928); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi.
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out among the City of Chicago, the Illinois Central Railroad, the SPC, and
the Secretary of War, who exercised control over the harbor. Most
significantly for present purposes, the railroad agreed to depress its tracks
nine to fourteen feet underground, to electrify its trains so as to eliminate
noise and air pollution, and to construct viaducts for auto traffic crossing
over its right-of-way.118 Two years later, the State and the U.S. Army
agreed to extend Grant Park 300 feet farther into the lake using new landfill,
in order to accommodate the construction of Lake Shore Drive.119 This in
turn required demolishing and rebuilding the yacht clubs beyond the
extended boundary of the park.120 As a result of these changes, the railroad
began receding from view in the park—and automobile traffic gradually
rose from a trickle to a torrent.
With the addition of Lake Shore Drive along its eastern edge and the
construction of the museums south of 12th Street, the boundaries of Grant
Park were finally fixed. For the balance of the twentieth century, the Ward
cases deterred any attempt to construct within the area of the park any
structure that could unambiguously be described as a building. The century
would witness many legal actions brought or threatened by Michigan
Avenue landowners. But these related primarily to issues defining the outer
limits of the dedication, such as continued expansion of the Art Institute,
reconstruction of the yacht clubs, and proposals to build a new band shell.121
This equilibrium was disrupted by the Millennium Park project at the
dawn of the twenty-first century. As originally conceived, the Millennium
Park project was consistent with the Ward precedents. The basic idea was
to cover over the area in the northwest corner of Grant Park where rail
passenger operations—now part of the Metra commuter rail system—
remained exposed; construct a new underground parking garage; and use
the revenues from the parking fees to fund surface landscaping and a new
band shell.122
As the Millennium Park project progressed, cost estimates for the
underground garage soared and augmenting donations were sought from
wealthy Chicago families.123 The families responded positively but wanted
their largesse associated with permanent monuments added to the park.
The Pritzker family agreed to fund a new band shell, provided that it was
designed by architect Frank Gehry.124 Renamed a “music pavilion,” the
and the Development of the Lake Front (July 21, 1919), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR THE COUNCIL YEAR 1919, at 969–89 (1919).
118
Id. at 971–79.
119
Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi. Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 467–68, 171 N.E. 550, 552 (1930).
120
Id.
121
See infra Parts V.A and V.B.
122
GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 147–74, 319–40.
123
Id. at 107–29.
124
Id. at 129.
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design for this structure became more and more elaborate until it could
scarcely be described as a mere band shell.125 The Harris family agreed to
pay for a new theater for music and dance.126 The theater would be
constructed underground, but required a two-story glass and steel entrance
above ground (see Figure 9).
FIGURE 9: HARRIS THEATER ENTRANCE IN MILLENNIUM PARK
ALONG RANDOLPH STREET (2010)

With these additions to the plan, the tension with the Ward cases could
no longer be ignored.127 Attorneys for the Millennium Park project obtained
consents for construction of these and other structures from property
owners who owned land on Michigan Avenue and Randolph Street abutting
the northwest corner of Grant Park. A Cook County Circuit Court judge
ruled that these consents, patterned after those secured in 1891 to build the
Art Institute, eliminated any constraint associated with the Ward
precedents.128
Whatever its aesthetic merits or demerits, Millennium Park succeeded,
for the first time, in drawing large crowds to a portion of the park on a

125

Id. at 194.
Id. at 135–46.
127
Id. at 141.
128
See Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000);
GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 141–43.
126
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consistent basis.129 The Art Institute quickly followed up with another
addition—its largest yet—linked to Millennium Park by a long pedestrian
bridge over Monroe Street.130 Recently the City proposed that a new
children’s museum be added to the park.131 Although this immediately
elicited objections from Michigan Avenue property owners,132 the
momentum has clearly shifted toward adding new physical structures to the
park, leaving the legacy of the Ward precedents in doubt.
II. THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC DEDICATION
Everyone relies on public spaces. We rely on the streets on which we
live remaining public thoroughfares, the alleys behind our homes remaining
accessible to service vehicles, and the parks down the block remaining open
and accessible places for recreation. Today, the primary protection of these
expectations is the political process. State and local statutes typically
require public notice and other procedural formalities before public spaces
can be closed or sold, giving affected individuals an opportunity to vocalize
their objections.133 In some instances, roadways and open spaces may be
protected by easements or by covenants running with the land. But these
sources of protection are exceptional insofar as government-owned spaces
such as roads and parks are involved. Moreover, easements and covenants
typically require formal writings, incorporated into deeds, before they can
be enforced against successors in interest.134
129

The park was expected to have a baseline attendance of 3 million visitors in 2005, with 3.3–3.65
million visitors in 2010 and 3.66–4.4 million visitors in 2015. GOODMAN WILLIAMS GROUP,
MILLENNIUM PARK ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 5 (2005), available at http://www.chicagoloopalliance.
com/db_images/includes/227Millennium Park Economic Impact Study 20050503.pdf. The park
exceeded expectations, with 4 million visitors in 2009 and 4.5 million visitors in 2011. Crain’s List
Chicago’s Largest Tourist Attractions (Sightseeing), CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 22, 2010, at 21; Crain’s
List Largest Tourist Attractions, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 28, 2011, at 24.
130
Art Institute Addition Set To Open in May, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2008, § 2 (Metro), at 3.
131
Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, Chicago Children’s Museum Moving to Grant Park (Sept.
27, 2006) (on file with authors).
132
A lawsuit was filed challenging the procedure by which the Chicago Plan Commission and the
City Council approved the museum in Grant Park. See Complaint for De Novo Judicial Review of and
to Void a Chicago Zoning Amendment, Figiel v. Chi. Plan Comm’n, No. 08-CH-32919 (Cook County,
Ill., Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008). After the court ruled in favor of the museum, Figiel appealed and lost.
Figiel v. Chi. Plan Comm’n, 408 Ill. App. 3d 223, 945 N.E.2d 71 (2011). This was an administrative
law challenge to the approval process. See id. at 229, 945 N.E.2d at 76. In the event that construction
begins, property owners will likely bring suit challenging the construction under the Ward precedents.
133
See, e.g., 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1/30–50 (2008) (requiring for the sale of public land valued at
more than $2500 a resolution of township trustees, an appraisal, and notice to the public); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 205/6 (2008) (providing that vacating plats, a procedure in which the legal effect of a plat
is nullified, requires consent of the city, village, or county and of any owners who have bought lots in
the plat).
134
JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 3:1–2
(2010); Charles E. Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants, 32 YALE
L.J. 123, 124 (1922).
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Protecting reliance interests in public spaces is a particularly difficult
problem where new communities or subdivisions are involved. In the
nineteenth century, entire towns and cities regularly sprang into existence
where no organized settlement had previously existed. The promoters of
these new communities would often display maps or plats indicating that
lots offered for sale would be made accessible by roads and streets, and
would be favored with nearby public squares or parks.135 Prospective
purchasers would rely on these representations in deciding whether to
purchase and how much to pay for particular lots.136
The actions of the Board of Commissioners of the Illinois and
Michigan Canal, in referring to maps indicating that land to the east of
Michigan Avenue would remain “forever Open, Clear & free of any
buildings,”137 and the actions of the agents of the federal government, in
recording a map stating that land east of Michigan Avenue would forever
“remain vacant of buildings,”138 were therefore representative of a much
larger problem. There were no Illinois precedents regarding the legal
consequences of such representations when Michigan Avenue lots were
first purchased after 1836 and 1839.139 There was, however, a growing
body of precedent from other jurisdictions—including several prominent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.140 A legally sophisticated purchaser
would have been encouraged by these precedents to assume that the
restrictions appearing on the maps of fractional sections 15 and 10 would be
legally enforceable by those who had purchased property on the west side
of Michigan Avenue.
The restrictions noted on these maps, perhaps because it was assumed
that they were legally enforceable, set in motion strong expectations about
what would come to be called Lake Park and later Grant Park. These
135

See Lewinnek, supra note 28, at 197–98.
See id.; see also HOLLAND, supra note 28, at 61–65.
137
See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text (including Figure 2).
138
See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (including Figure 3).
139
There was a plat statute that prescribed a procedure by which municipal authorities could take
title to dedicated roads and public spaces. See 1833 Ill. Laws 599. Compliance with this procedure
gave rise to what were later called “statutory dedications,” although the Illinois courts continued to
recognize “common law dedications” where the statute was not followed. See, e.g., Chi., Rock Island,
& Pac. R.R. v. City of Joliet, 79 Ill. 25 (1875); see generally 2 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 628, at 738–39 (4th ed. 1890). Substantively, there was no
difference between statutory and common law dedications in Illinois. City of Joliet, 79 Ill. at 32–33;
DILLON, supra, at 739 n.1. The only difference lay in the difficulty of proving the existence of a
dedication. Statutory dedication created a safe harbor in which only one piece of evidence was required:
compliance with the statute. Common law dedication often required difficult inquiries into the behavior
of individuals, officials, and the general public over time.
140
See City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832) (recognizing public
dedication of commons in Cincinnati); Barclay v. Howell’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 498 (1832)
(recognizing public dedication of street in Pittsburgh); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (recognizing public dedication of quay in New Orleans).
136
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expectations, in turn, were reflected in the Chicago real estate market.
Throughout most of Chicago’s history, lots abutting Michigan Avenue have
sold for a premium relative to lots on streets farther from the lake.141 Local
residents have been keenly aware of this, and have identified the direct
exposure to Lake Michigan enjoyed by owners on Michigan Avenue as the
reason for the price differential.142
A. A Unique American Hybrid
American courts in the nineteenth century developed a potent doctrine
for protecting expectations about public spaces, generally known as the law
of public dedication. The doctrine, at least as it applied to public spaces, is
“of ambiguous origin.”143 Scattered English precedents had recognized the
dedication of public roads.144 But there is no evidence that English courts
extended the idea of public dedication to public spaces such as parks or
squares. The first known American court to apply public dedication
reasoning to protect a public space, the Vermont Supreme Court,
analogized the issue to the dedication of land to pious uses, a doctrine with
roots in civil and canon law.145
Close on the heels of the Vermont decision came the most influential
precedent in establishing public dedication of public spaces, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1832 decision in Cincinnati v. White.146 John Cleves
141

See HOYT, supra note 24, at 128–95. Lots in this vicinity sold at prices up to ten times higher
than those sold a few blocks away. Id. at 187. Interestingly, testimony in the Ward cases indicates that
when Ward purchased his land in 1887, prices for land on Wabash Avenue, one block west of Michigan
Avenue, were higher. Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 294–95 (testimony of William C. Thorne).
This may have been because the dominant land use along Michigan Avenue after the 1871 fire changed
from residential to commercial uses such as liveries and saloons. Wabash was closer to the center of
commercial activity in the City, and hence may have been a more desirable location for such activities.
In time, land use along Michigan evolved again, toward hotels, private clubs, public buildings such as
the Auditorium Theater and Orchestra Hall, and high-end retail shops. With this further transformation,
the Avenue again enjoyed a price premium over blocks to the west. See generally HOYT, supra note 24,
at 178–90.
142
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 287–88 (testimony of William C. Thorne).
143
Abbott v. Cottage City, 10 N.E. 325, 328 (Mass. 1887); accord 11A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33:1, at 422 n.1 (3d ed. 2009).
144
Appleton v. City of New York, 114 N.E. 73, 77 (N.Y. 1916) (citing a 1713 English decision).
For other cases, see Wood v. Veal, (1822) 106 Eng. Rep. 1257; 5 B. & Ald. 454; Jarvis v. Dean, (1826)
130 Eng. Rep. 585; 3 Bing. 447.
145
Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521, 527 (1831). Under the doctrine of dedication to pious uses, land
donated to a church for church purposes would be held in the name of the minister for the use of the
church. In the event of a vacancy, the title would be held in abeyance. The minister could not transfer
title to the land without the consent of the members of the church. See, e.g., Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. (2
Tyng) 500 (1807).
The Louisiana Supreme Court anticipated the public dedication doctrine in an 1822 case in which
abutting owners were granted an injunction against construction on a public square, but the court did not
invoke public dedication reasoning. See Mayor of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11 Mart. (o.s.) 620 (1822).
146
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832).
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Symmes, who had a habit of selling the same property twice,147 conveyed
land to three individuals who proceeded to lay out a plan for the town of
Cincinnati. Their plan showed a tract along the Ohio River, set apart as a
common “for the use and benefit of the town forever.”148 Symmes later
conveyed the same riverfront tract by another deed, which passed after
several conveyances to one White, who sued to gain possession of the
tract.149 The Court held that the original restriction was a valid public
dedication, notwithstanding its failure to satisfy the elements of a
conventional grant.150 The subsequent conveyance of the same tract in fee
to another could not defeat the purpose of this dedication, which was “for
the public use, and the convenience and accommodation of the inhabitants
of Cincinnati.”151
The Court in White acknowledged the difficulties presented by the fact
that no grantee had taken title to the land under the original plan, and there
was no written conveyance that would satisfy the statute of frauds.152
Following the lead of the Vermont Supreme Court, however, it relied on
donation-to-pious-uses cases,153 as well as English highway cases,154 to
show that other courts had recognized exceptions to overcome these
difficulties. The Court concluded that “[i]f this is the doctrine of the law
applicable to highways, it must apply with equal force, and in all its parts,
to all dedications of land to public uses.”155
After White, the use of public dedication theory to protect public
spaces spread rapidly.156 Initially, some older states on the eastern seaboard
resisted the new doctrine.157 But even these states came to accept public
dedication of public spaces.158 The resulting doctrine was a unique

147

See Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837) (a famous adverse possession case
involving land sold twice by Symmes, also in Cincinnati).
148
White, 31 U.S. at 431.
149
Id. at 433.
150
Id. at 442–44.
151
Id. at 438.
152
See id. at 438–39.
153
Id. at 436–37 (citing Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829); Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815)).
154
Id. at 439 (citing Jarvis v. Dean, (1826) 130 Eng. Rep. 585; 3 Bing. 447).
155
Id. at 437–38.
156
Relying on White, Louisiana adopted the doctrine in 1833, see De Armas v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 5 La. 132, 148 (1833), and Ohio the year after that, see Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio 298, 303
(1834).
157
Massachusetts and New York initially rejected the idea. See Hinckley v. Hastings, 19 Mass. (2
Pick.) 162 (1824); Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 111 (N.Y. 1838).
158
See Abbott v. Cottage City, 10 N.E. 325, 328 (Mass. 1887); Cady v. Conger, 19 N.Y. 256
(1859).
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American hybrid159—one that provided powerful protection for public
spaces.160
Viewed from the perspective of property law doctrines familiar today,
the nineteenth-century public dedication doctrine seems highly peculiar.161
On the one hand, the doctrine appears to recognize something functionally
similar to a negative easement: a prohibition against modifying public
spaces that runs with ownership of the abutting land. Ordinarily, negative
easements can be created only by a written grant, typically in the form of a
deed.162 Restrictions such as those contained in the maps of the Canal
Commissioners and the United States would not qualify as negative
easements, because they did not appear in deeds issued to purchasers of
land.
On the other hand, the public dedication doctrine seems to embody an
anomalous conception of public rights. We tend today to think of parks and
other public spaces as being owned by governmental bodies. Public
property means government property.
The government, as owner,
presumptively has all the rights and privileges associated with fee simple
title as to how these properties will be managed, developed, and alienated.163

159

One nineteenth-century treatise remarks that the doctrine is “comparatively modern” and
suggests that it came to be generally accepted only in the 1830s. EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON
THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 184–85 (3d ed. 1873). Although American
courts naturally identified certain English highway-dedication precedents as antecedents, see id. at 184,
the leading English treatise on easements contains no mention of the doctrine. See CHARLES JAMES
GALE & W.J. BYRNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS (10th ed. 1925).
160
A survey of the cases in 1877, many of them from Illinois, observed that “[t]he dedication of
land is becoming a very important question in the jurisprudence of this country.” Dedication of Lands—
Estoppel in Pais, 3 MONTHLY W. JURIST 641, 641 (1877).
161
The public dedication doctrine was recognized as peculiar even at the peak of its power. See
DILLON, supra note 139, § 653a, at 774 (noting with approval how under the doctrine of public
dedication “the ordinary rules of law relating to private rights have been modified and limited by the
public convenience and necessities”).
162
English common law recognized only four types of negative easements—that is, rights of one
landowner to require another landowner to desist or refrain from some use of his property. See, e.g.,
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959); United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Va. 2005). The right to keep adjacent land free
of development was not among these rights. American courts have recognized a wider variety of
negative easements, but only if they are created by written grant. Fontainebleau, 114 So. 2d at 359;
4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.01[3], 34.02[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2010). Because of these and other limits on negative easements, conservation easements—private
negative servitudes running with the land that preclude development—have required special legislation
authorizing their creation. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1039 (2007); see also Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 470–79
(1984).
163
There are, of course, various restrictions on the government’s discretion with respect to the
disposition of parks and similar public property, including the public trust doctrine. But for any member
of the public to bring a legal action challenging the government’s disposition of its property, it is

1447

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The public dedication doctrine, in contrast, suggests that certain public
properties come with restrictions running in favor of particular private
parties. This notion of private rights in public land seems alien in a world
in which land is classified as being either public or private, with exclusion
rights and control over uses being assigned to either public or private
managers, respectively.
The most basic explanation for why American courts were able to
devise such a curious hybrid doctrine is that public dedication cases were
brought as actions for injunctive relief, and the courts hearing these actions
regarded themselves as exercising the flexibility traditionally associated
with courts of equity.164 Equity was understood in the nineteenth century to
protect only rights of property.165 A public dedication did not create an
easement or any other conventional property right; consequently, equity
could not enforce a public dedication directly.166 Nevertheless, equity
would intervene to protect conventional property rights, such as lots and
buildings, from indirect harms such as nuisances. Using similar reasoning,
courts of equity concluded that they could intervene at the behest of owners
of lots and buildings abutting a public dedication to protect these owners
from the effects of a failure to comply with the terms of the dedication.167 A
public dedication was a commitment made with respect to public property
that had an effect on abutting private property—an effect strong enough to
warrant intervention by courts of equity at the behest of the private owner.
Substantively, the unique hybrid doctrine that emerged can be seen as
sharing some features of the law of contracts, some of equitable estoppel,
some of easements by prescription, and some of the law of trusts.

necessary to satisfy standing requirements and then identify some legal constraint that the government
has allegedly violated.
164
See generally 1 JAMES L. HIGH & SHIRLEY T. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS
60 (4th ed. 1905) (describing the broad flexibility of judges to grant injunctions under English equity
law).
165
See Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237, 247 (1875) (“The [chancery] court is conversant only with
questions of property and the maintenance of civil rights. Injury to property, whether actual or
prospective, is the foundation on which the jurisdiction rests.”); HIGH & HIGH, supra note 164, § 20b, at
34–35; Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 640 (1916). See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND.
L. REV. 295 (2001) (explaining the origins of the rule against prior restraints in terms of the
understanding that equity would intervene only to protect property rights).
166
The nineteenth-century cases did not refer to public dedications as “easements.” Much later,
courts would sometimes use the word “easement” to describe public dedications, suggesting that they
were a property right belonging to abutting property owners. See, e.g., Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of
Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 558 (1931). This suggests that the original rationale for the public dedication
doctrine was no longer familiar to courts in the twentieth century.
167
See People ex rel. Bransom v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232, 249 (1880) (recognizing that dedications affect
the private parties’ interests in their own property).
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As in the law of contracts, the creation of a public dedication proceeds
on an offer-and-acceptance model. An owner of property “offers” to
dedicate some portion of his property, through words or deeds, to the
public. The offer is then “accepted,” either officially by the duly appointed
representatives of the public (such as the town council) or by longstanding
actions of the public in conformance to the dedication.168 Courts repeatedly
said that neither the offer nor the acceptance had to be in writing, but each
could be inferred from the course of conduct of either the grantor or the
public.169 Of course, having the offer or the acceptance in writing made it
much easier to establish a dedication.
As in the law of equitable estoppel, courts placed heavy emphasis on
the reliance interests of those who acted or changed their position in
response to a public dedication.170 Most prominent here were the reliance
interests of those who purchased land—typically at higher prices—on the
understanding that adjacent land would remain subject to public use.
Evidence of purchase at higher prices was routinely asserted in establishing
the standing of abutting owners to sue in equity to enforce public
dedications.171 Such evidence was also offered in actions brought by public
authorities, perhaps to establish the requisite interference with property
rights necessary to invoke the intervention of courts of equity.172
As in the law of easements by prescription, courts enforcing public
dedications emphasized longstanding use by the public to establish an
implied offer to dedicate, an implied acceptance by the public, or reliance.173
Like an easement by prescription, a dedication, once established, was
regarded as irrevocable by the grantor.174

168

See DILLON, supra note 139, §§ 636, 642, at 751–52, 759–61. A dedication formally accepted
following established procedures was called a statutory dedication; a dedication accepted instead by the
actions of the public and public authorities was called a common law dedication. Id.
169
See, e.g., Marcy v. Taylor, 19 Ill. 634 (1858) (public acceptance of dedication may be shown by
actions of public over a period of time); City of Alton v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38 (1850) (public
dedication established by reciprocal deeds); Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850) (dedication of
public landing on Mississippi River established by oral testimony).
170
The Supreme Court in City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White noted the close connection between
public dedication and estoppel. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 438 (1832). This in turn was repeated by courts
and commentators. See, e.g., LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 335 (1898).
Nevertheless, there are important differences between dedication and estoppel. Dedication rests on an
express or implied intention on the part of the grantor and runs to the public as well as to particular
individuals. Estoppel does not turn on the intention of the grantor and runs only to individuals.
171
For examples of cases where evidence of purchase at higher prices was adduced, see Village of
Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325 (1875); Bill of Complaint, supra note 72, at 10–11.
172
See City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 67 Ill. 540, 542 (1873).
173
See DILLON, supra note 139, §§ 631, 632, 637, at 743, 744–46, 753–54.
174
See City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. at 544. In this case, the town had been laid out to include a
public square that was used as a park. The court held that the city was entitled to sue in equity on behalf
of abutting owners and others to enjoin a state statute authorizing the construction of a railroad in the
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Finally, as in the law of trusts, courts spoke frequently of governmental
bodies, once they had accepted a dedication, as having assumed a trust
obligation to preserve public spaces.175 This obligation was owed especially
to abutting property owners, who received special benefits from the
dedication. But it was also routinely said to extend to the public more
generally.176
B. Questions Posed by Map Restrictions
Although there were no Illinois cases on public dedications in 1836 or
1839 (the dates of the maps preceding the first sales of Michigan Avenue
land), the Illinois Supreme Court embraced the doctrine in 1850.177 Soon
Illinois courts were enforcing the doctrine with vigor, applying it to a
variety of plat and map restrictions involving streets, landings, highways,
and parks.178 Thus, the central elements of the public dedication theory,
including the understanding that plat restrictions are rights enforceable in
equity by abutting landowners, were fully recognized in Illinois law well
before Ward filed his first lawsuit in 1890.179
Nevertheless, the particular dedication reflected in the notations on
various maps of fractional sections 10 and 15 raised a number of
unanswered questions. Would the restriction on buildings be subject to
modification by future legislation? Or would it be regarded as a vested
right impervious to legislative revision? If the restriction were to be
regarded as a vested right, could it nevertheless be condemned in an action
in eminent domain, and eliminated by paying just compensation to those
who had relied upon it?
Another set of questions: Would traditional equitable doctrines such as
the need to show irreparable harm stand as potential barriers to the issuance
of an injunction enforcing the dedication? Would defenses such as laches,
waiver, abandonment, or adverse possession be available if enforcement
were sought after buildings were constructed?
square. Id. at 545. In effect, the interest of abutting owners in preserving the square as a park was
regarded as a vested right, and as such was immune from legislative abrogation. Id.
175
See, e.g., id. at 544; Bd. of Trs. of the Ill. & Mich. Canal v. Haven, 11 Ill. 554 (1850).
176
See JOHN LEYBOURN GODDARD & EDMUND H. BENNETT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EASEMENTS 181–82 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1880); JONES, supra note 170, at 332–67.
177
Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850); see also Canal Trustees, 11 Ill. at 555–57 (relying on
doctrine in determining the scope of private riparian rights in order to assess an award of damages for a
stream diversion).
178
See, e.g., City of Alton v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38 (1850); Marcy v. Taylor, 19 Ill. 634 (1858);
Waugh v. Leech, 28 Ill. 488 (1862).
179
See, e.g., Maywood Co. v. Vill. of Maywood, 118 Ill. 61, 69, 71, 73, 6 N.E. 866, 869, 870–71
(1886) (enjoining actions that would result in the transfer of a dedicated public park to private parties);
Vill. of Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325 (1875) (barring the village from moving the village hall onto the
public square); City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. at 545 (barring construction of railroad in dedicated public
square).
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A third set of questions: Who, in addition to the public body that
accepted the dedication (here the City, it was eventually held) and abutting
owners, could enforce it? In particular, could the original grantors of the
dedication—the Canal Commissioners and the United States—also enforce
the dedication, like the settlor of a trust?
If abutting landowners could enforce the dedication, then a series of
further questions would arise about who should be included in this class.
Would this apply only to owners in fee simple of land abutting Michigan
Avenue? What about purchasers on Randolph Street, to the north of the
restricted area, or on Park Row, to the south? What about purchasers of
land one block west, on Wabash Avenue, who could not claim a view of the
lake but would benefit from lake breezes? Would tenants living in
buildings on Michigan Avenue be allowed to enforce the dedication?
Landlords holding only a reversion? Once condominiums were created,
would each condo owner be entitled to enforce the dedication, or only the
association as a whole, perhaps by majority vote?
If the restrictions were legally enforceable by individual landowners,
then could the landowners agree to waive the restrictions, assuming of
course that any other parties empowered to enforce (such as the City as
trustee) also agreed to the waiver? How would such a waiver or consent be
made? Would it be binding on successors in interest? Would one or more
consents give rise to an estoppel barring a decision not to waive the
restrictions in the future?180
Still other questions related to the physical lay of the land. To begin:
Did the statements on the maps have a different force with respect to
property north of Madison Street as opposed to property south of Madison
Street? To the north, the promise appeared on a map that was publicly
recorded, and thus could be said to appear in the chain of title of all
subsequent Michigan Avenue owners as well as whoever was determined to
own Lake Park.181 To the south, the promise appeared on at least one
unrecorded commercial map and was made in oral representations to
purchasers.182 Arguably these more informal representations could not be
invoked by successors in interest.
To continue: Did the restrictions apply only to the narrow strip of land
shown on the original maps and plats, or would they also attach to
enlargements of Lake Park (and later Grant Park) created by landfills? If
the restrictions extended to artificial enlargements of the park, would this
include only areas formally regarded as part of the park, or any contiguous
landfilled area? What about structures erected on offshore islands?
180

An analogy might be made to the rule in Dumpor’s Case, which holds that once a landlord
consents to assignment of a lease by a tenant, further assignments are presumed to have the landlord’s
consent. (1578) 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.); 4 Co. Rep. 119 b.
181
See supra Part I.A.
182
See supra Part I.A.
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Structures built north and south of the original boundary of the park?
Underground structures?
A final set of questions related to the reference to “buildings” in the
dedications: Did the dedications only prohibit buildings in a particular
space? Or did the reference to “public ground” found on both the United
States map of fractional section 10 and the commercial map of fractional
section 15, together with the ordinances of the 1840s in which the City
accepted the dedication and denominated the area a “park,” give rise to an
inference that the space was dedicated as a park? Did this in turn mean that
the only uses permitted in this space were ones consistent with park
purposes? And, ultimately, a seemingly prosaic question: What is a
building? Does a building refer only to an enclosed structure, and thus
exclude things such as fences, bridges, and baseball stadiums?183 Does a
structure have to reach a certain size to be considered a building, thereby
excluding small structures such as restrooms or storm shelters? Does a
building refer only to a permanent structure, thereby excluding temporary
enclosures such as tents?
One overarching issue presented by several of these questions is
whether the restriction should be interpreted according to its ordinary or
plain meaning, or instead in such a way as to effectuate its purpose. If
purposive interpretation is appropriate, then it is necessary to identify the
relevant purpose. Was the purpose of the restriction to preserve an open
view and direct breezes from Lake Michigan? Or was it to preserve the
market value of the Michigan Avenue property purchased in reliance on the
restrictions? Was it to preserve the area as a public park? By way of
illustration, consider a proposal to erect a baseball stadium in the space,
consisting of a low fence and an open seating area. This might not qualify
as a “building” under the ordinary meaning of the term. It also might not
impair the view of the lake or the flow of air and light from the lake toward
the properties on Michigan Avenue. But the crowds and noise that the
stadium would attract might well impair the market value of the property of
Michigan Avenue owners. And if it was a commercial enterprise, the
baseball stadium might be deemed incompatible with the idea of a public
park.
It would take many years, and many legal decisions, to answer the
questions posed by the 1836 and 1839 restrictions. Some remain
unresolved to this day.
III. PUBLIC DEDICATION ON THE LAKEFRONT BEFORE WARD
Someone familiar only with the Ward cases might assume that they
were the first invocation of the public dedication theory on the Chicago
lakefront. This would be mistaken. The public dedication theory was in
183
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fact advanced with some regularity by Michigan Avenue property owners
well before Ward came on the scene. To be sure, none of the pre-Ward
cases generated an appellate opinion.184 But on the whole, these efforts
were successful—enough so that one can say the public dedication theory
was recognized not only in general jurisprudence but also as part of the
local law of the Chicago lakefront.
The first known effort to enlist the aid of the courts in prohibiting the
construction of a building in Lake Park occurred in 1864. The occasion
was the Democratic National Convention scheduled to be held in Chicago
that summer.185 The convention obtained the City’s permission to construct
a “wigwam”—a circular wooden amphitheater with a canvas roof—at the
southern end of the park at 11th and Michigan.186 Michigan Avenue
property owners objected to the plan, arguing in state court that it violated
the promise to keep Lake Park free of buildings.187 Their petition in equity
stated that all of the land east of Michigan Avenue between Randolph Street
on the north and Park Row on the south “is, and of right ought to be, kept
open and vacant land.”188 Tracking the language of the 1861 and 1863 city
charters, the petition claimed that no person or corporation was permitted to
encroach on the land absent the assent of all abutting property owners.189
Judge Wilson immediately granted the requested injunction.190
The suit was perceived as being politically motivated, and a public
outcry ensued.191 On June 2, 1864, the parties filed a detailed stipulation to
remove the injunction and permit the construction of the wigwam to go
forward, subject to a number of conditions, including a promise that the
building would be torn down within six days of the end of the convention.192

184

Before 1887, a party could not appeal an interlocutory order granting or denying an injunction.
See Gage v. Eich, 56 Ill. 297, 298 (1870) (“It is a well settled rule in equity practice, as well as in
proceedings at common law, that no appeal lies from any interlocutory order merely, in either court.
There must be a final decree, order or judgment, to justify an appeal.”); SABIN D. PUTERBAUGH,
PUTERBAUGH’S CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 811 (6th ed. 1916). Thus, a party would have to
incur the time and expense of litigating an action for injunction to a final judgment before taking an
appeal. Since abutting property owners were generally successful in seeking temporary injunctions,
they had no opportunity to appeal. Why the defendants in these actions did not appeal is not clear, but
arguably they did not have a sufficiently strong stake in the matter to warrant the expense of an appeal
until the fundamental question of title to Lake Park was resolved. In 1887, Illinois passed a law
providing for appeals from interlocutory orders granting or enlarging the scope of injunctions, but not
orders denying or dissolving them. 1887 Ill. Laws 250.
185
See Cremin, supra note 26, at 59–62.
186
Id. at 59–60.
187
The Copperhead Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1864, at 4; Cremin, supra note 26, at 60.
188
The Copperhead Amphitheater, supra note 187.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
See Democratic Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1864, at 4.
192
Copperhead Amphitheater, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1864, at 4.
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Construction promptly resumed,193 and the convention proceeded to
nominate General George McClellan as the party’s candidate in the general
election. Consistently with the stipulation, the structure was removed in
September 1864 after the convention.194
FIGURE 10: WIGWAM IN LAKE PARK (AUG. 29, 1864)195

The wigwam dispute, as the first legal action seeking to enforce the
1836 and 1839 map restrictions, was an important local precedent.
Abutting landowners were granted an injunction enforcing the restriction
against buildings, evidently on the understanding that this was necessary to
protect their property rights. Public skepticism about the motives of the
abutting owners was also a harbinger of the future. The settlement of the
dispute—allowing the temporary erection of what was clearly a building—
even more clearly established a pattern for the future.
A more consequential judicial precedent arose from the aftermath of
the 1869 legislation known as the “Lake Front Steal.”196 Recall that one of
the elements of that act was a provision requiring the City to transfer title of
north Lake Park to the Illinois Central Railroad for the construction of a
new passenger depot.197 This provision was widely opposed in Chicago,

193
194
195
196
197
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primarily on the ground that the $800,000 to be paid by the railroad for the
land was inadequate.198
Given that the objective of the grant was the erection of a building, it is
not surprising that the first legal challenge to the Act was an action to
enjoin construction as violating the restriction on buildings on the map of
fractional section 10.199 The identity of the complainant and the forum
were, however, something of a surprise: the action was brought on behalf of
the United States Government in federal circuit court by the local United
States Attorney, J.O. Glover.200
A preliminary injunction was quickly granted, with U.S. Circuit Judge
Thomas Drummond issuing a published opinion justifying his action.201
Judge Drummond had no trouble concluding that the restriction against
buildings was a binding commitment that could not be abrogated by “a
simple stroke of legislation.”202 Such a “special dedication” of property, he
wrote, could only be extinguished through a proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain.203 The Lake Front Act was not a valid exercise in eminent
domain because the compensation was fixed by the legislature, not by a
court, and was set at what was alleged to be an inadequate level.204
Moreover, the matter could not be vindicated by actions at law by affected
owners because construction of the depot would cause irreparable injury to
multiple persons.
The more difficult question, according to Judge Drummond, was
whether the United States had authority to enforce the restriction on
buildings. He concluded that the United States did have such authority,
largely because the land marked “public ground” on the plat of fractional
section 10 had never been sold, and hence, he assumed, was still owned by
the United States.205 The United States was thus in the position of an owner
who has restricted part of his land in order to encourage the sale of the
remainder. In these circumstances, the federal government held the retained
land as a “trustee” on behalf of those who had purchased, and had the right
to invoke the power of a court of equity to enforce the restriction.206 In any
198

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 800–11.
See United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 26 F. Cas. 461, 461 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1869).
200
Id.
201
Drummond had been appointed a federal district judge in 1850 and then, after the Judiciary Act
of 1869 created new circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction to review district court decisions, was
appointed the first circuit judge in the region. Kevin Collins, Drummond, Thomas, in 1 GREAT
AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 212, 212–20 (John R. Vile ed., 2003). Drummond later
rendered a second important decision involving public dedication on the lakefront. See infra note 219
and accompanying text. He retired in 1884. Collins, supra, at 219.
202
Ill. Cent. R.R., 26 F. Cas. at 463.
203
Id. at 462.
204
Id. at 464.
205
Id. at 462–63.
206
Id. at 464.
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event, Judge Drummond concluded that a private-property owner abutting
the park would have the right to seek an injunction. He observed that there
was such an owner who also had sued and thus the order in which the suits
were considered was immaterial.207 The injunction was not appealed by the
Illinois Central,208 and had the effect of freezing plans to construct a new
depot on the north Lake Park site (for all time, as things turned out).209
Shortly after the Drummond injunction was issued, much of Chicago,
including Michigan Avenue properties, was consumed by the great fire.210
As previously described, this event fundamentally transformed the
lakefront.211 In the wake of the fire, a number of temporary buildings
sprang up in Lake Park, most dramatically the enormous Inter-state
Exposition Building constructed in 1873. The trauma of the fire also
suppressed litigation over the construction of structures in the park.
Gradually, the Exposition Building was joined by armories, baseball
stadiums, depots operated by other railroad companies, various work sheds
and loading docks, and a temporary post office.212
Chicago was back on its feet again by the 1880s; the economy was
booming, and Michigan Avenue property owners began to rediscover their
distaste for encumbrances in the park. Litigation over the restriction against
buildings erupted again in 1882. The principal properties that were
involved in lawsuits during the ensuing years are shown in Figure 11. The
catalyst for the first action was a decision by the City to permit the
Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad to construct a passenger depot in the
park.213
207

That suit was filed by Ralph E. Starkweather. Starkweather v. Ill. Cent. R.R., No. 8976
(C.C.N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1869), discussed in Chicago Public Library Archives: Property Records
Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 208; see Transcript of Record, supra
note 4, at 281. Two suits were also filed in state court seeking to enjoin construction of the depot. One
was filed by Cyrus McCormick, the reaper manufacturer, and was later dismissed. McCormick v. Ill.
Cent. R.R., No. 31566 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. June 22, 1869), discussed in Chicago Public Library
Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 209. Three
years later, a fourth suit was filed by Mathew Laflin, also in state court; it, too, was dismissed. Laflin v.
City of Chicago, No. 3066 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. June 29, 1872), discussed in Chicago Public
Library Archives: Property Records Dearborn Park Property 1935–1898 Box 1, supra note 86, at 210.
208
According to newspaper accounts written later, the case proceeded to a full trial in July 1871,
with Drummond granting a permanent injunction. See The Lake-Front: John F. Stafford Wants It
Denuded of Buildings, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1882, at 8; A Bill Filed To Keep the “Nickel-Plate” off the
Lake-Front, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1882, at 3. The permanent-injunction opinion and other papers were
evidently destroyed in the Chicago Fire three months later; in any event, we were unable to find them.
209
It is not known why the Illinois Central did not appeal. One possible reason is that the railroad
sought to get the Illinois legislature to abrogate the dedication. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at
898. Any appeal at that time would have been to the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S. REV. STAT. §§ 563,
629 (1878).
210
See KOGAN & CROMIE, supra note 38.
211
See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.
212
See Cremin, supra note 26, at 90–128.
213
See Bill of Complaint, supra note 72.
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FIGURE 11: CERTAIN MICHIGAN AVENUE AND LAKE PARK PROPERTIES CIRCA 1882
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The B&O had a thriving business in Chicago, transporting to the
Midwest immigrants who had arrived from Germany and other European
countries on the company’s ships.214 The B&O used the Illinois Central
tracks but had not been able to arrange with the Illinois Central for depot
space, presumably because of the Illinois Central’s own challenges in that
regard.215 Instead, it had been using a space in the Inter-state Exposition
Building.216 It seemed only logical to allow it to build a freestanding depot
just north of the Exposition Building.
Once construction of the new depot was underway, however, it was
challenged in federal court by two Michigan Avenue property owners, John
Stafford and Thomas Hoyne, joined by the State of Illinois.217 The essential
allegations included the standard elements of the public dedication theory.
Not surprisingly, given the extensive construction activity in the park since
the fire, the B&O’s answer emphasized themes of waiver or abandonment.
The railroad averred that the City had permitted various buildings to be
constructed in the previous decade, that its proposed building could scarcely
be seen from Michigan Avenue because of the other construction, and that
the character of the west side of Michigan Avenue had changed
permanently after (and because of) the fire.218
The matter, like the 1869 litigation over the transfer of north Lake Park
to the Illinois Central, was assigned to Judge Drummond. This time,
however, the estimable judge refused to issue the requested injunction.219
He noted that the State and the United States had originally intended the
area to remain free of buildings, and he agreed that the Exposition Building,
the armories, and the railroad structures were all built in violation of the
trust in which the land was held. Nevertheless, with each new building, the
State and the adjoining landowners gradually lost their right to enforce the
dedication. In essence, because the plaintiffs had not objected to any of
these buildings, they were estopped from now challenging the B&O
terminal.220
The following year, 1883, was a banner year for litigation concerning
the Chicago lakefront. In an effort to resolve the vexing question of title to
Lake Park, the Attorney General of Illinois filed suit in Cook County

214

2 EDWARD HUNGERFORD, THE STORY OF THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD 1827–1927, at
180–98 (1928).
215
See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text.
216
See Cremin, supra note 26, at 101.
217
Stafford owned half of a lot on Michigan Avenue on the block between Madison and Monroe.
Thomas Hoyne owned a lot on Michigan Avenue well south of the proposed depot. See Bill of
Complaint, supra note 72, at 9; supra Figure 11.
218
Answer at 8–16, Illinois v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. (C.C.N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1882).
219
The Lake-Front: Judge Drummond Decides a Point in Favor of the Railroads, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
8, 1882, at 12.
220
See id.
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Circuit Court against the Illinois Central, the City of Chicago, and the
United States, asserting ownership in the State.221 After removing the case
to federal court, the Illinois Central answered and filed cross-claims against
the other parties, asserting alternatively that either the City or the railroad
owned the park.222 The United States filed its own complaint against the
Illinois Central and affiliated railroads, as well as the City, asserting
ownership in the United States.223 These actions were consolidated together
before Justice John Marshall Harlan, sitting as circuit justice.224
That same year, Stafford filed suit in state court, mounting essentially
the same challenge to buildings in Lake Park that he had unsuccessfully
pursued in federal court the year before.225 Stafford brought the action on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated property owners—essentially as
a class action.226 It named as defendants not only the railroads, but also all
other entities involved in building in the park, including the City.227
The forty-one-page complaint recounted at length the origins of Lake
Park, which were said to establish a dedication to public uses free of
buildings.228 It complained that the City, in violation of this public
dedication, had permitted the construction of the Inter-state Exposition
Building, a building occupied by Battery D of the First Artillery Illinois
National Guard, the armory of the First Regiment of Cavalry of the Illinois
National Guard, and the B&O depot.229 It also complained—for what
would appear to be the event that precipitated the litigation—that the City
had recently authorized a structure to be erected by the Trades Assembly
and Knights of Labor, which was projected to be two stories tall and of
sufficient dimensions to “contain one main hall and gallery and two ticket
offices and a place for the sale of spirituous liquors, and all the other
accessories of a play house or public hall and saloon.”230 Anticipating the
likely defense, Stafford’s complaint averred that the abutting property
owners had never consented to any encroachments on the lands so
The relief sought was an injunction against further
dedicated.231
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Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 732 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
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Id.
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Bill of Complaint, Stafford v. City of Chicago, No. 83C44290 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Mar.
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Id. at 1.
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construction in the park and a cessation of essentially all development
there.232
On May 9, 1883, Judge Moran granted a temporary injunction against
further construction.233 According to a report of the decision in Chicago
Legal News, the judge found the question whether the map restrictions
could be enforced in equity “had been entirely settled by the [Illinois]
Pending a final decree, the buildings already
Supreme Court.”234
constructed could stay.235 “But there must be no further encroachments.”236
Judge Moran’s injunction had the effect of freezing further
construction in Lake Park. The portion of the park on the east side of
Michigan Avenue, at least from the Exposition Building north to Randolph
Street, was by then littered with a ragtag collection of structures, nearly all
of which had been erected on a “temporary” basis. These could stay for the
time being. But no further construction would be permitted.
The next move was launched by the United States Attorney and
directed specifically at Albert Spalding’s baseball stadium (Figure 12).237
On May 27, 1884, the United States sued the City and the Chicago Base
Ball Club, Inc., complaining of the baseball grounds east of Michigan
Avenue.238 The United States again alleged that it retained title to the land
in fractional section 10.239 While Chicago was in possession of this land (as
“mere custodian”), the federal government had dedicated the property and
held it in trust for neighboring property owners and Chicago residents.240
The complaint alleged that the City had violated this trust by permitting
Spalding to construct “a board fence at least ten feet in height, in such
manner as to completely shut out said ground from public view or access,
and . . . buildings for offices and also a building for a Grand stand,” with “a
roof and . . . seats.”241 The complaint noted that the public was excluded
from the stadium unless it paid admission.242
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Id. at 36–39. At oral argument on the temporary injunction, Judge Moran remarked that the
“only doubt” that he had about the case was whether Stafford and the others had standing or whether the
State needed to be involved. The Lake-Front Case Taken Under Advisement by Judge Moran, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 25, 1883, at 6.
233
See The Lake Front: A Temporary Injunction Granted Restraining the Erection of Any More
Buildings on the Lake Park, 15 CHI. L. NEWS 290 (1883).
234
Id. In particular, the judge regarded City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Railway Co., 67 Ill. 540
(1873), as “directly in point.” Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 6.
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FIGURE 12: UNION BASE-BALL GROUNDS 1883243

The government stated that “this bill is filed at the request and partly
on the behalf of” neighboring owners and other Chicago residents.244
Indeed, though signed by U.S. Attorney Richard S. Tuthill,245 the complaint
was verified by none other than John F. Stafford.246
Despite Spalding’s entreaties that the requested injunction could force
the team to disband because it had no other suitable venue available, the
government prevailed.247 On July 17, 1884, federal Circuit Court Judge
Henry Blodgett ordered that the City “absolutely desist and refrain from
leasing the whole or any part of the public ground” or from “constructing
on or occupying the whole or any part of [it].”248 After the season was over,
the ballclub was to cease playing on the grounds and remove its

243

The Chicago Base-Ball Grounds, HARPER’S WKLY., May 12, 1883, at 292.
Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 9.
245
Later, after his appointment to the Cook County Circuit Court bench, Tuthill heard the initial
Daggett–Art Institute case and dissented from the full panel decision against Daggett. See infra notes
323–29 and accompanying text.
246
Bill of Complaint, supra note 70, at 13. For Stafford’s other involvement in lakefront litigation,
see supra notes 217–20, 225–36 and accompanying text.
247
The Lake-Front: No More Trespassers Allowed To Occupy the Ground, CHI. TRIB., July 18,
1884, at 8.
248
Id.
244
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structures.249 For the first time, a court ordered the actual demolition of a
standing structure.250
The Base Ball Club litigation is also interesting because it reveals that
there was considerable confusion, at least on the part of some influential
actors, about the exact nature of the public dedication. At one point,
Marshall Field and others felt compelled to go to Judge Blodgett for a
modification of the injunction to permit the lakefront to be used as a place
where snow removed from the front of businesses could be dumped.251
Field and his compatriots evidently understood the dedication to be not just
a negative restriction on buildings, but also an affirmative mandate to use
the lakefront for park purposes. If the dedication was only a negative
restriction on buildings, no serious argument could be made that it would
bar dumping snow. But if the dedication was to use the space as a park,
then dumping snow would be arguably improper.
In any event, the doubts expressed by Judge Drummond in 1869 about
whether the United States had standing to enforce the public dedication
were soon powerfully reinforced. In 1888, Justice Harlan, sitting as circuit
justice, issued a comprehensive opinion resolving all the title issues raised
by Illinois’s 1883 lawsuit.252 The State was given title to the submerged
lands, the City was given title to Lake Park, and the railroad was allowed to
keep all of its existing tracks, facilities, piers, and wharves, largely as an
incident to its riparian rights north of Randolph Street and south of 12th
Street.253
With respect to the matter most relevant to the public dedication issue,
however, Justice Harlan held that the United States did not have standing to
object to the construction of buildings in Lake Park.254 Justice Harlan
concluded that the public recording of the plat of the Fort Dearborn
Addition in 1839 constituted an offer to make a statutory dedication of the
open space marked on the plat, and this had been accepted by the City of
Chicago when the City adopted its ordinances declaring the space a public
park.255 The statutory dedication transferred the title of the open space to
the City. In effect, the United States had given away any remaining interest
in the property and thus did not have standing to enforce the plat
249

Id.
So-called “mandatory injunctions”—those requiring positive action on the part of the
defendant—were rarely granted in federal court. See 3 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY
PRACTICE § 2289 (1909) (“A mandatory injunction is never granted unless very serious damage will
ensue from withholding relief . . . .”).
251
See Motion to the Honorable Henry W. Blodgett at 1, United States v. Chi. Base Ball Club, No.
19026 (C.C.N.D. Ill. May 27, 1884) (undated motion signed by Marshall Field and others, requesting
that George Wells be allowed to dump snow on the lakefront).
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dedication.256 This ruling would be affirmed by the Supreme Court a
number of years later.257
The practical effect of Justice Harlan’s decision, in terms of Lake Park,
was that Michigan Avenue landowners could no longer count on
accommodating U.S. Attorneys serving as their enforcement agents. One or
more property owners themselves would have to step forward to assume
this role. But Justice Harlan did not question the right of abutting
landowners to enforce the dedication. Judge Moran’s injunction against the
construction of any new buildings, issued on behalf of John Stafford and
other landowners, still stood. And there was evidence that the property
owners would continue to assert their rights.
Meanwhile, a new plaintiff appeared on the scene: Warren F. Leland,
owner of the Leland Hotel, located on the west side of Michigan Avenue
between Jackson and Van Buren streets. In late 1886, Leland filed suit in
Cook County Circuit Court against the City and one John M. Martin,
seeking an injunction against a toboggan slide that the City had permitted
Martin to erect in Lake Park south of the Exposition Building.258 Martin
said that the toboggan slide was intended to raise funds to support an
impoverished widow, Mrs. Carpenter.259 He further claimed to have
obtained the consent of property owners on Michigan Avenue.260 But
Leland refused to consent; he alleged that the toboggan slide would damage
his hotel business. Judge Louis Collins issued a temporary injunction in
late December and a permanent injunction early the next year.261
In 1889, Leland was back in state court again, this time challenging a
proposal to modernize the Exposition Building by adding a powerhouse.
Again, a temporary injunction was promptly issued.262 The City disclaimed
any interest in building a power plant on the lakefront, but nevertheless
stated that it wanted to continue the lawsuit so that it could obtain a
definitive declaration of the rights of the City in the park.263 It appears,
however, that Leland made no effort to pursue a permanent injunction.
At this point, it is worth pausing to ask this question: What would a
well-informed attorney have concluded in 1890, on the eve of the first Ward
suit, about the status of the public dedication theory as applied to Lake
256

Id.
United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225 (1894).
258
Bill of Complaint at 1, Leland v. City of Chicago, No. 86-G-59228 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct.
Dec. 29, 1886); A Toboggan Slide, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1886, at 12.
259
A Toboggan Slide, supra note 258.
260
Id.
261
Items, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1887, at 6.
262
A Novel Suit, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Aug. 4, 1889, at 9.
263
The Lake Front Trouble, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Nov. 1, 1889, at 3. Presumably this
interest was stimulated by Justice Harlan’s circuit court ruling in the first Illinois Central case that the
City held the title to the land on the lakefront.
257
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Park? There could be no doubt that under Illinois law the restrictions
against buildings reflected in the 1836 maps of fractional section 15 and the
1839 map of fractional section 10 were legally enforceable. There could
also be no doubt that owners of land abutting Michigan Avenue had
standing to sue in equity to enforce the restrictions. On the other hand,
there was uncertainty as to whether the dedication merely barred the
construction of buildings, or whether it affirmatively mandated that the
lakefront be used as a park. There was also some risk that abutting
landowners would be denied relief on the ground that the restrictions had
been abandoned or waived because of the flurry of construction activity in
the park after the great fire in 1871. And it was increasingly likely that the
United States would be denied standing to enforce the restrictions, and
hence the U.S. Attorneys could no longer act on behalf of the property
owners in federal court. On the whole, however, the prospect for success
through litigation by Michigan Avenue owners was quite good—especially
if they could find a champion willing to shoulder the cost.
IV. THE WATCHDOG OF THE LAKEFRONT
We now turn to an individual who was to have a profound impact on
the future of the Chicago lakefront.
Aaron Montgomery Ward’s
contribution did not take the form of a publicly articulated vision for the
future of the park, as in the case of Daniel Burnham. Nor did it take the
form of any legal innovation. The elements of the public dedication theory
that Ward’s lawyers would advance were all in place, and had been
repeatedly asserted in the context of the Chicago lakefront before Ward
came on the scene. Ward’s contribution was to fund litigation on behalf of
Michigan Avenue property owners at a level and with a degree of
persistence that had not been previously seen and has not been witnessed
since. Ward’s deep pockets and his persistence—some would say
stubbornness—transformed the local understanding of the public dedication
doctrine into four Illinois Supreme Court decisions, the cumulative impact
of which would serve for over a century to constrain local officials from
constructing new buildings in Grant Park.
A. Aaron Montgomery Ward
Montgomery Ward has always been something of a mystery, especially
with respect to his motives for waging a twenty-year campaign to keep
Grant Park free of buildings. He has no full-length biography.264 He
264

The only published biography is NINA BROWN BAKER, BIG CATALOGUE: THE LIFE OF AARON
MONTGOMERY WARD (1956), a children’s book containing imaginary dialogue and no bibliography.
The major reported events in the book, however, are consistent with company biographical sketches and
other sources.
A document titled “Copy of a Memorandum Found among the Private Papers of Mr. A.
Montgomery—in his own handwriting” briefly recounts the history of Ward’s life. This document is
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disliked publicity and rarely spoke to the press.265 He consistently refused
permission to be written up in sketches of Chicago leaders.266 He reportedly
gave generously to philanthropic causes during his lifetime, but nearly
always anonymously.267 Allison Dunham, a longtime property professor at
the University of Chicago Law School, once wrote: “Those who really want
to know Mr. Ward’s motives will have to await psychoanalysis of his letters
and papers.”268 Unfortunately, if Ward left any papers and letters, they long
ago disappeared.269
The bare outline of what is known about Ward suggests that he was the
quintessential self-made man.270 Ward was born on February 17, 1844, in
Chatham, New Jersey.271 Raised in poverty in Niles, Michigan, he left
school at the age of fourteen to work as a manual laborer to help support his
family.272 Later, he became a shop clerk in St. Joseph, Michigan.273

available at the Chicago History Museum and the American Heritage Center at the University of
Wyoming. It seems to be the foundation for most of the biographical sketches of Ward and is often
cited as “Ward’s diary.” See, e.g., Daniel J. Boorstin, A. Montgomery Ward’s Mail-Order Business,
2 CHI. HIST. 142, 145 (1973).
265
Robert J. Thorne, Former Executives Tell of the “Old Days,” FORWARD, Nov. 1925, at 4. Ward
“had a strong aversion to being interviewed by the press, or having any court papers served upon him.”
Id. His second-floor office was difficult to access, being reached only by a winding iron staircase. Id.
“When he was in the very public first floor offices, he usually left his hat on, making it seem to a
stranger that he was a visitor.” Id.
266
Allison Dunham, The Chicago Lake Front and A. Montgomery Ward, 1 LAND-USE CONTROLS
11, 19 (1967).
267
Ward’s wife, Elizabeth, and daughter, Marjorie, made substantial charitable donations after his
death, many of which bear the Ward name. Based on a donation of $8 million, the principal classroom
building at Northwestern University’s medical school is still named after Mr. and Mrs. Ward. History:
1900–1949 Timeline, NW. U., http://www.northwestern.edu/about/history/1900-1949.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2011).
268
Dunham, supra note 266, at 20.
269
Such is the conclusion of both our own research and that of David Blanke. See DAVID BLANKE,
SOWING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW CONSUMER CULTURE TOOK ROOT IN THE RURAL MIDWEST 273
n.10 (2000).
270
We rely primarily on two company-sponsored histories for biographical details: MONTGOMERY
WARD & CO., THE HISTORY AND PROGRESS OF MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY (1925) [hereinafter
HISTORY & PROGRESS] and FRANK B. LATHAM, 1872–1972, A CENTURY OF SERVING CONSUMERS: THE
STORY OF MONTGOMERY WARD (1972).
271
HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 5.
272
Id. at 6.
273
Id.
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FIGURE 13: PORTRAIT OF AARON MONTGOMERY WARD274

After the Civil War ended in 1866, Ward moved to Chicago, the new
center of the Midwest, where he worked as a clerk at Field, Palmer &
Leiter, which later became Marshall Field & Co.275 Ward then became a
traveling salesman for a St. Louis wholesale house, which served as a
supplier to rural general stores.276 During his travels throughout the rural
Midwest, he observed the often-shoddy goods sold at high prices to farm
families in small-town stores.277 He later switched jobs again, becoming a
buyer for C. W. & E. Pardridge Co., a Chicago dry-goods company.278
274
275
276
277
278
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Armed with close familiarity with rural tastes and values and a
background in both sales and purchasing, Ward conceived a revolutionary
scheme to buy goods in bulk and sell them directly to farmers through the
U.S. mails.279 In early 1871, Ward had saved enough money to buy a small
amount of goods, but before he could advertise to customers, his inventory
was completely destroyed by the Chicago Fire.280 He was determined to
start over, and in August 1872 he had again saved enough money to build a
small inventory.281 His first catalog was a single page.282 The first year was
a slow one, exacerbated by the Panic of 1873, and Ward kept his day job at
Pardridge’s while he filled orders at night from items that he bought from
surplus Pardridge’s stock.283
The missing ingredient was credibility with rural customers, who
needed to be convinced that they would not be cheated if they sent cash to a
firm in Chicago.284 Ward solved the problem by forging an alliance with the
populist Granger movement, securing the right to use Granger membership
lists and to call his operation the “Original Grange Supply House.”285 He
also conceived the radical idea of offering a money-back guarantee on all
goods sold, no questions asked.286
The result was phenomenal.
By cutting out the middlemen,
emphasizing value, and working tirelessly to determine what his customers
wanted, Ward’s company quickly became the largest retailer in America.287
Ward’s concept was copied by Sears, Roebuck & Co., which would
eventually overcome Ward’s after fierce competition.288 But it is no
exaggeration to say that Montgomery Ward was to the late nineteenth
century what Sam Walton and Walmart were to the late twentieth. Starting
with a focus on rural and small-town America, Ward, like Walton,
revolutionized merchandizing.289 Also like Walton, Ward encountered
279

Boorstin, supra note 264, at 144–45.
LATHAM, supra note 270, at 5–6.
281
Id. at 6.
282
CECIL C. HOGE, SR., THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS ARE THE TOUGHEST: WHAT WE CAN LEARN
FROM THE CENTURY OF COMPETITION BETWEEN SEARS AND WARDS 12 (1988).
283
LATHAM, supra note 270, at 8–9.
284
In November 1873, the Chicago Tribune advised its readers not to trust a company calling itself
Montgomery Ward & Co., which the paper characterized as a “swindling” operation run by “deadbeats.” Grangers, Beware!, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1873, at 3. Ward immediately called for a retraction,
and the newspaper sent a reporter to investigate Ward’s operations. The reporter was so impressed that
the newspaper printed a full retraction, including a glowing review of the company. Montgomery, Ward
& Co., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 1873, at 5. Ward reprinted the entire article in his 1874 catalog. LATHAM,
supra note 270, at 9–10.
285
HOGE, supra note 282, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286
LATHAM, supra note 270, at 12.
287
HOGE, supra note 282, at 23.
288
Id. at 36–40.
289
See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 121–29 (1973); see
also Boorstin, supra note 264, at 142–52.
280
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fierce resistance from local retailers, some of whom organized collective
burnings of Ward’s catalogs to protest his enterprise.290
Ward’s first Granger catalog was mailed in 1872. Within a few years,
he and his partner, George Thorne,291 were scrambling to acquire everbigger office and warehouse space in Chicago, first on Clark Street, then
Michigan Avenue, then Kinzie Street, and then Wabash Avenue.292 In
1887, Ward and Thorne purchased two adjacent lots on the west side of
Michigan Avenue, between Madison and Washington streets, for
$235,000.293 Two years later, they acquired the lot to the south for
$72,000.294 By 1890, they had constructed a seven-story “skyscraper,”
celebrated for its six steam elevators (see Figure 14).
Ward and Thorne later stated that they selected the site on Michigan
Avenue in order to assure that their employees enjoyed sunlight, fresh air,
and a relatively quiet location in which to work.295 This claim is plausible.
Ward was by all accounts highly solicitous of his employees’ well-being: he
offered group health insurance to employees well before it was typical to do
so, enabled female workers to dry their shoes and stockings on rainy days,
and offered free malted milks midmorning and midafternoon in the belief
that this would fortify at-risk employees against tuberculosis.296 The
lakefront site was not chosen to appeal to customers, since the catalog
facility was not, at least initially, open to the public. Later, during the
Columbian Exposition, Ward added a plush “Customers’ Parlor” on the first
floor, where visitors could browse through catalogs and place orders, or
simply rest their feet.297 But when the Michigan Avenue facility was

290

BOOTON HERNDON, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: AN UNCONVENTIONAL REPORT TO TODAY’S
CONSUMERS 168 (1972). Some local groups offered a small reward for customers who threw their
catalogs in the fire. Many of these customers would earn the reward and simply send off for another
catalog. Id.
291
George Thorne was not very involved in the lakefront fight. At the time of the disputes, Ward
was the owner of the Michigan Avenue properties. See Letter from George P. Merrick to John G.
Carlisle, Sec’y of Treasury (June 20, 1895) (on file with the National Archives at College Park,
Maryland). In addition, Thorne may not have been as active as Ward in the lakefront fight because he
may have had a different view of how the Chicago lakefront should look. It is possible that he shared
the views of his son, Charles Thorne, who was a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago and was
involved with the development of the Burnham Plan.
292
HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 11, 14, 17.
293
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George R.
Thorne); LATHAM, supra note 270, at 29.
294
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George R.
Thorne); LATHAM, supra note 270, at 30.
295
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 312–15 (statement of A. Montgomery Ward and George
R. Thorne). Ward also cited the lack of soot and dust from nearby chimneys and a lower fire-insurance
rate as additional advantages of the lakefront location. Id. at 315.
296
See HERNDON, supra note 290, at 169.
297
WILLE, supra note 4, at 73.
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established, Ward, Thorne, and their employees were the only people who
would be affected by the light, air, and views that the lake afforded.
FIGURE 14: CATALOG COVER SHOWING THE ACTIVITY IN WARD’S WAREHOUSE AT THE
CORNER OF MADISON STREET (LEFT-HAND SIDE) AND MICHIGAN AVENUE CIRCA 1900298

298

On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-HB-29482.
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B. The Local Litigation Phase—1890–1895
When Ward and Thorne purchased their property on Michigan Avenue
in 1887, other landowners, including John Stafford, Warren Leland, and
Sarah Daggett, were already active in threatening and sometimes actually
suing for injunctions to stave off construction in the park.299 Once Ward
and Thorne completed their new building in 1890, they quickly joined
forces with this group. Ward was not immediately regarded as the leader.
He gradually assumed this role, as Stafford leased his property for ninetynine years beginning in 1888,300 Warren Leland sold his hotel and withdrew
from his suit in 1892,301 and Daggett died in 1895.302
During the first years of Ward and Thorne’s ownership on Michigan
Avenue, their legal activity remained focused on the local courts, which had
been issuing injunctions enforcing the dedication off and on since 1864.
The first recorded salvo from Ward & Co. came on October 16, 1890.303
The partners filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Cook County to
enjoin the City of Chicago from erecting any buildings in Lake Park.304 The
Illinois Central and other railroads were made parties to the suit.305 The
genesis of the suit—according to later accounts—occurred when Ward
looked out the window from his new office and saw workers building
scaffolding to load garbage into railroad cars.306 He summoned his lawyer,
George P. Merrick, and demanded that something be done to clean up the
mess.307
299

See supra Part III.
Indenture Between John Francis Stafford and Andrew Jackson Cooper (Dec. 1, 1887) (on file
with Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office, Doc. No. 1244031, recorded in book 2848 page 322).
301
Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79, 82 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892); Warren
F. Leland Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1899, at 7.
302
See Will of Sarah E. Daggett, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1895, at 15.
303
City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 393, 48 N.E. 927, 927 (1897).
304
Id.
305
Id., 48 N.E. at 928.
306
LATHAM, supra note 270, at 51; WILLE, supra note 4, at 71. We have uncovered no
contemporary evidence to support this account of the suit’s origins. The first version of the story that
we found appears in Gene Morgan, How Grant Park Was Saved for People; Ward’s Great Fight Waged
21 Years, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 8, 1935, at 5.
307
Ward was represented throughout the litigation by two lawyers, Elbridge Hanecy and George
Merrick. Hanecy grew up in Wisconsin and moved to Chicago in 1869 after graduating from the
College of Milwaukee. His first job in Chicago was at Field, Leiter & Co., where he missed Ward by
about two years. After being admitted to the Illinois bar in 1874, Hanecy practiced solo for several
years until he took on Merrick, who became his partner in 1889. Hanecy was elected circuit judge for
Cook County in 1893, where he remained until 1904. A.N. WATERMAN, 2 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHY 660–62 (1908); George Peck Merrick, in 2
HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ILLINOIS 547, 547 (Newton Bateman & Paul Selby eds., 1906). Hanecy
served as Ward’s lawyer until he took the bench, and he resumed his representation of Ward when he
returned to the bar. Despite his previous service to Ward, Hanecy, while serving as a judge, presided
over a case related to the lakefront. See infra note 568 and accompanying text.
300
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The complaint offered a relatively straightforward rendition of the
public dedication theory, aside from some hedging about which government
entity had title to Lake Park—a matter still pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court.308 Among other derelictions, the complaint emphasized, the
City had allowed several railroads to build “cheap frame structure[s]” in the
park, had “constructed or caused to be built certain scaffolding” upon which
“filth, refuse, garbage, and rubbish from many streets and alleys of the City
of Chicago has been placed,” and had “caused to be built a large one story
structure . . . partially rotted or decayed” for storing paving blocks.309
The next day, the clerk of court issued a writ of injunction prohibiting
any of the defendants “from erecting or causing to be erected . . . any
structure [in the park].”310 In essence, this merely replicated the injunction
issued by Judge Moran, which was still in effect.311 The action thereafter
lay dormant for several years.
Meanwhile, planning for the Columbian Exposition was underway.
The sponsors ultimately decided that one building, the World’s Congress
Auxiliary, would be located in Lake Park, in a new structure that would
replace the decrepit Inter-state Exposition Building.312 After the fair, the
new building would become a permanent memorial to the Exposition and a
home for the Art Institute.313 The directors of the Art Institute were well
aware of the risk of litigation from Michigan Avenue owners.
Consequently, Caryl Young, a Michigan Avenue property owner
sympathetic to the project, sought to obtain consents to construction of the
new structure from property owners abutting the park.314 Consents were
sought from those who owned property immediately across from the
proposed structure and those owning lots immediately north and south of
this area. Ward and Thorne’s property was one block north of this consent
zone, so their consents were not sought.315 Even within the two-block
Unlike Hanecy, Merrick was educated by private tutors and attended college at Northwestern
University. ALBUM OF GENEALOGY AND BIOGRAPHY: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 598–99 (3d ed. 1895).
He served as a trustee for Northwestern for several years, and he had many prominent clients, including
the Santa Fe Railroad. Despite his many achievements, Merrick’s work on the lakefront litigation was
cited at his death as his greatest accomplishment. George Merrick Dies; A Veteran Chicago Lawyer,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1938, at 18.
308
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 5 (Bill of Complaint).
309
Id. at 8–11.
310
Id. at 18.
311
See City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 392, 400, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897); Transcript of
Record, supra note 4, at 17–19.
312
See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
313
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
314
Affidavit of Caryl Young at 1, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County,
Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794).
315
Later authors have claimed, erroneously, that Ward and Thorne gave their consent to the Art
Institute. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 266, at 15. There is no documentary evidence supporting this
claim, and it is inconsistent with the list of consenting owners in the Daggett case file.
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stretch of land in which consents were sought, one owner, Sarah Daggett,
held out.316 While she was visiting family members in New York, Young
approached her husband, Isaac Daggett, seeking his consent. Although
Isaac had no ownership interest in the property and declined to sign the
consent form, Young evidently came to believe that the Daggetts did not
oppose the Art Institute construction, and reported this back to the
directors.317
Armed with what it apparently regarded as a complete set of owner
consents, the Art Institute entered into construction contracts on February 4,
1892.318 On February 6, Sarah Daggett wrote to one of the directors stating
that she in fact did not consent to the construction of a new building.319
Although that director informed his fellow directors of this communication,
construction went ahead. Shortly thereafter, on April 3, the City was served
with an order to show cause why it should not be held in contempt under
the 1889 injunction obtained by Warren Leland.320 Leland had withdrawn
as a plaintiff in that suit in 1892,321 but had been replaced by none other than
Sarah Daggett.322
316

Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79; see also Gives Its Reasons, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1892, at 13.
John Stafford also opposed the Art Institute, but he had entered into a ninety-nine-year lease of his
property, which raised (legitimate) doubts about his standing to object or consent. Alone in the Fight,
CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1892, at 16.
317
The panel of circuit court judges reviewing the case determined that this consent was sufficient.
Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 86. The first Ward decision also later posited that this consent was likely
sufficient. City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 420, 48 N.E. 927, 936 (1897). Newspaper accounts of
the episode offer somewhat conflicting depictions of what happened. Compare Four Judges Hearing It,
EVENING NEWS (Chi.), June 20, 1892, at 2, and Courts of Record, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), May 21,
1892, at 13, with She Ignored Her Spouse, CHI. DAILY NEWS, June 2, 1892, at 1. In the circuit court
litigation, Caryl Young submitted an affidavit stating that he had visited Isaac Daggett, believing him to
be the owner of the Michigan Avenue property, and that Isaac Daggett told him to return after he had
received more consents. Later, while Daggett was in New York, Young sent him several newspaper
clippings regarding the Art Institute. At no time, according to Young, did Daggett manifest any
opposition to the Art Institute. Affidavit of Caryl Young, supra note 314, at 1–3. Isaac Daggett
responded with an opposing affidavit stating that he had told Young that Sarah Daggett was the owner
of the property, whereupon Young said he would return after receiving more signatures. Daggett, “not
wishing to be considered rude or unfriendly . . . replied . . . that [Young] might call.” Affidavit of Isaac
M. Daggett (May 2, 1892) at 2, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill.,
Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794). Daggett insisted, however, that he never did anything to suggest that
either he or his wife supported the Art Institute; to the contrary, he had always opposed any building on
the lakefront. Id. at 1–4.
318
Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 86.
319
Id. Isaac Daggett sent a letter to Art Institute Director William M.R. French on February 1,
1892, stating that he and Sarah did not consent to the Institute. A copy of Director French’s reply of
February 6, 1892, is found in the case record. Affidavit of Isaac M. Daggett (June 20, 1892), Daggett v.
City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No. 89C74794).
320
Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87; Gives Its Reasons, supra note 316, at 13.
321
Leland had sold his hotel on Michigan Avenue and purchased another on the South Side.
Warren F. Leland Dead, supra note 301.
322
Gives Its Reasons, supra note 316.
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Ruling on the motion, Judge Tuthill found that the 1889 Leland
injunction applied to the Art Institute building, and construction activity
was brought to a halt.323 In an unusual move designed to resolve the matter
expeditiously, because the opening of the fair was rapidly approaching, the
matter was then reheard three weeks later by a full panel of circuit court
judges, which reversed Tuthill’s ruling.324
The panel of circuit judges reaffirmed that the plat restrictions created
an enforceable public dedication, and that Daggett, as an abutting owner,
had standing to enforce the restrictions in equity.325 It gave three reasons
why injunctive relief was nevertheless improper. First, the panel held that
Daggett was guilty of laches for failing to assert her claim for injunctive
relief before the Art Institute had expended considerable money ($100,000
Given the dubious
was mentioned) on construction activity.326
circumstances surrounding Daggett’s alleged consent, and her prompt
clarification that she had not given such consent just two days after the
construction contracts were signed, this was a flimsy argument. Second,
the state legislature had adopted legislation in 1890 authorizing the World’s
Fair to construct buildings in the park, and this legislation provided for
condemning any rights of abutting property owners for a period of up to
five years if necessary.327 Although no action to condemn the rights of
abutting owners had been commenced, the court reasoned that this
legislation in effect converted their interest into a right to obtain money
compensation in exchange for their interest, and hence eliminated their right
to specific relief in equity.328 Finally, the panel expressed skepticism about
323

See Against the Art Institute, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1892, at 3.
For an Institute, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1892, at 13; Oppose Mrs. Daggett, CHI. TRIB., June 21,
1892, at 13. Three of the four judges had previous involvement in lakefront litigation. Judge Tuley had
previously worked as corporation counsel for the City of Chicago. Judge Horton had been an attorney in
the 1869 lakefront case that Judge Drummond heard, apparently working for Ralph Starkweather. Judge
Tuthill, as U.S. Attorney, had filed the suit against the Chicago Base Ball Club. See Oppose Mrs.
Daggett, supra, at 13; supra note 245.
325
Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87. Judge Tuthill dissented from the denial of the injunction.
326
Id. at 87, 92.
327
1890 Ill. Laws 5–6. Section 2 of the Act in Relation to the World’s Columbian Exposition
provided that all exposition buildings would be removed within a year after the fair, but that the City
could purchase the buildings from the fair. It further provided:
If any owners of any lands or lots abutting or fronting on any such public grounds, or park
grounds, or adjacent thereto, shall have any private right, easement, interest or property in such
public or park grounds, appurtenant to their lands or lots, or otherwise, or any right to have such
public or park grounds remain open or vacant and free from encroachments, [the State or the
county can file an action] praying that the compensation [be determined] for such right, interest,
easement or property, or for any interference with or damage thereto . . . .
Id.
328
In the terminology introduced by Calabresi and Melamed, the panel reasoned that the statute
transformed protection for the owners’ entitlement from a “property rule” to a “liability rule.” See
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972).
324
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whether Daggett would suffer any loss in the market value of her property
by having the Art Institute constructed across the street, and it alluded to the
traditional equity rule that an injunction will not issue in the absence of
irreparable injury.329
The panel did not overturn the existing Leland injunction; it simply
held that the injunction was modified to the extent necessary to permit
construction of the Art Institute. With this ruling, Daggett’s holdout ended.
In order to appeal, she would have had to post a large bond,330 and this
undoubtedly dissuaded her from taking further action. The building was
still under construction when the World’s Congress Auxiliary took
possession in late spring 1893.331
The Art Institute was the only substantial permanent building to be
constructed in the park, and would remain so until the Millennium Park
project more than a century in the future. Although Ward was not asked to
give his consent to construction of the Art Institute, it is doubtful that he
harbored any reservations about the project. His legal activity in 1892 and
for some years afterwards was focused on nuisance-like conduct—unsightly
loading platforms, shabby work sheds, and armory buildings used for
dogfights.332 Moreover, Ward served as a Governing Member of the Art
Institute from 1888 to 1913, and as the museum commented after his death,
“[d]uring all his years as the ‘watch-dog of the Lake Front’ he was always
friendly to the Art Institute and considerate of its interests.”333
Although Ward was a passive bystander in the Art Institute fight, he
found himself back in court in several disputes arising under the temporary
injunction that he had obtained in 1890, which remained in force. In May
1891, the City petitioned the court to modify the injunction to allow it to
issue a license to the Adam Forepaugh Circus to erect a tent in Lake Park.334
329

Daggett, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. at 87–88. The City and the Art Institute had obtained affidavits from
several consenting owners stating that the building would increase the value of their property.
Affidavits of Orrington Lunt, Charles A. Winship & William F. Price, O. M. Powers, W. C. Ritchie,
Leroy Payne, Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892) (No.
89C74794).
330
Bonds were a general prerequisite to the grant of an injunction under Illinois law: “[B]efore an
injunction shall issue, the complainant shall give bond in such penalty, and upon such condition and
with such security as may be required by the court, judge or master granting or ordering the injunction.”
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 69, § 9 (1877). Courts had authority to dispense with the bonding requirement for
good cause. Id. Having been denied an injunction by the panel of circuit judges, Daggett almost surely
would have been required to post a large bond to obtain an injunction pending appeal. Cf. Marks v.
Columbia Yacht Club, 219 Ill. 417, 420, 76 N.E. 582, 583 (1905) (upholding a significant award of
damages against a Michigan Avenue property owner pursuant to a bond posted to secure an injunction
on public dedication grounds).
331
Cremin, supra note 26, at 184.
332
To Be a Fine Park, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1893, at 6.
333
Notes: Montgomery Ward, 7 BULL. ART INST. CHI. 47, 47 (1914). Montgomery Ward is also
listed as a Benefactor on the Art Institute’s donor wall.
334
See Small Boys Are Happy, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1891, at 9.
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Ward opposed modification, arguing that a circus tent was no less a
building than a permanent structure.335 Judge Hawes said that the park had
been neglected by the City for twenty years, and he asked the parties to
submit authorities on whether abutting property owners had standing to
prevent temporary use of a “mud hole.”336 He eventually modified the
injunction to allow the circus to go forward with the tent.337
In February 1892, the City sought permission to modify the injunction
to allow another wigwam to be built, this time for the Democratic National
Convention to be held during the coming summer.338 Ward initially
objected along with other property owners,339 but he eventually consented,
having been assured that the wigwam would be torn down immediately
after the convention.340 Ward later regretted the decision, saying that “it
took five years of litigation to undo the precedent thus established.”341
In the winter of 1893, in a sign of Ward’s emerging leadership, the
Michigan Avenue property owners met at the Montgomery Ward & Co.
offices.342 The owners collectively agreed to fund a project to beautify the
park at their own expense, committing $10,000 to the effort.343 The City
evidently rejected the offer.
Three months later, in April 1893, the City of Chicago petitioned for a
modification of the injunction to permit the Adam Forepaugh Circus to hold
another circus in the park.344 In response, Ward and Thorne amended their
original (1890) complaint, naming the proprietors of the Forepaugh Circus
as defendants. The amended complaint reiterated the derelictions of the
City in permitting sheds to be erected and garbage to be dumped in the
park. But a good portion of the document was spent listing the reasons why
the circus should not be allowed to operate in the park.345 On May 24, the
court entered an order enjoining all defendants from “erecting any

335

Id.
Id.
337
City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 394, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897); Transcript of Record,
supra note 4, at 484–88 (petition of Adam Forepaugh Shows); Small Boys Are Happy, supra note 334.
338
Ward, 169 Ill. at 420, 48 N.E. at 936.
339
Against the Democratic Wigwam, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1892, at 3.
340
Ward, 169 Ill. at 420, 48 N.E. at 936. Hanecy demanded for Ward that the Democratic National
Convention put up a $15,000 guarantee that it would demolish the building when the convention was
over. Must Put Up a $15,000 Guarantee, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1892, at 6. Whether the Convention
complied with this demand is unclear.
341
A. Montgomery Ward, Letter to the Editor, Mr. Ward Explains, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1900, at 4.
In the winter of 1893, the City successfully petitioned the court to allow it to dump snow in the park.
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 32–33 (order granting petition).
342
To Be a Fine Park, supra note 332.
343
Id.
344
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 33–34 (order granting petition).
345
See id. at 39–54 (amended complaint).
336
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buildings, sheds, plateforms [sic], tents, or other structures upon [Lake
Park].”346
Ward’s attitude toward use of the lakefront nevertheless remained
selective. In 1895, the City adopted a resolution allowing a temporary post
office to be built in Lake Park until a permanent one could be built
elsewhere.347 The City’s corporation counsel wrote a legal opinion
concluding that the City could not erect such a building without first
obtaining permission from Ward and the other abutting property owners.348
After some equivocating, Ward gave his oral consent, which the federal
authorities regarded as sufficient.349 Once the building was completed,
however, he again drew the line. Postal carrier Leslie C. Whitaker had
received permission to build a bicycle track next to the temporary post
office building. Ward promptly obtained an injunction to stop this
enterprise.350 When the post office decided to expand the temporary
building, Merrick was back in court again.351 He secured an injunction in
state court, but when the case was removed to federal court, the injunction
was dissolved. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the “original plan” called
for a larger post office than had been originally constructed, and thus
Ward’s consent should be construed to include the newly enlarged
structure.352
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Phase—Ward I
For over thirty years, from 1864 to 1896, litigation over the
construction of buildings in Lake Park was confined to courts in Chicago—
the federal circuit court and the Cook County Circuit Court. Then, rather
abruptly, the action shifted to the Illinois Supreme Court. The explanation
for this is simple: the stakes were suddenly higher. In decisions rendered in
1892 and 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty over who
had title to Lake Park: the State of Illinois had title, and had delegated

346

Id. at 57–59.
Id. at 354–55 (reflecting resolution).
348
Can’t Allow Its Use, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1895, at 8.
349
According to correspondence with federal authorities, Thorne signed an affidavit indicating that
Ward had given his oral consent. Letter from George P. Merrick to John G. Carlisle, supra note 291.
Merrick then wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster of Chicago denying that
Ward had given his consent. Id. Two days later, however, Merrick followed up with another letter,
withdrawing his repudiation of Thorne’s affidavit and allowing the construction of the temporary post
office building to move forward. Letter from George P. Merrick to John G. Carlisle, Sec’y of Treasury
(June 22, 1895) (on file with the National Archives at College Park, Maryland). Whether this episode
reflected an internal disagreement between Ward and Thorne, or Ward and Merrick, or simply
miscommunication, is unclear.
350
Court Bars Bike Track, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1897, at 1.
351
Ward v. Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598, 598–99 (7th Cir. 1900).
352
Id. at 600–01.
347
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authority over the use of the park to the City of Chicago.353 This resolution
of the title question, combined with the burst of civic energy associated
with the Columbian Exposition, unleashed a flurry of plans to fill the park
with permanent monumental structures. The City and its allies had to
obtain a definitive resolution of the public dedication issue in order to
proceed with these plans. The Michigan Avenue landowners had much less
incentive to seek a ruling from a higher court, because they had consistently
been winning in the local courts. But given the intense pressure for
development of the lakefront, they too may have seen the wisdom of
securing a more authoritative precedent interpreting the public dedication.
The inexorable movement to the state supreme court began when the
City of Chicago brought a motion to compel Ward to “dispose of the issues
now pending on demurrer,” and the court gave Ward ten days to respond.354
The demurrer was overruled on March 2, 1896.355 Testimony was then
taken before Judge Brentano over a three-week period in June and July of
1896, supplemented by a massive documentary presentation detailing much
of the history of the controversy over the park.356
After reviewing the voluminous record, Judge Brentano ruled in
September 1896 that the temporary injunction previously issued in favor of
Ward should be made permanent.357 His order prohibited the City and the
Illinois Central from building any new railroad tracks, sheds, or other
structures in the park.358 An exception was made for structures authorized
by the ordinance passed on October 21, 1895, which contemplated
construction of a new armory and parade ground for the Illinois National
Guard in north Lake Park.359 The injunction also specifically exempted the
Art Institute and the temporary post office, both of which, the court
concluded, enjoyed owner consent.360 The next day an article appeared in
the Chicago Tribune naming Ward the “watch dog of the lake-front,”361 a

353

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 154 U.S.
225 (1894).
354
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 68. One of the defendants named in Ward’s original
complaint filed a demurrer in 1890, but for reasons that are not clear, the court had never ruled on it.
When the City decided to reactivate the litigation in 1896, the mechanism for doing so was to demand a
ruling on the demurrer.
355
Id. at 69.
356
See id. at 93–542.
357
City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 395, 48 N.E. 927, 928 (1897).
358
Id.
359
Id. at 395–96, 421, 48 N.E. at 928, 936.
360
Id. at 396, 422, 48 N.E. at 928, 937.
361
One Year To Take Park, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1896, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The same newspaper had previously referred to Warren F. Leland by the same title. See Watchdogs of
the Lake-Front, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1892, at 1. The first known published occurrence of the title is a
Chicago Tribune article apparently quoting a statement from Sarah Daggett’s attorney. Alone in the
Fight, supra note 316.

1477

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tagline that the paper would continue to use up to its publication of Ward’s
obituary.
The City promptly appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. In a
unanimous decision authored by Justice Carter, the court, on November 8,
1897, upheld the decree.362 Most of the opinion was devoted to
recapitulating the complex history of the park, from the initial marketing
efforts of the Canal Commissioners and the United States through the
balance of the nineteenth century.363 The court concluded that the
restrictions on buildings included on the maps of 1836 and 1839 were
legally binding public dedications.364 It explained that the City had accepted
the dedications when it adopted the resolution of 1844 and the ordinance of
1847 designating the space as a public park, and that the City had thereby
agreed to hold the land in trust for the public.365 These propositions were, as
we have seen, relatively uncontroversial, given the Illinois Supreme Court’s
existing precedents on public dedications and the longstanding acceptance
of the public dedication doctrine by local judges in Chicago in repeated
disputes over the use of the park.
The court also held that the adjoining property owners had standing to
enforce the dedication. The court’s holding on the standing question was
reinforced by language in the U.S. Supreme Court’s second Illinois Central
decision, where Justice Field had declared that
[t]he only parties interested in the public use for which the ground was
dedicated are the owners of lots abutting on the ground dedicated . . . and it
may be conceded they have a right to invoke, through the proper public
authorities, the protection of the property in the use for which it was
dedicated.366

Again, this proposition was uncontroversial, given numerous previous
decisions to the same effect.
The court also had little trouble concluding that it made no difference
that Lake Park was dedicated by two different owners—the Canal
Commissioners and the United States—at different times.
Both had represented to prospective purchasers that the land east of
Michigan Avenue would be clear of buildings.367 “Besides,” the court
remarked, “this open space has always been treated by the city and the
public as one park.”368

362

Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927.
See id.
364
Id. at 402–03, 48 N.E. at 930.
365
Id. at 403, 48 N.E. at 930.
366
Id. at 417, 48 N.E. at 935 (quoting United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1894))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
367
Id. at 418, 48 N.E. at 935.
368
Id.
363
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Turning to the most seriously contested question, the court rejected the
City’s argument that the adjoining property owners were estopped from
enforcing the public dedication because they had acquiesced in other
violations of the restriction in the park.369 This, of course, had been Judge
Drummond’s rationale in 1882 for denying abutting landowners an
injunction against the B&O depot.370 Since then, however, the owners had
roused themselves, and the Illinois Supreme Court recounted the extensive
record of litigation surrounding the park for over a decade.371 The only
recent exceptions, the court noted, were the Art Institute and the post office,
and property owners had consented to their erection. It would not be
appropriate, the court said, to find that the owners had “waived all of their
rights in the premises because they may have chosen to waive some of
them.”372
In affirming the decree issued by Judge Brentano, no mention was
made of the exemption in his decree for the new armory projected for the
ongoing landfill activity in north Lake Park. This set the stage for the next
round of litigation.
D. Ward Versus Everyone Else—Ward II and Ward III
Ward’s next battles would be more difficult because the City wanted to
add buildings that enjoyed widespread support among the civic elite, the
local newspapers, and presumably a majority of the populace. Ward I was
decided shortly after the Chicago City Council, pursuant to ordinances
adopted in 1895 and 1896, had transferred title to Lake Park to the South
Park Commissioners.373 The ordinances contemplated that the SPC would
engage in a massive landfill, extending the park to the harbor line. The
north portion of the new landfill was to be used for a National Guard
armory and training ground, and the south portion developed by the SPC as
an expanded park including new monumental public buildings. While
Burnham continued to work on an overall design for the park, over the next
several years the SPC concentrated on the landfill project.374 In 1899, the
state legislature passed an act dedicating the new landfill for park purposes
and renaming the expanded space “Grant Park.”375 The SPC retransferred
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Id.
See The Lake-Front, supra note 219; supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
371
See Ward, 169 Ill. at 418–21, 48 N.E. at 935–36.
372
Id. at 421, 48 N.E. at 937.
373
Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 117–18, 64 N.E. 705, 708 (1902).
374
Cremin, supra note 26, at 246. The fill was composed of street sweepings supplied by the city
streets department and sludge dredged from the river and the canal. Id. at 247–48.
375
1899 Ill. Laws 328.
370
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title to the north portion of the landfill area to the State, and entered into
contracts for construction of the armory.376
As soon as construction began on the armory, Ward filed a bill for an
injunction on June 19, 1900.377 He prevailed in the trial court, and the
defendant in the suit, the Board of Commissioners for the armory and
parade grounds, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The issue on
appeal in Ward II was whether the public dedication recognized in Ward I
applied only to the land west of the Illinois Central tracks, or also extended
to new land east of the tracks created by landfill, such as the land to be used
for the new armory.378
Ward argued that the issue had been resolved as to the entire park by
Ward I. But the Illinois Supreme Court held that its previous decision had
enforced the public dedication only as to lands west of the tracks.379
Nevertheless, the court decided that the dedication applied equally to the
newly filled land east of the tracks. Justice Cartwright’s opinion for the
court was less than clear about the rationale for this conclusion. One reason
appeared to be based on an analogy to natural accretion. If the original
parkland had been augmented by natural accretion, no one would argue that
the original dedication did not also apply to the expanded park. The court
was “unable to see how any different rule can prevail” when the
augmentation occurred by artificial filling.380 “In either case the extension
grows upon the original park and becomes corporate with it and part of it,—
in the one case by natural process, and in the other by artificial means, with
the assent of the State.”381
This argument ignored the distinction between accretion—where
riparian land is gradually and imperceptibly augmented—and avulsion—
when the change is sudden and perceptible.382 Title to land formed by
accretion belongs to the riparian owner and is subject to the same
restrictions as apply to the original land.383 But where riparian land is
augmented by avulsion, title to the new land does not attach to the riparian
376

Bliss, 198 Ill. at 118–19, 64 N.E. at 708–09. The City wanted a new armory for several reasons.
The violence of the recent Pullman Strike was doubtless on the minds of citizens when the project was
approved. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Additionally, even the City Council of Chicago
was disappointed in the current condition of the park. Old Buildings To Go, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1895,
at 8.
377
See Wants Armory Work Stopped, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1900, at 10.
378
Bliss, 198 Ill. at 112, 64 N.E. at 706.
379
Id.
380
Id. at 121, 64 N.E. at 709.
381
Id.
382
See 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 69 (1904).
383
The very first Illinois dedication case had held that additions to dedicated land caused by
accretion are also subject to the dedication. Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29, 36 (1850). However, it
does not appear that any Illinois courts had previously extended a dedication to land added by avulsion,
whether natural or artificial.
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owner and instead remains where it stood before the change occurred.384
Many courts have held that artificial filling is a form of avulsion, not
accretion.385 If this is correct, then it seems to follow that restrictions on
title that inhere in the original riparian lands should not automatically
extend to the newly formed landfill.
The court’s decision also hinted at a more functional analysis:
specifically, that extending the dedication to the newly created parkland
was necessary in order to fulfill the purposes of the original dedication.
“[T]he property owners on Michigan avenue bought their lots with the
distinct understanding that there should never be any building between their
lots and the lake.”386 That being so, the court said, “when the limits of the
park were extended into the lake, no right was acquired to erect buildings
between the lots and the lake although at a greater distance from the lots.”387
This reasoning is more persuasive, although it failed to take into account
that structures erected farther from Michigan Avenue would obviously have
a reduced impact on light, air, and view for owners of land abutting
Michigan Avenue, at least relative to structures immediately opposite them
in what had been the original Lake Park. In all events, another victory for
Ward.
At this point, the disputes between Ward and the SPC turned to two
monumental civic projects supported by private philanthropy. The
principal properties and proposed construction sites are shown in Figure 15.
When John Crerar, a railroad mogul, died in 1889, he left $2.5 million
to the City of Chicago for a public library, as well as a separate $100,000
bequest to support construction of a statue of Abraham Lincoln.388 In 1901,
the City Council settled on the newly renamed Grant Park, between
Madison and Monroe streets, as the location for these projects.389 The state
legislature promptly passed an act authorizing both the Crerar Library and
the statue to be built in Grant Park.390 The Act recognized the interests of
the abutting property owners, and provided that consent had to be obtained
from all owners before construction could begin.391

384

See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2598–99
(2010); see also FARNHAM, supra note 382, § 69.
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See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
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Bliss, 198 Ill. at 115, 64 N.E. at 707.
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Id. at 115–16, 64 N.E. at 707.
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Thomas W. Goodspeed, John Crerar, in THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 98, 117 (D.A. Henderson
ed., 1920); see Crerar Lincoln Monument Plans Nearly Completed, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1907, at 9.
389
Favors the Crerar Plan, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1901, at 1.
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1901 Ill. Laws 232. The commission for the Lincoln statute had been awarded to the famous
sculptor, Auguste St. Gaudens, in 1897, and the project was expected to take three years. Favors the
Crerar Plan, supra note 389. St. Gaudens’s “Lincoln” still stands in Grant Park.
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1901 Ill. Laws 233.
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FIGURE 15: CERTAIN MICHIGAN AVENUE AND GRANT PARK PROPERTIES CIRCA 1903
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George Merrick, Ward’s attorney, initially responded to the Act by
saying that Ward would not consent to any buildings in the park.392 A few
weeks later, Merrick issued another statement, saying that Ward would
consent to the library, but only if it were built south of Jackson
Boulevard—that is, south of the Art Institute, rather than to the north where
Ward’s property lay.393 The SPC responded that Ward’s condition was
unacceptable.394 The commissioners were adamant that the library be
placed to the north of the Art Institute.395
The directors of the library quickly obtained consents from most of the
other property owners on Michigan Avenue, and indicated that they would
go to court to overturn the Act’s requirement of unanimous consent from
abutting owners.396 But it appears that they did not do this. Instead, in
1903, the legislature enacted a statute permitting the SPC to condemn the
rights of abutting owners.397 In early 1905 the SPC gave final approval to
build the Crerar Library on the lakefront,398 and the board of directors for
the library accepted the SPC’s ordinance.399 The contractors would set up
their equipment and prepare to break ground.400
Merrick immediately initiated contempt proceedings on Ward’s
behalf.401 In a tacit recognition that Ward was moving against the tide of
public opinion, Merrick simultaneously issued a statement to the press
attempting to neutralize the reaction.402 The statement declared that Ward
was “misunderstood” and that he was merely trying to preserve the park for
the people of Chicago. The statement also accused the library directors and
SPC officials of acting lawlessly in blatant disregard of the decision in
Ward II.403
A hearing on the matter was held on June 25, 1906, and Elbridge
Hanecy, who was no longer on the bench, argued the case for Ward.404 He
called on the court to sanction the SPC and the library board for their
“outrageous conduct.”405 The library board and the SPC, taking a page from
the panel decision in the Daggett case, argued that the 1903 Act giving the
392
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SPC the power to condemn easements in the park eliminated Ward’s right
to injunctive relief.406 In effect, the power to condemn should be treated as
if an actual condemnation had occurred—minus the payment of
compensation, which Ward would have to obtain through a later action for
damages.407
Judge Brentano, who had issued the 1896 injunction that was upheld in
Ward I, did not buy the argument that an unexercised power of eminent
domain was sufficient to deprive a court of equity of the power to enforce a
public dedication. He issued an order giving the library board and the SPC
until July 16, 1906, to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
of court.408 A few days later, he ordered all building materials removed
from the lakefront.409
At this point, the legal fight over the Crerar Library abated. Although
the library’s attorney was quoted by one newspaper as saying that the
matter should go to the Illinois Supreme Court, where “it will be a totally
new case” as a result of the 1903 legislation,410 no appeal was filed.
Litigation costs do not seem to have been the decisive factor; it is more
likely that the library concluded that the theory about an unexercised power
of eminent domain was a loser and that the proponents of new park
structures should proceed directly to condemnation. This seems confirmed
by the fact that the library trustees later funded condemnation proceedings
to acquire the rights of Michigan Avenue owners at the same time the SPC
undertook to condemn the owners’ rights to object to the Field Museum.411
Eventually, after the condemnation effort also failed,412 the library trustees
settled on a location just outside the park, on the northwest corner of
Michigan Avenue and Randolph Street.
As litigation over the Crerar Library subsided, the battle flared with
new intensity on another front: the Field Museum. After the World’s
Columbian Exposition closed in 1893, Marshall Field began a campaign to
house the natural history artifacts in a permanent museum. He donated
more than $1 million in initial funding and encouraged others to donate
their World’s Fair stock to such a museum.413 Ward, ironically, was the
largest contributor, donating 1000 shares.414 The museum was incorporated
406
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as the Columbian Museum of Chicago and was originally housed in one of
the buildings built for the fair on the South Side.415 As early as 1896, Field
and others wanted to construct a larger building in Grant Park. The mayor
had added a provision to the 1896 ordinance, directing that the Field
Museum be constructed in the park.416 However, the South Park
Commissioners were reluctant to commit to a specific location until the
final plans for the park system were complete.417 The commissioners were
also concerned about the legality of building in the park, which was in
obvious tension with the rulings in Ward I and II.418
The plans for the museum were shelved for several years while the
SPC cleaned up the park and planned the next move.419 In early 1903,
Marshall Field announced that he would donate funds for the “handsomest
museum building in the world” to house the museum collections on the
lakefront.420 Several bills were proposed to the state legislature in
connection with the museum building, including the previously mentioned
1903 Act allowing the SPC to condemn the rights of nonconsenting
abutting property owners to facilitate construction of the museum.421
Consents for the museum from abutting owners were slowly obtained.422
With plans for fixing the location of the museum stalled, garbage
began to pile up in the park again. Public discontent over Ward’s decision
to block the building grew, fueled by remarks from SPC leaders reported in
the newspapers.423 SPC President Henry G. Foreman threatened to “turn the
front yard of the city into a rubbish heap” and to abandon all plans to
maintain or improve Grant Park if the museum could not be built on the
lakefront.424 In response to growing public criticism, Merrick released a
statement to the Tribune describing the history of the park and defending
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the idea of a park free of buildings.425 In early 1904, the SPC submitted a
proposal to the voters for approval of a tax to support the museum, which
passed overwhelmingly.426
Marshall Field died on January 16, 1906, leaving $8 million to the City
of Chicago for the express purpose of building the Field Museum.427 His
will provided that the bequest would revert to his estate if a site was not
chosen for the museum within six years of his death.428 Although Field’s
will did not expressly require the site to be Grant Park,429 SPC officials and
the museum’s trustees implied as much. Harlow Higinbotham, president of
the museum trustees, declared that there was only one site available in the
City and that, if Ward successfully kept the museum off the lakefront, it
would amount to “the ruin of what otherwise ultimately will be the greatest
museum in the world.”430
In early 1907, the SPC adopted an ordinance granting the museum a
tract of land at the foot of Congress Street on the east side of the Illinois
Central tracks—in the center of Grant Park but half a mile south of Ward’s
building at Madison Street.431 Ward was not in the City when the news was
released.432 When the newspapers contacted Merrick for a response, he said
that Ward would not take immediate action and would wait for some overt
action before going to court.433 Higinbotham stated that Ward was the only
remaining objector and dared others in opposition to come forward.434 He
declared that Ward had no right to contest the museum building because the
people of the City had already voted on it.435

425

Makes Plea for Park “Watch Dog,” CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1903, at 3. Merrick indicated that he
had provided advice to other abutting property owners, but the only name mentioned was Ward. Id.
426
S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 7 (July 10, 1909).
427
Museum Loss Feared, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Nov. 21, 1908.
428
Id.
429
Will of Marshall Field § 17, at 35–40 (Sept. 5, 1905) (on file with Chicago History Museum).
430
Fight on Museum Starts in Court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1907, at 3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
431
Field Museum Gets Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1907, at 9.
432
Id.
433
Id.
434
Id.
435
Id. Higinbotham was a partner in Field, Palmer & Leiter. He had personally contributed
$100,000 to the Field Museum project and served as president of the museum’s board of trustees for
several years. GILBERT & BRYSON, supra note 22, at 736; Head of Museum Really Deposed, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 22, 1909, at 7. Higinbotham was a strong-willed character who had previously served as president
of the Columbian Exposition. See LARSON, supra note 90, at 309. It is perhaps not surprising that he
reacted poorly to Ward’s opposition to the trustees’ preferred plan for the museum. In one interview
with the Tribune, he declared that “[w]e must have a new structure or stop developing—and that means
stop existing.” Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Higinbotham’s pugilistic attitude eventually got him fired from the board of trustees. Head of Museum
Really Deposed, supra. Higinbotham was at Field’s department store at the same time as Elbridge
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As final preparations for construction began, Merrick met with John
Barton Payne, attorney for the museum trustees, to discuss the situation.436
Payne was concerned about the cost of entering into construction contracts
that would be delayed by litigation, and they planned a symbolic act of
driving a stake into the ground so that litigation could be started.437 Merrick
filed a twenty-nine-page petition for an injunction on February 23, 1907.438
The SPC filed a cross-bill to enjoin Ward from interfering with
construction.439
The matter was assigned to Judge George Dupuy, who had served as
counsel to the City in Ward I before joining the bench and was clearly
hostile to Ward’s position. Hanecy engaged in some vigorous maneuvering
to get the case reassigned, but to no avail.440 Judge Dupuy overruled
Hanecy’s demurrer to the cross-bill, holding that buildings consistent with
“park purposes” would be allowed in the park.441 In so ruling, Judge Dupuy
implicitly adopted the understanding that the dedication was an affirmative
command to use the space for park purposes, ignoring the language on the
original maps expressed in terms of a negative restriction on “buildings.”
The case went to trial in October 1908. In the meantime, Ward offered
to settle the matter and allow the museum in Grant Park, as long as the SPC
would agree not to sponsor any more buildings.442 The SPC immediately
rejected Ward’s offer, saying that they did not want to go “hat in hand” to
Ward every time they wanted to build in the park.443 The parties’ patience
had grown thin by this time, and courtroom discussions were often
heated.444
At the close of evidence, Judge Dupuy denied Ward an injunction
against the museum and further enjoined Ward from interfering with
construction in the park.445 Judge Dupuy concluded that Ward I and Ward
Hanecy, and the friction between them in the Field Museum fight may have reflected a rivalry of longer
standing.
436
Field Museum Plans Ready for Ward’s Lightning Bolt, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1907, at 9.
437
Id.
438
Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430.
439
Abstract of Record at 67, Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731
(1909) (No. 6657-11).
440
Ward’s attorneys moved for a change in venue. See Lake Front Suit Hits Snag in Court Order,
CHI. REC.-HERALD, Nov. 20, 1908; No Gain to Ward in Museum Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1908, at
2. Hanecy also tried to withdraw Ward’s petition, presumably to refile it in the hope of securing a
different judge, but this too was blocked on the ground that the petition could not be withdrawn once a
cross-bill had been filed. “Watchdog” Ward Must Face Issue, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1907, at 6.
441
Lake Front Open to Park Houses, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1908, at 1.
442
Ward Explains War on Museum, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1908, at 4.
443
Offer Spurned by Park Board, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1908, at 5.
444
In one incident, Hanecy kicked a map that Payne had tossed at him. Judge Dupuy dismissed the
incident—perhaps he was hesitant to discipline two former judges. Hanecy Kicks Map in Court, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 9, 1908, at 5.
445
Site for Museum Seems Assured, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1908, at 6.
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II were not controlling because neither the SPC nor the museum had been a
party to the earlier cases.446 He went on to divide the park in two, holding
that although Ward I prohibited all buildings on the west side of the Illinois
Central tracks, Ward II left open the possibility that “proper park buildings”
could be built on the east side of the tracks.447 Judge Dupuy found that the
Field Museum was a proper park building and hence could be built.448 Both
Ward and the SPC were unhappy with the decision—the South Park
Commissioners were still hoping to build the Crerar Library and a new city
hall on the west side of the Illinois Central tracks—and immediately
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.449
The high court reversed, ruling for Ward once again.450 The court held
that Ward I and Ward II were fully applicable to the SPC, who stood in the
shoes of the City.451 The City could not circumvent the previous rulings by
transferring the park to another municipal corporation.452 The court also
held that there was no basis for dividing the park in two because the court in
Ward II had already determined that the reclaimed land was of the same
character as the rest of the park, just as if the additional land had naturally
accreted.453 The court summarily dispensed with Judge Dupuy’s idea that
“proper park buildings” could be erected in the park.454 Ward was not
concerned with the type of buildings that could be allowed in the park;
rather, he claimed that no buildings could be erected in the park.455
This was a seemingly decisive blow in favor of the no-buildings
conception of the dedication. Nevertheless, the court went on to address the
SPC’s argument that certain buildings are absolutely necessary in a park,
such as rain shelters, band shells, and lavatories.456 Those types of facilities,
the court agreed, “can be provided without the erection of what would
properly be characterized as a building.”457 This was as close as the Illinois
Supreme Court would come to offering a definition of “building” in the
Ward cases. Its reasoning was opaque, but the idea that the dedication was
at least in part for “park purposes” seemed to creep into the discussion of
the meaning of the term. It was not clear whether the court regarded certain
kinds of structures as being too important to be excluded from the park and
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
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Id. at 510, 89 N.E. at 737.
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Id.
Id. at 507, 89 N.E. at 735.
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hence not “buildings,” or, more likely, whether it thought that the listed
structures were so innocuous that they did not jeopardize the interests of the
abutting landowners and hence should not be deemed “buildings,” or some
combination of both.
A triumphant Ward finally gave the Tribune an interview following the
decision.458 He said that his fight was “for the poor people of Chicago—not
for the millionaires.”459 He was not opposed to the museum on the
lakefront, but came to understand that the SPC had “nineteen” other
projects lined up, and he feared that the park would become riddled with
buildings if he did not object.460 He also said that if he had known how
much the fight was going to cost, in both time and money, he might not
have started it, adding, with more than a touch of self-pity, that this was
especially so because he was not even receiving gratitude in return.461
Perhaps as an implicit quid pro quo for the interview, the Tribune, an
erstwhile booster of the museum, printed an editorial the next day
commending Ward for his perseverance in protecting the park.462
E. The SPC Moves to Condemn Ward’s Interest—Ward IV
Following the defeat in Ward III, the South Park Commissioners
announced that they would begin condemnation proceedings against
Ward’s interest in the park.463 The 1903 Act had given the SPC the power
to condemn the rights of any nonconsenting abutting property owner.464
Throughout the Ward III proceedings, the SPC had threatened
condemnation and indicated that they would keep their ability to condemn
the abutting owners’ rights as a backup plan.465 Both the president of the
Crerar Library, on behalf of the directors, and the trustees of the Field
Museum wrote to the SPC, asking the commissioners to start condemnation
proceedings.466 The board of the Crerar Library offered to pay the SPC’s
legal fees, and a contract to that effect was drafted in December 1909.467
The SPC filed the condemnation action on January 27, 1910.468 In
addition to Ward and his company, the suit named as condemnees Levy
Mayer, who owned the Stratford Hotel, and S. Karpen & Bros. and several
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459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
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Moving To Block Victory of Ward, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1909, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Editorial, Mr. Ward and the Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1909, at 10.
Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458.
1903 Ill. Laws 263–64; see also supra note 421 and accompanying text.
Fight on Museum Starts in Court, supra note 430.
S. Park Comm’rs, supra note 398, at 160, 163.
Id. at 160–62.
New Move Taken for Museum Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1910, at 13.
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banks.469 These were not the only nonconsenting property owners, and the
SPC indicated that if they were successful in the first proceeding more
condemnation actions would follow.470
The first hearing came up several weeks later.471 Henry Russell Platt of
Levy Mayer’s law firm represented the condemnees, including Ward.472
Platt argued that condemnation of the abutting owners’ rights was not a
proper public use under the constitution. The public would be injured, not
benefited, he contended, by condemning the restriction on buildings in the
park. Moreover, the condemnation was for the benefit of private entities,
the Field Museum and the Crerar Library, not public authorities.473
Two weeks later, Judge William H. McSurely dismissed the
condemnation action.474 He said he was satisfied that the previous suits had
determined the rights of all of the parties, including the right of the SPC to
condemn any “easement[]” that Ward might have.475 The SPC immediately
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.476
Ward won yet again in the Illinois Supreme Court, but for the first time
the court was closely divided, ruling by a vote of four to three. With
respect to whether the SPC could condemn Ward’s interest in the park, the
court acknowledged that the power of eminent domain extends to every
kind of property or interest.477 Nevertheless, the legislature could not
authorize a taking for an illegal use.478 The previous Ward cases had
established that it was unlawful to erect buildings in the park.479 Therefore,
469

Park Board in Suit for a Museum Site, CHI. REC.-HERALD, Jan. 29, 1910, at 9. Levy Mayer,
cofounder of the firm that is now Mayer Brown LLP, was named personally in the complaint.
Complaint at 3, S. Park Comm’rs v. S. Karpen & Bros., No. 10S277375 (Cook County, Ill., Super. Ct.,
Mar. 24, 1910); Join Ward in Museum Suit, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1910, at 9. Mayer’s notable career
included successfully defending the Chicago meatpackers against prosecution under the Sherman Act
and representing Charles Comiskey and his “Black Sox” after the alleged 1919 World Series scandal.
About Mayer Brown, MAYER BROWN, http://www.mayerbrown.com/about/index.asp?nid=10113 (last
visited Aug. 23, 2011). After his death, Mayer’s wife, Rachel, donated $500,000 to Northwestern
University for the construction of a law building on the Chicago campus. Leigh Bienen, The Life and
Times of Florence Kelley in Chicago 1891–1899: Levy Mayer, NW. U., http://florencekelley.
northwestern.edu/historical/mayer/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2011). The building, known as “Levy Mayer
Hall,” is still in use today.
470
Park Board in Suit for a Museum Site, supra note 469.
471
Park Site Fight Opened in Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1910, at 14.
472
Id. When the case was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, George Merrick again
represented Ward, and Mayer represented himself and S. Karpen & Bros. See S. Park Comm’rs v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910).
473
Park Site Fight Opened in Court, supra note 471.
474
Dismisses Suits of Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1910, at 11.
475
Id.
476
See id.
477
S. Park Comm’rs, 248 Ill. at 304–05, 93 N.E. at 912.
478
Id. at 305, 93 N.E. at 912.
479
Id.
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the court reasoned, the legislature could not authorize a taking of Ward’s
interest, because the use for which the SPC wanted to take it was
unlawful.480
The court then summarized its previous holdings on dedications.
Under these decisions, once a donor dedicates property to the public with
restrictions, “the public authorities having their election to accept or reject
the donation, are bound, if they accept it, to apply the property to the
declared use.”481 This meant that the City was bound by its previous
acceptance of the dedication of the parkland with the restriction that it
would be kept free from buildings.482 The City could not escape the
consequences of its decision through the device of eminent domain.
The court reinforced its decision with two other arguments. First, it
rejected the SPC’s contention that Ward’s interest was in the nature of an
easement and therefore could be condemned because easements are
property rights subject to condemnation.483 The court explained that in the
previous cases Ward had secured equitable enforcement of a restriction on
the use of the park that affected his property values. However, Ward would
not have been able to obtain an injunction if he had had an easement; under
Illinois law, the only remedy for interference with an easement was an
award of money damages.484
The court also supported its holding on res judicata grounds.485 The
1903 Act allowing the SPC to condemn Ward’s easement had been passed
before the litigation in Ward III, the court said, and the SPC had brought it
up as a defense to Ward’s injunction action.486 Moreover, the reasoning
went, the equity court would not have given Ward the injunction if the use
had been lawful under the 1903 Act.487
Justice Dunn, dissenting in an opinion joined by two other justices,
pointed out the weaknesses in the majority’s reasoning. The res judicata
argument was unavailing, he wrote, because the previous cases were about
whether buildings could be erected in the park.488 In those cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court had expressly stated that it was not ruling on whether
Ward’s rights could be taken by condemnation.489
480

Id. at 306, 93 N.E. at 913.
Id. at 308, 93 N.E. at 914.
482
See id.
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Id. at 310–11, 93 N.E. at 914.
484
Id.
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Id. at 312, 93 N.E. at 915.
486
Id. As previously described, the power of eminent domain conferred by the 1903 Act had been
the SPC’s principal argument in Ward III as to why a court of equity should deny injunctive relief. See
supra notes 406–07 and accompanying text.
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248 Ill. at 312, 93 N.E. at 915.
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Id. at 316, 93 N.E. at 916 (Dunn, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 317, 93 N.E. at 917.
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Dunn then turned to whether the City could use eminent domain to
develop the park. He asserted that eminent domain is an inherent attribute
of sovereignty, and that the State could not divest itself of its condemnation
powers by accepting a dedication with restrictions.490 The State could not
deprive itself of the right of eminent domain through contract because
The
contract rights themselves are subject to eminent domain.491
government must be able to use the land within its power for the changing
needs of the public.492
Dunn argued that the majority’s position, taken to its logical
conclusion, would mean that if the entire lakefront had been dedicated and
placed in trust, then the City could allow no streets, docks, or wharves
along the lakefront.493 Surely the City could not deprive itself of its ability
to make use of the navigable waterway.494 Without defining the interest
held by Ward and the other abutting property owners, Dunn concluded that
although the dedication created a right that required the assent of all
property owners before buildings could be built in the park, “the acquisition
of such right to object is equivalent to obtaining their assent.”495
Justice Carter—who had authored the opinion in Ward I—wrote a
separate dissent. He stated that “all private rights are held upon the implied
condition that they may be re-taken by the sovereign.”496 Again assuming
that the dedication was contractual in nature, Carter argued that the City and
the State had no power to accept the dedication if acceptance included a
waiver of their sovereign powers of eminent domain.497
By today’s lights, Ward IV seems hard to defend.498 If one assumes
that the acquisition of land for a museum open to the public is a public
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Id. at 324, 93 N.E. at 919.
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Id. at 325, 93 N.E. at 919.
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Id. at 337, 93 N.E. at 924 (Carter, J., dissenting).
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Ward IV was in fact overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1961 in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Walter V. Schaefer, but the opinion was later withdrawn on rehearing. A lawsuit had been
filed to stop the University of Illinois from locating a Chicago branch in Garfield Park. When the case
reached the Illinois Supreme Court, the court not only permitted the transfer of parkland to the
University, but also overruled Ward IV. People v. Chi. Park Dist., Nos. 36171–72 (Ill. 1960),
withdrawn; Thomas Buck, Rule U. of I. May Use Garfield Park Site, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1961, at 1.
The court withdrew its opinion before publication on a motion for rehearing filed by, among others,
Michigan Avenue property owners, ruling that the issue was moot because the University of Illinois had
selected another site for its Chicago campus. Thomas Buck, Ruling on Park Use Cancelled by High
Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1961, at B2; Michigan Av. Suit Attacks Park Decision, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9,
1961, at A10; see also Comment, The Status of Dedicated Land in Illinois, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 61, 61–
62 (1961).
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use,499 then the State should be allowed to condemn all interests in land
necessary to secure such a public use, whether those interests are
characterized as property rights, contract rights, or equitable interests.
Perhaps the closest analogue to Ward IV in modern eminent domain law is
the understanding that land acquired for one public use cannot be
condemned for another public use without express legislative
authorization.500 Ward IV holds that land dedicated to a public use cannot
be condemned for another public use. The problem with the analogy is that
the SPC did have express legislative authority for the condemnation to
change public uses, which should have been the end of the matter.
In retrospect, the commissioners and their allies overreached by failing
to proceed toward condemnation immediately after the decisions in Ward I
and Ward II. Instead, they sought to rely on a statutory power to condemn
without actually going through the condemnation process. This made it
look as if they were trying to take a valuable right without paying for it, and
were willing to pay only after they were called out. It is not surprising that
a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court took a dim view of these tactics.
The directors of the Crerar Library evidently had seen this coming, but the
SPC and Higinbotham were apparently so exercised by Ward’s opposition
that it impaired their judgment.
In any event, Ward IV had a decisive impact on the future of Grant
Park. It is virtually certain that if the decision had gone the other way, the
Illinois legislature would have granted the SPC the power to condemn the
interests of the abutting owners for a variety of projects. Since Ward IV
would likely not be followed today, this suggests an important limitation on
the efficacy of the public dedication doctrine and the unanimous consent
mechanism as an instrument for preserving public spaces: namely, that
these rights can be condemned by eminent domain.
Following the decision in Ward IV, the Field Museum trustees had to
scramble to find a site outside the protected area, and they had to find it fast
if they were to avoid losing the bequest.501 On March 15, 1911, the trustees
formally asked the SPC to rescind the contract providing a site in Grant
Park and to approve a location south of the public dedication area between
12th and 16th Streets.502 A few days later, the SPC and the museum trustees
499

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that eminent domain can be used for memorial grounds and
parks. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (upholding the use of eminent
domain to acquire part of Gettysburg battlement for memorial cemetery); Shoemaker v. United States,
147 U.S. 282 (1893) (upholding the use of eminent domain to acquire land for Rock Creek Park).
500
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Chi., Burlington & N. R.R., 122 Ill. 473, 482, 13 N.E. 140, 143
(1887); 2 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH
AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE § 361 (2d ed. 1917); 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03[3][d] (3d ed. 2010).
501
Under Field’s will, the bequest would expire and revert to the estate six years after he died, or on
January 16, 1912. Will of Marshall Field, supra note 429, § 17, at 39–40.
502
S. Park Comm’rs, Meeting Minutes 106 (Mar. 13, 1911).
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entered into a contract for the new site.503 In May of that year, the state
legislature enacted legislation allowing the SPC to build the museum on the
new site.504 The new site required some land to be added to the shoreline,
and the state legislature appropriated funds to assist with that project.505 It
also required the cooperation of the Illinois Central Railroad in turning over
some of its land south of the park, which the railroad readily agreed to do.506
The museum was finally completed in 1921.507
F. Ward’s Other Actions
While the high-stakes duel between Ward and the civic elite was
playing itself out in the Illinois Supreme Court, Ward continued to perform
his accustomed role of park watchdog. The results were mixed, partly on
account of his aggressive efforts to expand the scope of the public
dedication. Ward sought and failed to obtain an injunction against the
construction of a trolley line in the right-of-way of Michigan Avenue.508 He
also sought and failed to enjoin the construction of a clubhouse for a yacht
club in the harbor just east of the border of Grant Park.509
Ward was more successful in blocking the erection of a tent to be used
for a major speech by William Jennings Bryan, who was touring the
country in 1900 as the Democratic Party candidate for President.510 When
Ward saw the tent going up in the park, he called the city corporation
counsel to protest.511 The Democrats reluctantly agreed to forgo the tent
and held the event in the open air.512 Ward’s action was viewed as
politically motivated, and Senator James K. Jones, chairman of the
Democratic National Committee, urged Democrats to boycott Montgomery
Ward & Co. in protest.513 Ward engaged in damage control by issuing a
statement in which he claimed—implausibly—that he had not known the
purpose of the tent, and said he was merely “guilty of trying to give the
people of Chicago a free park.”514
The next year, Ward called on the Superintendent of Streets to demand
that the federal government desist from building a fence outside the
503
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temporary post office.515 The mail wagons cutting through the park had
been stirring up dust clouds, creating a problem for the Art Institute. The
government had offered to build a fence to block the dust. Ward saw the
fence being erected and immediately objected.516 The fencing project
stopped.517
While the Ward IV case was pending, the vice president of the Illinois
Central Railroad Company requested permission to build a depot at Monroe
Street in Grant Park.518 George Merrick promptly wrote letters to the SPC
and the Illinois Central stating that such a depot would be illegal.519
Needless to say, the depot was never built.
These actions suggest strongly that Ward was not motivated by any
particular animus toward Marshall Field and his museum, as has sometimes
been suggested.520 Indeed, Ward’s early financial support for Field’s
initiative, and his offers to settle with the Crerar Library and the museum on
terms that would permit those structures to be built in the park, indicate that
he was relatively sympathetic to the construction of monumental buildings
in the park. At the same time, Ward’s actions after 1900 suggest a growing
imperiousness as he came to assume that he had unilateral authority to
approve or disapprove practically any construction activity between
Michigan Avenue and the centerline of the lake. His willingness to pay the
legal bills necessary to back up his judgments meant that this assumption
closely corresponded with reality.
By 1912, Montgomery Ward & Co. had outgrown the facility on
Michigan Avenue and moved its operations to Chicago Avenue, north of
the city center. Ward, who was by then the sole owner of the Michigan
Avenue property,521 quickly sold it in three different transactions.522 In
515

City Prevents Uncle Sam from Building a Fence, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1901, at 3.
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See id. at 30–31.
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MIDLOTHIAN COUNTRY CLUB WKLY. NEWS BULL. (Midlothian Country Club, Midlothian, Ill.), Sept.
15, 1983 (on file with Chicago History Museum).
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By 1892, Thorne’s five sons had joined the business and had assumed management of the
company. HISTORY & PROGRESS, supra note 270, at 18–19. In 1893, Ward sold his controlling interest
in the company to Thorne. LATHAM, supra note 270, at 32.
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midway between Washington and Madison Streets to attorney Harry C. Levinson for $1,295,000. Lake
“Watchdog” Sells Big Tower, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1913, at 1. The second sale occurred in September
1912, when Ward sold the property on the corner of Michigan Avenue and Washington Street to
architect Jarvis Hunt for $1.1 million. Lake “Watchdog” Sells New Site; Power Passing, CHI. TRIB.,
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February 1913, Montgomery Ward & Co. went public.523 Later that year,
Ward broke his hip while at his winter home in Pasadena, California. He
returned to Chicago to convalesce, but died of pneumonia on December 7,
1913.524 Although it was thought that Ward would make a provision in his
will for the ongoing fight against buildings in Grant Park,525 he left nearly
all of his money to his wife and daughter.526
G. Ward’s Motives
What are we to make of Ward’s motives for his remarkable crusade to
keep Grant Park free of offending structures? The first thing to note is that
Ward’s record as “watchdog” was largely consistent with his interests as an
investor in commercial real estate. Ward’s actions to protect the lakefront
began when he acquired significant Michigan Avenue property, and ended
when he sold that property. His effort to protect the park intensified after
1893 when he acquired Thorne’s interest in the property and became its sole
owner. From that time until he sold it, the Michigan Avenue property was
Ward’s largest asset.527
Ward’s enforcement activity was also selective in a way that reflected
his interests as a property owner. He did not challenge the Art Institute or
the Public Library, he consented to the Democratic Party wigwam and the
temporary post office—and he was prepared to consent to both the Crerar
Library, if it would be located in the south park, and the Field Museum, if
the SPC would agree that there would be no more buildings. He opposed
loading platforms, storage sheds, garbage, circuses, bicycle tracks, tents for
political rallies, armories, and railroad depots. His guiding principle was
not big versus little—he sometimes opposed small structures (storage sheds,
bicycle tracks, fences) and sometimes favored large ones (the Art Institute,
the Public Library, the post office). Nor was it permanent versus
temporary—sometimes he opposed temporary structures (circuses, tents for
political rallies) and sometimes he favored permanent ones (the Public
Library, the Art Institute).
Overall, Ward appeared to be guided by a sure sense of how different
projects would affect the market value of real estate on Michigan Avenue.
Nuisances, clutter, unsightly temporary platforms, fences, and—
especially—noisy crowds would likely impair real estate values on
523

See $5,000,000 Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1913, at 14 (advertising
public stock offering).
524
LATHAM, supra note 270, at 51; Death Takes Ward, Lake “Watchdog,” Following Fall, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 8, 1913, at 1.
525
Death Takes Ward, supra note 524.
526
Ward’s $5,000,000 Goes to Family, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 1913, at 3. See also Last Will and
Testament of A. Montgomery Ward (on file with Chicago History Museum).
527
Ward sold the property for $3.7 million in 1912–13, see supra note 522, and left an estate of
$5 million when he died in 1913. See Ward’s $5,000,000 Goes to Family, supra note 526.
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Michigan Avenue. Stately and decorous structures such as the Public
Library and the Art Institute would not. Ward’s opposition to the Crerar
Library and the Field Museum are arguably inconsistent with this
generalization, since it is plausible that these structures—like the Public
Library and the Art Institute—would have enhanced real estate values on
Michigan Avenue.528 But this ignores Ward’s apparent willingness to settle
with the proponents of these two structures if he could put them where he
wanted them to go and could preserve his control over everything else.
Ward’s consent to construction of the temporary post office is
particularly revealing. This ungainly building would impair the view of the
lake and the flow of air and light enjoyed by Ward’s facility immediately
opposite on the west side of Michigan Avenue. But by 1895, Montgomery
Ward & Co. had become the single largest customer of the U.S. Postal
Service.529 A well-functioning postal system was an imperative for such an
organization, and it was clearly in Ward’s financial interest to consent to the
temporary post office.530
FIGURE 16: TEMPORARY POST OFFICE IN GRANT PARK AT WASHINGTON STREET CIRCA 1900531

Still, although Ward’s financial interests undoubtedly motivated and
shaped his behavior, they do not fully account for his remarkable zeal in
enforcing the public dedication. For one thing, he spent an estimated
$50,000 on litigation during his period of ownership532—roughly
$1.1 million in today’s dollars and far more than any previous or
528

In Daggett, the court heard extensive testimony that the Art Institute would likely increase the
value of Sarah Daggett’s property immediately across the street. Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir.
Ct. Rep. 79, 87 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892).
529
HOGE, supra note 282, at 28.
530
It is true that Merrick filed suit on behalf of Ward challenging an expansion of the temporary
post office in 1900. See Ward v. Cong. Constr. Co., 99 F. 598 (7th Cir. 1900). But this legal action may
have been motivated more by Merrick’s concern about defeating the estoppel argument advanced by the
City in Ward I than by Ward’s hostility to having a post office located opposite his property.
531
On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-32436.
532
Dunham, supra note 266, at 19.
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subsequent owner was willing to spend.533 Ward himself suggested that the
expenditure was not economically justified.534 His litigation activity also
took on a fanatical quality, especially as the years went on. Preventing the
Bryan campaign from putting up a tent for a one-day rally was hardly in the
interests of Montgomery Ward & Co., particularly given the call for a
boycott that it elicited. And it is hard to see how Ward’s property values
would be affected by the construction of a yacht club in the lake.
One hypothesis is that Ward was driven by populist sympathies.535 He
himself claimed on several occasions that he did it for the “poor people”
rather than the “millionaires.”536 Ward regarded himself as a man of the
people. He started life as a manual laborer, strongly empathized with
struggling farm families, made many charitable donations to the poor, and
was affiliated for many years with the Granger movement. And the public
statements issued in his name or on his behalf, and seeking to explain his
actions, consistently emphasized populist themes.
But the pattern of Ward’s actions does not support the thesis that he
was seeking to protect the interests of the masses. A number of the projects
that he blocked had been expressly approved by the Chicago City Council
and the Illinois General Assembly, both composed of elected
representatives of the people. One, the Field Museum, not only was
supported by representative bodies but also received an overwhelming
affirmative vote in a public tax referendum.537 These are better measures of
popular opinion than Ward’s views about the wants and needs of the
Further, Ward showed striking hostility toward popular
people.538
entertainment in the park, bringing multiple actions to block the Adam
Forepaugh Circus and shutting down a bicycle track, just as an earlier
generation of owners had opposed toboggan slides and professional
baseball games. It is highly doubtful that the “poor people” approved of
these actions.

533

This inflation estimate is based upon the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Calculator. CPI
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last
visited Aug. 23, 2011). For a calculator that provides seven measurements of the relative value of U.S.
dollars, see Seven Ways To Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present,
MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare (last visited Aug. 23, 2011).
This calculator provides a range of $848,000 to $18.7 million when converting $50,000 at Ward’s death
in 1913 to present value in 2011. Id.
534
Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458.
535
See WILLE, supra note 4, at 71.
536
See, e.g., Moving To Block Victory of Ward, supra note 458; Ward Awaits Other Consents, CHI.
TRIB., May 7, 1901, at 3.
537
See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
538
Ward could afford to defy local public opinion because his wealth did not depend on what
people in Chicago thought about him. His market was rural and small-town America. Thus, in contrast
to Marshall Field, for example, he could incur the displeasure of Chicagoans without any significant
personal hardship to his firm or its profits.
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A somewhat better hypothesis is that Ward was a naturalist or
environmentalist ahead of his time. In effect, Ward wanted to preserve the
park in an unspoiled condition free of artificial encumbrances. Ward made
some statements consistent with this hypothesis. In a short interview with a
reporter in 1893, Ward stated he had been impressed on a recent trip to
Europe by the public parks that had been assembled in many cities there.539
The reporter quoted Ward as urging that the armories and other clutter in
Lake Park be removed, “and in [their] place give us beautiful fountains,
pleasant walks and green lawns where tired humanity may disport at will,
unhampered by any restriction whatever.”540
The evidence for this hypothesis is somewhat stronger than for the
claim that Ward was a populist. Ward often expressed distaste for garbage,
refuse, and litter in the park.541 And his opposition to gatherings in the park
for circuses, bicycle races, and political rallies might reflect an austere
naturalist vision of the proper uses of a park, akin to what many proponents
of national parks and wilderness areas often express today. Again,
however, the data do not fully conform to the thesis. Ward was clearly
more sympathetic to the erection of monumental public buildings such as
the Public Library and the Art Institute than he was to lesser intrusions such
as circuses, bicycle tracks, and political rallies. The temporary post office
building was about the most unnatural addition to the park imaginable, but
it had Ward’s consent.
Yet another interpretation is that Ward had a strong antipathy to
disorder. His retailing empire was characterized by its precise organization
and attention to detail.542 Ward was first drawn to intervene in the lakefront
by his disgust at seeing garbage piled in the park for loading onto trains.
Once he assumed the role of “watchdog,” he consistently opposed any
activity that would generate nuisances or involved the gathering of large
and boisterous crowds, such as circuses. The old armories demolished in
1895 were associated in his mind with raucous prizefights and dogfights. In
contrast, large, well-ordered institutions such as public libraries and the post
office were less likely to incur Ward’s displeasure.
To use the modern vernacular, Ward was something of a control freak.
He had the financial resources and, thanks to the public dedication doctrine,
the legal power to attempt to impose his vision of a more orderly world on
the space known as Grant Park. He did not fully succeed, of course, for
large public spaces in major urban centers are inherently disorderly—they

539

To Be a Fine Park, supra note 332.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (source for this particular portion of article as attributed by
the American Heritage Center in Laramie, Wyoming).
541
See supra notes 4, 306–09 and accompanying text.
542
See Boorstin, supra note 264, at 147–78.
540
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are subject to the vagaries and whims of the random clusters of people who
venture forth into them.543
Whatever his private motives, Ward’s persistence and willingness to
spend large sums of money on litigation left a body of law—in particular,
four Illinois Supreme Court precedents—that would protect Grant Park
from major intrusions for more than a century. The City of Chicago would
look very different today but for Aaron Montgomery Ward.
V. THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC DEDICATION DOCTRINE
The Ward precedents were strong stuff—no buildings in Grant Park,
period—and it is not surprising that courts were soon asked to prescribe
limits to this understanding in terms of the territory covered by the public
dedication and the type of intrusions prohibited. The process of identifying
limits began while Ward was still fully engaged in the role of watchdog. It
continues to this day.
A. Territorial Limits of the Doctrine
Ward was responsible for defining the territorial boundary of the Grant
Park public dedication—north, south, east, and west. Ward I established
that the doctrine applied to the original fractional section 10, from Madison
Street on the south to Randolph Street on the north. Ward II extended the
doctrine to landfill east of the original area encompassed by Lake Park.
Ward III established that the doctrine applied in the original fractional
section 15, from Madison Street on the north to Park Row (later to 12th
Street) on the south, and to landfill east of this original area. Ward also
launched two other battles that further delineated the eastern and western
boundaries of the dedication.
In March 1898, the Chicago City Railway Company started
construction on Michigan Avenue for an electric trolley.544 The company
planned to put poles along Michigan Avenue from which to hang trolley
wires.545 Ward secured a temporary injunction against the erection of poles
543

There is evidence that Ward was rather disengaged from the litigation, especially after 1893
when he turned over control of the company to the Thornes. During this period, Ward spent significant
time away from Chicago at his homes in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, and Pasadena, California. For
example, he was absent from the State during the three weeks of evidentiary hearings in Ward I. See
Transcript of Record, supra note 4, at 341 (statement of Thorne and Ward). At least one reporter, who
submitted written questions to Ward only to have the answers quickly clarified by Hanecy, was driven to
ask “whether Mr. Ward, or his attorney, Elbridge Hanecy, is the author of the opposition to
improvements in Grant park.” Ward Wavering on Museum Plan, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1908, at 1.
Nevertheless, although Ward’s attorneys—especially Merrick—made something of a career out of the
Grant Park litigation, there is no evidence that Ward ever disapproved of their efforts or threatened to
stop paying the legal bills. Something about being the watchdog of the lakefront was deeply gratifying
to him, and he persisted in that role until he sold his last interest in the Michigan Avenue property.
544
Bar for the Wires, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1898, at 10.
545
Id.
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and wires within the right-of-way of Michigan Avenue, based on Merrick’s
argument that Ward I covered the area to the west line of Michigan
Avenue.546
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court dissolved the injunction,
holding that Ward had not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that the
ninety feet of Michigan Avenue as constructed was subject to a public
dedication.547 The court pointedly noted that Merrick had failed to include
the original map of fractional section 10 in the record. More pertinently,
the court added that even if the dedication did cover Michigan Avenue, the
dedication was to establish a “public ground,” and “we see nothing
inconsistent, so far as appears from any allegations of fact in the bill, with
such public ground being used for street purposes, and not as a park.”548
The case was remanded to the trial court, where Judge Brentano continued
the injunction to allow Ward to file an amended bill of complaint.549 After
that, the dispute disappeared from the newspapers, presumably because it
was settled or dropped. The practical effect of the ruling seems to have
been to fix the western boundary of the dedication at the eastern—rather
than the western—edge of Michigan Avenue.550
The trolley case also marked one of the last attempts to argue that the
public dedication was an affirmative command to use the lakefront for park
purposes, rather than a negative restriction on buildings. Merrick had no
choice but to make “park purposes” the centerpiece of his argument, since
poles and wires are obviously not “buildings.” This probably explains why
he did not introduce a copy of the original map of section 10—which
explicitly referred to “buildings”—into the record. In any event, the court
saw through the ploy. The decision, which would soon be reinforced by
Ward III, effectively marked the end of the park-purposes argument.551
Another protracted battle launched by Ward would even more clearly
delineate the eastern boundary of the dedication. In 1899, the federal
government granted the Columbia Yacht Club permission to build a
permanent two-story structure at the foot of Randolph Street, just outside
the harbor line.552 At the time, several hundred feet of water separated the
eastern edge of Lake Park and the harbor line. The South Park
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Ban on Loop To Stand, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1898, at 10.
Chi. City Ry. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 76 Ill. App. 536 (1898).
548
Id. at 544.
549
Lifts Ban on Trolley, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1898, at 4.
550
See, e.g., Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chi. Park Dist., 412 Ill. 350, 357, 106 N.E.2d 359, 364
(1952) (describing the boundary of Grant Park, and by implication the dedication, as “the east line of
Michigan Avenue”); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 557 (1931) (describing
boundary of Grant Park as ninety feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue).
551
See supra notes 441–61 and accompanying text.
552
New Yacht Club House, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1899, at 4. The Columbia Yacht Club had been
operating out of a shed atop a barge. Id.
547
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Commissioners intended to fill the park to the harbor line, and the yacht
club building would eventually be situated just off the shore.553 The club’s
officials stated that since the club would be located in waters outside the
harbor line, it would be outside the jurisdiction of the SPC, the City, and the
State.554
On August 16, 1899, Ward filed a bill to enjoin construction of the new
clubhouse, alleging that the structure violated the restriction on buildings in
the park.555 The yacht club responded that Ward had no standing to bring
the suit, because the structure was not located in the park. It argued that
Ward was asserting a type of riparian right associated with ownership of the
park.556 That right belonged to the people at large, and could be vindicated
only by the State’s Attorney, not by a private citizen.557
In December, Judge Kavanaugh declined to grant an injunction, ruling
that Ward lacked standing.558 The judge noted that the City and the Illinois
Central both held property that lay between Ward’s property and the
clubhouse, eliminating any rights that he might claim based on riparian
ownership. A newspaper account of the ruling indicates that Ward intended
to appeal,559 but it appears that he did not.
This was only the beginning of the controversy over the yacht clubs.
In 1901, the SPC granted a second club, the Chicago Yacht Club,
permission to build a clubhouse at the foot of Monroe Street, also just
outside the harbor line.560 Clarence W. Marks, who had sold Ward and
Thorne some of the property that they occupied on Michigan Avenue
between Washington and Madison Streets,561 filed an action for an
injunction against both the Chicago and Columbia Yacht Clubs.562 The
complaint sought to stop the Chicago Yacht Club from building its
clubhouse and to compel the Columbia Yacht Club, which had nearly
completed its building, to tear it down.563 Marks was represented by George
Merrick, Ward’s lawyer throughout the marathon litigation over buildings
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Permission to fill the harbor came from an 1895 city ordinance. See Appellate Record at 63–64,
Chi. Yacht Club v. Marks, 97 Ill. App. 406 (1901).
554
New Yacht Club House, supra note 552.
555
Move Against Columbia Yacht Club, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1899, at 4.
556
Ownership of riparian land often includes the right to an unobstructed view of the water as a
matter of law. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(3), at 6-52–6-53 (Robert E. Beck & Amy L.
Kelley eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2010) (1967) (citing authority).
557
Columbia Yacht Club’s Defense, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 1899, at 4.
558
Rules Against Ward & Co., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1899, at 7.
559
Id.
560
See Defends Lake Front Too, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1901, at 9.
561
Marks had previously consented to the erection of the Chicago Public Library in Dearborn Park.
See Owners of Lots Abutting on Dearborn Park, supra note 86.
562
Defends Lake Front Too, supra note 560.
563
Id.
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in Grant Park.564 It is conceivable that Marks agreed to undertake the
litigation at the urging of Ward, who was presumably barred by res judicata
from challenging the Columbia Yacht Club structure.565
Marks acknowledged in his complaint that the yacht clubs were being
constructed on submerged land that was technically outside the boundary of
Lake Park as defined by the City’s ordinance of 1895.566 But he insisted
that this location was deliberately chosen to frustrate the rights of Michigan
Avenue owners and reflected a conspiracy on the part of the clubs to evade
the law.567
Marks initially had better luck than Ward, securing an ex parte
injunction from Judge Hanecy, Merrick’s former (and future) law partner.568
On appeal, however, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the public
dedication doctrine stopped at the eastern border of Lake Park, wherever
that might be located.569 One can detect in the opinion significant
skepticism about the bona fides of Marks’s contentions. There was
considerable distance between the west side of Michigan Avenue and the
yacht clubhouses, and the structures were not large. The court observed
that “the view from appellee’s premises at the corner of Washington street
and Michigan boulevard can scarcely be said, from the allegation of the
facts of the bill, to be obstructed by a building in the lake opposite the foot
of Monroe street.”570
The first battle over the yacht clubs was concluded, but conflict would
resume again in 1925 after the harbor line, and the park, were extended
farther east into Lake Michigan to facilitate the construction of Lake Shore
Drive. Expansion of the park required relocation of the yacht clubs, and
Michigan Avenue property owners, fortified now by four Ward decisions
rather than just one, promptly sought to enjoin reconstruction of the clubs.

564

Id.
There is no direct evidence of this. After the Chicago Yacht Club’s motion to dissolve the
temporary injunction was denied, Merrick stated to the press, “Mr. Ward is in Europe and I have no
instructions to begin any new suits.” Have Right to View of Lake, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1901, at 1
(internal quotation marks omitted).
After the appellate court overturned the injunction, the case went to the Illinois Supreme Court on
the question of damages under the bond that Marks had posted to secure the injunction. See Marks v.
Columbia Yacht Club, 219 Ill. 417, 76 N.E. 582 (1905). The court awarded the Chicago Yacht Club
$1200 and the Columbia Yacht Club $700 in damages. Id. at 419, 76 N.E. at 582. Marks was
represented by Stein, Mayer, Stein & Hume, not Merrick, in this phase of the dispute. Id.
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See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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Appellate Record, supra note 553, at 12–15.
568
Defends Lake Front Too, supra note 560.
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Chi. Yacht Club v. Marks, 97 Ill. App. 406, 411–12 (1901).
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Id. at 413. Monroe Street is two blocks south of Washington Street.
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In two separate decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected these
renewed challenges to the clubs.571 One of the actions was brought by the
owners of the Stevens Hotel, which would become the Conrad Hilton Hotel
(and is today the Hilton Chicago).572 Although Marks was not cited, the
reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court was equally formalistic: the
proposed yacht club buildings were outside the legal boundary of the park,
and the public dedication doctrine applied only to the park.573
One puzzle presented by these cases is why the yacht clubs triggered
such persistent litigation activity from Michigan Avenue landowners. One
can understand why owners of properties on Michigan Avenue would be
upset by baseball stadiums, armories, depots, and even circus tents blocking
their view of the lake and bringing congestion, noise, and litter to the park
across the street. These structures and their associated activity would
depress the market value of property on the west side of Michigan Avenue,
which would be a reason for a property owner to sue. Yet it is difficult, at
least at this distance in time, to understand how the existence of the yacht
clubs posed any threat to Michigan Avenue land values. The club buildings
were relatively small and not visible from street level on Michigan Avenue.
Indeed, from the perspective of modern sensibilities, the clubs’ neat rows of
sailboats bobbing in the harbor during warm weather would add to, rather
than detract from, the aesthetics of the vista. It is also hard to imagine that
yacht clubs would inject significant traffic or uncouth crowds into the park,
at least to a degree that might affect property values.
We can only speculate that the owners feared that the yacht clubs
would become a precedent that would allow more extensive construction in
the water just outside the official boundary of the park. This was not an
idle threat. Daniel Burnham’s Plan of Chicago prominently featured a wide
strip of park in the lake separated from the shore by lagoons, as well as
multiple artificial islands farther off shore.574 And at one juncture during
the marathon fight over the Field Museum, state legislators proposed to
construct the museum on an island just off the edge of the park.575 Of
571

McCormick v. Chi. Yacht Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N.E. 418 (1928); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chi.
Yacht Club, 339 Ill. 463, 171 N.E. 550 (1930). The McCormick who sued the yacht clubs was not
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, but Robert H. McCormick. The
latter, ironically, was among other things a member of the New York Yacht Club. THE BOOK OF
CHICAGOANS: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF LEADING LIVING MEN OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 438
(Albert Nelson Marquis ed., 1911).
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The Stevens Hotel was managed by the father of John Paul Stevens, future U.S. Supreme Court
Justice. Adam Liptak, From Age of Independence to Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1.
The Stevens Hotel struggled throughout the Great Depression, leading to eventual criminal charges of
embezzlement against Justice Stevens’s father, uncle, and grandfather; their convictions were overturned
by the Illinois Supreme Court. See People v. Stevens, 358 Ill. 391, 193 N.E. 154 (1934).
573
See, e.g., Stevens Hotel, 339 Ill. at 468, 171 N.E. at 552.
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BURNHAM & BENNETT, supra note 93, at 50–53.
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Plan an Atlantis of Field Museum, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1910, at 1.
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course, whether or not their apprehensions were warranted, the owners, by
suing and losing, enhanced the very risk they feared.
Whatever may have motivated the owners to challenge the yacht clubs,
there is little doubt why the Illinois courts rejected these challenges. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in the McCormick decision, quoted paragraphs from
the stipulation of facts reciting the many public benefits associated with the
clubs. The clubs provided free wharfage for the U.S. Naval Reserve, free
nautical training for sailors in World War I, and free sailing lessons for Boy
Scouts; moreover, the wharves of the clubhouse would afford the “only
present means whereby vessels and other craft may safely land passengers
along the lake front.”576 On the other hand, the court seemed skeptical of
the property owners’ claims of injury. One of the plaintiffs, the Stevens
Hotel, averred that it had designed its enormous 3000-room hotel “so that as
large a number of rooms as possible should front on Grant Park and guests
occupying the rooms would have an unobstructed view over the park to the
lake.”577 But the court noted that the reconstructed yacht club building
would be three-quarters of a mile away from the hotel, in a northeasterly
direction, “and the proposed club house will not be visible to a person
walking along Michigan avenue from any point thereof or any part of the
hotel building below the second story.”578 Although the court did not rest its
decisions on a balancing of the equities, it is not hard to perceive that the
court regarded the public benefits from the yacht clubs as exceeding any
detriment to the property owners.
B. Defining “Building”
Just as the trolley and yacht club cases defined the territorial limits of
the Grant Park public dedication, other controversies helped define what
sorts of structures would be regarded as “buildings” prohibited by the
public dedication. In contrast to questions about territorial limits, where
bright-line boundaries have prevailed, the definition of “building”
frequently has been influenced by the purposes of the dedication. To be
sure, the ordinary meaning of “building”—a structure enclosed by walls and
a roof, large enough to accommodate some form of human activity579—has
576

McCormick, 331 Ill. at 519–20, 163 N.E. at 419–20.
Stevens Hotel, 339 Ill. at 465–66, 171 N.E. at 551.
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Id. at 468, 171 N.E. at 552.
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A dictionary in use at the time the dedications were made states that “building” is “[a] fabric or
edifice constructed for use or convenience, as a house.” NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 111 (New York, S. Converse 3d ed. 1830). Shortly after the Ward cases,
“building” was defined as
[t]hat which is built; . . . . As now generally used, a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed,
designed to stand more or less permanently, and covering a space of land, for use as a dwelling,
storehouse, factory, shelter for beasts, or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does
not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding, or similar structure, though designed for
permanent use where it stands; nor a steamboat, ship, or other vessel of navigation.
577

1505

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

established the core meaning of this concept. But in marginal cases the
courts, at least on occasion, have turned to purposive interpretation.
The many decisions and controversies up to 1910 established the outer
limits of the meaning of the term “building.” At one end of the spectrum,
decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court established that libraries, museums,
armories, post offices, and depots were buildings, and the court in dictum
added that power houses and stables would be buildings, too.580 The decree
in Ward I also established that loading platforms and storage sheds were
regarded as buildings. Local precedent had held that a baseball stadium
was a building.581 At the other end of the spectrum, it appears that no one
has ever argued that bridges such as those spanning the Illinois Central
tracks are buildings, or that statues and fountains in the park are buildings.
And the court has opined in dictum that storm shelters, band stands,
lavatories, and toilets would not be buildings.582
As to whether temporary as opposed to permanent structures qualify as
buildings, the local precedents are mixed. Ward was clearly of the view
that tents and wigwams count as buildings, and his aggressive litigation
achieved some success in vindicating this viewpoint. But a number of local
decisions went the other way, both before and after Ward’s reign as
watchdog. The practice today is to allow tents to be erected during various
festivals held in the park.583
The most extensive consideration of the definitional issue occurred in a
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1952, ruling on a challenge to the
construction of the first of four parking garages under the park.584 Although
the project in question entailed significant disruption of the north park and
caused the destruction of the well-known peristyle at Randolph Street and
Michigan Avenue, the court held that it did not violate the public
dedication.585 The court noted that once construction was finished, nearly
all of the parking garage would be underground, except for entrances and
exits and several five-foot-high air vents and intakes, which would be
disguised with shrubbery.

WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 288 (2d ed. 1913). A
modern dictionary defines “building” as “a relatively permanent enclosed construction over a plot of
land, having a roof and usually windows and often more than one level, used for any of a wide variety of
activities, as living, entertaining, or manufacturing” or as “anything built or constructed.” RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 274 (2d ed. 2001).
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Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 510, 89 N.E. 731, 736 (1909).
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See supra notes 237–50 and accompanying text.
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Ward, 241 Ill. at 510, 89 N.E. at 736.
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See, e.g., Kathy Bergen, Event Adds $12 Million for Olympics Bid, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2008,
§ 3 (Business), at 3.
584
Mich. Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chi. Park Dist. (Parking Garage Case), 412 Ill. 350, 352, 106
N.E.2d 359, 361 (1952).
585
Id. at 364, 106 N.E.2d at 367.
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In considering whether the parking garage project violated the
restriction against buildings, the court emphasized the purposes of the
dedication. The intention of the dedication, the court said, “was to keep the
public tracts free of buildings so that there would be unobstructed view of
Lake Michigan” and to make “lots abutting on such tracts more
desirable.”586 Significantly, although the parties had stipulated that the air
vents and intakes were “structures and not buildings,” the court indicated
that it did not regard this as determinative: “[I]t is drawing too fine a line of
distinction to say that the erection of structures generally would not be in
violation of the spirit of the restrictions in the original dedications.”587 The
vents and intakes did not violate the dedication because they occupied only
an “infinitesimal portion” of the whole park, they would be concealed “with
shrubbery so that they will not disfigure” the park, and they would “not
obstruct the view of any tenant of the plaintiff or any tenant of other
abutting property.”588
The decision strongly implied that in borderline cases, whether a
particular structure violates the dedication should be determined by asking
whether it would interfere with the “right to view, light and air” sought to
be protected by the dedication.589 In other words, at least in close cases, the
purpose of the dedication should be considered. The decision eventually
led to the construction of three more underground garages, making Grant
Park—below the surface—one of the largest parking facilities in the
world.590
Under the purposive test deployed in the Parking Garage Case, many
of the structures later erected in Millennium Park would have to be regarded
as buildings. Indeed, Millennium Park includes several structures that
would be regarded as buildings under the dictionary definition of the term,
including the Harris Theater, the Exelon Pavilion, and the McDonald’s
Cycle Center or bicycle station.591 For this reason, the promoters of
Millennium Park eventually concluded that they needed the consent of
abutting landowners to circumvent the Ward precedents.592 But even
without regard to these structures, the Jay Pritzker Pavilion—though
perhaps literally a “band stand” and thus under the dictum in Ward III not a
building—is so massive that it completely obscures the views toward the
lake from Washington Street (see Figure 17). Under the purposive
interpretation of the Parking Garage Case, it should be deemed to be a
building. The polished bean-shaped “Cloud Gate” weighs 110 tons, is
586
587
588
589
590
591
592

Id. at 361, 106 N.E.2d at 365.
Id. at 362, 106 N.E.2d at 366.
Id.
Id. at 363, 106 N.E.2d at 366.
See supra note 116 (listing the underground garages, including sizes and dates of construction).
See GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 251–60, 320–23.
Id. at 141–43.
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sixty-six-feet long, and stands thirty-three-feet high.593 And the Crown
Fountain consists of two towers twenty-three-feet wide, sixteen-feet thick,
and fifty-feet tall.594 From a purposive perspective, these monuments could
also be challenged as obstructing view, light, and air for abutting property
owners.
FIGURE 17: VIEW LOOKING EAST FROM WASHINGTON STREET TOWARD LAKE MICHIGAN AND
THE PRITZKER PAVILION (2010)

Another controversy that directly implicated the definition of
“building” was the longstanding saga involving the Grant Park band shell.
Free summer band concerts first appeared in the park in 1920, using a small
band stand paid for by local business associations.595 In 1931, a much larger
“temporary” band shell was constructed in south Grant Park. It proved to
be immensely popular: by 1940 an estimated 3.5 million people enjoyed the
free concerts every year.596 By the end of World War II, the band shell had
fallen into disrepair; on one occasion, a grand piano reportedly fell through
the stage.597

593
594
595
596
597
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Id. at 59.

105:1417 (2011)

Private Rights in Public Lands

The Park District embarked on a quest to identify a design and location
for a more permanent structure. A long progression of proposals, many by
famous architects, followed.598 The most ironic from the perspective of our
story was a 1961 plan, jointly sponsored by the Park District and the A.
Montgomery Ward Foundation, for a $3 million band shell dedicated to the
memory of Montgomery Ward (see Figure 18).599 Over about a thirty-year
period, all proposals foundered when one or more property owners on
Michigan Avenue either refused to consent or threatened to bring litigation
invoking the Ward precedents to stop construction.600
FIGURE 18: RENDERING OF PROPOSED WARD MEMORIAL BAND SHELL601

598

Id. at 50–63.
Id. at 53; see also Thomas Willis, The Grant Park Amphitheater: Ward’s Ghost Lives, CHI.
TRIB., July 2, 1972, at L3.
600
See, e.g., Hope for Vote on Band Shell Nov. 3 Waning, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 1953, § 1, at 3;
Bernard Judge, Park District Asks To Move Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1969, § 1, at 20; Portable
Band Shell Is Urged, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1972, § 1, at 19; Stanley Ziemba, Grant Park Concerts To Get
New Home—Tent or Bandshell?, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1972, § 1, at 4; Paul Gapp, Park District Seeks
Bids on Disputed Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1977, at B1; Stanley Ziemba, Band-shell Opponents
To Fight Plan in Court, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1977, at A1.
601
On file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-62406. Note the yacht clubs in the foreground.
599
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The impasse was broken, after a fashion, in 1977–78, when Edmund
Kelly, superintendent of the Park District, announced that a new
“demountable” band shell would be erected just east of Columbus Drive
and the Art Institute.602 No one sued to block its erection. When the
summer concert season ended, Kelly said that the Park District would not
waste its funds on “dismantling” the structure.603 Kelly in effect called the
bluff of the Michigan Avenue owners. The Petrillo Music Shell remains a
fixture of the park to this day, notwithstanding the construction of the
$60 million Pritzker Music Pavilion which was supposed to replace it.604
FIGURE 19: CONCERT AT THE PETRILLO BAND SHELL605

The thirty-year struggle to replace the decrepit Grant Park band shell
tells us a great deal about the power and the pitfalls of the public dedication
doctrine. The summer concerts attracted immense crowds,606 and it is not
surprising that one or more landowners might object to the building of a
structure that would encourage masses of humanity entering and leaving the
park. What is more surprising is that owner opposition resulted in the
collapse of repeated proposals for new band shells.607 In Ward III, the
602

Robert Davis & Stanley Ziemba, Compromise Reached on New Band Shell, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11,
1977, § 1, at 1.
603
Bandshell Won’t Be Removed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1978, § 2, at 2.
604
GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 63–76.
605
Photograph by John McCarthy (Sept. 6, 1987) (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi62404).
606
GILFOYLE, supra note 7, at 49.
607
Although the Ward cases were frequently alluded to as legal impediments to the new band shell,
see, e.g., Hope for Vote on Band Shell Nov. 3 Waning, supra note 600, we have discovered only one
instance in which a lawsuit was seriously threatened. See Ziemba, Band-shell Opponents To Fight Plan
in Court, supra note 600. That dispute was later settled. Robert Davis & Stanley Ziemba, Compromise
Reached on New Band Shell, supra note 602. The Park District and Chicago Plan Commission were
nevertheless sufficiently concerned about the threat of litigation that at one point they decided “to make
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Illinois Supreme Court had said that “certain structures are absolutely
necessary for the comfort of the public and the proper use of the park, but
most of them, such as shelters in the case of storms, band stands, lavatories,
toilets, and the like, can be provided without the erection of what would
properly be characterized as a building.”608 This was dictum, but it would
likely be taken seriously by later courts, and would provide an obvious
basis for constructing the argument that a band shell is not a “building”
within the meaning of the public dedication.
The puzzle is why the Park District did not move ahead with a new
band shell project, daring one or more landowners to initiate litigation,
which they would likely lose.609 The answer is unclear, although increasing
political conflict between the Park District and various civic and
environmental advocacy groups over the general direction of park policy
may provide part of the answer.610 The political infighting made it difficult
for the Park District to reach a consensus on a proposal, with the result that
the showdown with Michigan Avenue property owners never occurred.
FIGURE 20: PRITZKER MUSIC PAVILION (2010) (PHOTO TAKEN LOOKING WEST)

a ‘deep’ examination” of the legal issues, including “[w]hether [a] proposal ‘[was] in accord with court
decrees that Grant Park be forever vacant of buildings.’” Dolores McCahill, New Band Shell for Park
Delayed, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 1977, at 92.
608
Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 510, 89 N.E. 731, 736 (1909) (emphasis
added).
609
The Park District suggested this route at one point. Portable Band Shell Is Urged, supra note
600. However, the path was never followed.
610
The Park District faced obstacles from the Chicago Planning Commission, which had to approve
all structures in the park, as well as opposition from civic groups such as Friends of the Parks. See Paul
Gapp, Grant Park Band Shell Back to Drawing Board, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1977, § 4, at 1. See also
Gapp, supra note 600.
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C. The Consent Mechanism
The public dedication doctrine is a unanimous consent mechanism.
Any abutting landowner can block a forbidden use, provided that he or she
is willing to incur the expense of a lawsuit. But if all abutting owners
consent to a use, the project can go forward, even if it would otherwise
violate the dedication. The consent mechanism has been successfully
invoked on four occasions with respect to Grant Park: the Public Library,
the Art Institute, the temporary post office, and Millennium Park. Three of
those invocations—all except the temporary post office—have had a
profound effect on the visage of the park.
The Art Institute is by far the largest permanent building in the park,
and it owes its presence to the consent mechanism. We have previously
described the circumstances of its original construction in the park.611 The
building was designed as a venue for the World’s Congress Auxiliary, as
part of the Columbian Exposition, and, after the fair, was turned over as a
new permanent home for the Art Institute.612 The Daggett case, decided by
a panel of circuit judges in 1892, held that all necessary Michigan Avenue
owners except Sarah Daggett had consented to the erection of the building,
and it ruled that Daggett’s objections were barred by laches.613 The idea
that the Art Institute had obtained unanimous consent from Michigan
Avenue owners received the imprimatur of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Ward I, and from that time forward the consent mechanism has been
understood to be the legal foundation for the Art Institute complex.
The original legislation authorizing construction of the Art Institute
limited it to 400 feet of frontage on Michigan Avenue.614 As constructed,
the building occupied some 320 feet of frontage.615 In ensuing years, the
Art Institute would continually expand its facilities, though always to the
east, and always in such a way as neither to increase its frontage along
Michigan Avenue nor to raise its height above the original structure. In
1913, with the consent of the Illinois Central and the South Park
Commissioners, the Art Institute constructed an addition called Gunsaulus
Hall over the top of the Illinois Central right-of-way.616 This permitted
further expansion on the landfill area east of the railroad tracks, and
611

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
613
Daggett v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. Cir. Ct. Rep. 79, 86–92 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1892). The
decision also held, in the alternative, that the legislation authorizing condemnation of the rights of
abutting owners had eliminated their right to injunctive relief, id. at 88–92, but this rationale was
effectively overruled by Ward III and Ward IV, see supra Parts IV.D and IV.E.
614
Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 260 Ill. App. 555, 568 (1931); JOURNAL OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO FOR COUNCIL YEAR 1891, at 1825–26
(1891).
615
Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 568.
616
Id. at 568–69.
612
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multiple additions were placed in this area between 1920 and 1926.617 At no
time during this relentless expansion did any Michigan Avenue landowner
raise an objection.
FIGURE 21: ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO AS ORIGINALLY CONSTRUCTED (LOOKING NORTHEAST
618
FROM MICHIGAN AVENUE)

In 1928, the Art Institute received permission from the SPC to embark
on yet another addition east of the Illinois Central—the Agnes Allerton
Wing—and this expansion finally elicited a legal challenge.619 The Stevens
Hotel, which also sought at the time to enjoin reconstruction of the Chicago
Yacht Club, retained George Merrick to seek an injunction against the Art
Institute. Merrick was more than successful in the circuit court, obtaining a
broadly worded injunction from Judge Hugo A. Friend barring construction
of any building, structure, enlargement, or extension “of any kind, size,
nature or description whatever, or for any purpose whatsoever, anywhere
within the limits of Grant Park.”620 An alarmed Art Institute, following the
pattern of the Ward cases, filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Finding that the conditions for a direct appeal were not satisfied, the
supreme court transferred the case to the Illinois Appellate Court.621
617

Id. at 569.
Photograph by J.W. Taylor (1897) (on file with Chicago History Museum ICHi-59520).
619
See Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 569–70.
620
Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., 342 Ill. 180, 181, 173 N.E. 761, 762 (1930) (quoting
Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of Chi., No. B-176132, at 4 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1930))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
621
The question of the court’s jurisdiction had not been discussed by the parties but was raised by
the court sua sponte. The court held that no question of any freehold was involved nor was there any
challenge to the validity of any municipal ordinance or statute. Id. at 182–83, 173 N.E. at 762–63. The
court apparently viewed the case as involving nothing more than the validity of the contract between the
SPC and the Art Institute, authorizing the new extension.
618
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The appellate court proceeded to render a remarkable decision which
has effectively served as the legal charter for the Art Institute to the present
day. The court was significantly handicapped in construing the scope of the
original consents since they were not introduced into the record.622 The
622

Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 566. In the Boaz litigation, see infra notes 635–40 and
accompanying text, regarding the consents for Millennium Park, the City stated that the original Art
Institute consents had been lost. See Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 3 & Response to Motion to
Dismiss Complaint at 6–7, Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14,
2000). We uncovered the original consent sheet in the court records for the Daggett case. The City in
Boaz submitted a document from the archives of the Art Institute, which is a typed version of the
original consent sheet submitted by Caryl Young in the Daggett litigation; the typed version adds to the
original a title, an introductory paragraph, and has the signatures typed. Consent of Abutting Property
Owners (Apr. 25, 1892) (on file with authors). The original consent sheet reads as follows:
Whereas the undersigned are respectively the owners and occupiers under lease of the property
situate on the west side of Michigan Avenue and north of Jackson street, set opposite our names
respectively, and,
Whereas, the World’s Columbian Exposition and Art Institute of Chicago propose to erect a
permanent building on the so-called Lake Front, north of the north line of Jackson street extended,
and east of the east line of Michigan avenue, said building to be used for purposes connected with
the World’s Columbian Exposition until the close of said Exposition, at which time said
Exposition is to release all claims of every kind and character it may have in and to the buildings
erected upon said premises, and,
Whereas, thereafter said Art Institute proposes to control and devote said building to the
permanent use of said Art Institute, and for the exhibition of works of art, including paintings,
sculpture, etc., and also as a public memorial in memory of the discovery of America by
Christopher Columbus,
Now therefore, for the purpose of promoting the construction of said public art building, and
for the purpose of aiding the construction thereof—believing the same to be in the interest of the
City of Chicago, we, the undersigned as owners and occupiers of said property so situated upon
the west side and fronting Michigan avenue, hereby consent to the construction, erection and
maintenance of said building for the purpose aforesaid, and also hereby waive and release all
claims of any easement that we now have, or may heretofore have had in said Lake Front, north of
Jackson Street; and hereby waive all claims of damages of every kind and character that may result
from the erection and permanent maintenance of said building. PROVIDED, however, that if said
building shall not be occupied by said Art Institute for the exhibition of arts as contemplated by
the organization of said Institute, or if it shall be occupied for any other purpose or purposes than
as above authorized, then this release shall be void and without effect.
signed
W.C. Ritchie
40 feet
per W.E. Ritchie atty
40 "
F.B. Rhodes
40 "
Caryl Young 145 Mich. Ave.
71 2/3 ft.
Spoor MacKey
51 "
Warren F. Leland
160 "
O. M. Powers
38 "
Leroy Payne
105 "
B.F. McNeill & Bros.
Orrington Lunt
27 1/2 "
John S. Hair
26 "
Shepherd Brooks
by Owen F. Aldis, Atty. in fact
90 cor. of Monroe
R. F. Newcomb No. 152 & 153
39 feet
[seal] Pullman Palace Car Co.
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court accordingly proceeded by indirection, looking to language in the
statutes and ordinances authorizing the original construction of the building
as well as to the language of the Daggett and Ward I decrees validating the
consents. The court concluded from this review that the consents must have
contemplated that the building would be permanent, that it would
accommodate the reasonable needs of the Art Institute, and that it would
include “necessary enlargement of the building” over time as the museum’s
needs grew with an increasing Chicago population.623
The court reinforced these conclusions with a discussion of the conduct
of the Michigan Avenue owners in the almost forty years that had elapsed
since the building was initially authorized.624 After reciting the many
additions and enlargements that had been made during this period, the court
noted that all “were discussed in the public press and were generally known
to all of the citizens of Chicago and particularly to the abutting property
owners”; that the construction had taken place “in plain view” and was
“easily visible” to the owners; that no owner at any time had commenced a
legal proceeding against the Art Institute contesting these additions and
enlargements; and that, notwithstanding all this, during the same time
“abutting property owners ha[d] vigorously and successfully opposed the
construction of any other buildings in Grant Park.”625 This analysis was
advanced to support a construction of the consents based on the course of
conduct by the owners. But it could equally have been used to establish a
finding of acquiescence, waiver, or estoppel on their part; conceivably, it
might even have established that the right of the owners had been
extinguished by the open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession of
portions of the park by the Art Institute.
The court concluded by observing that the Art Institute had offered at
trial to enter into a number of stipulations if the broad injunction sought by
the hotel was denied.626 The court observed that “these stipulations might
well be incorporated in the final decree.”627 The result was in effect a
regulatory injunction granting the Art Institute the right to construct an
enormous complex, subject to height and frontage restrictions. As long as
by Geo. M. Pullman, Prest
120 ft. 5in.
Silas A. Barton
40 ft.
Winship & Price
40 feet
623
Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 567, 576–77 (emphasis omitted). The language of “necessary
enlargement” was found in the superior court decree in Ward I. See id. at 567.
624
Id. at 566–69.
625
Id. at 570.
626
These were as follows: the Art Institute would never exceed a boundary marked by Monroe
Street on the north, Jackson Street on the south, Michigan Avenue on the west, and what is now called
Columbus Drive on the east; it would never occupy more than 400 feet of frontage on Michigan
Avenue; and it would never build a structure higher than the original building on Michigan Avenue. Id.
at 577–78.
627
Id. at 578.
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the Art Institute adhered to the terms of the injunction, it would have no
further worries based on the public dedication doctrine.628 With its most
recent additions, the Art Institute has filled virtually the entire area
described by the stipulations.629
The Art Institute case resolved some important questions regarding the
consent mechanism. A consent given by an owner is binding on successors
in interest.630 A consent given to one structure does not constitute a waiver
of rights to object to other structures in the future.631 The scope of any
consent is to be determined by general principles of contractual
interpretation.632 If the actual consents have been lost, then the scope must
be determined inferentially by other evidence.633 Such other evidence
includes the practical construction of the scope of the consents as reflected
in the behavior of the parties.634
Many decades later, when attorneys advising the proponents of
Millennium Park concluded that the Harris Theater would likely be
regarded as a building, and hence that owner consents were necessary to
eliminate the threat of litigation under the Ward precedents, further
questions about the consent mechanism were presented. The question the
attorneys focused on most intensively: who qualifies as an abutting owner
for purpose of obtaining the needed consents? Based on the form from the
archives of the Art Institute and the decision in Ward I, the attorneys
concluded that consents were required only from those who owned property
directly opposite or diagonally across from the project.635 Consents were
solicited and obtained from owners or agents of owners within this group.636
A test case, Boaz v. City of Chicago, was then filed on behalf of the owners
of a condominium on Randolph Street located farther east of Millennium
Park, claiming that their consent was also required. The City moved to
dismiss, and after briefing and argument, Circuit Court Judge Green granted
628

The final decree incorporated the stipulations. Decree at 3, Stevens Hotel Co. v. Art Inst. of
Chi., No. 31C176132 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. July 9, 1931).
629
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
630
See Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 575–76.
631
See id. at 572.
632
See id. at 576.
633
See id.
634
See id. at 572.
635
This was also the conception of the relevant universe of owners whose consent was required in
constructing the Public Library and the temporary post office. For the Public Library, see supra note 86
and accompanying text. For the temporary post office, see supra notes 347–52 and accompanying text.
It does not appear that the litigants in Boaz were aware of either precedent.
636
In the case of Millennium Park, this was every owner (and in some cases lessees) on the west
side of Michigan Avenue from Monroe Street to Randolph Street, and every owner on the north side of
Randolph Street from Michigan Avenue to Columbus Drive, plus the diagonally situated property
owners on Michigan just south of Monroe, on Michigan just north of Randolph, and on Randolph just
east of Columbus. There were fifteen owners in all in this area. Motion to Dismiss Complaint ¶¶ 4–5 &
Exhibit E, Boaz v. City of Chicago, No. 99L-3804 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000).
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the motion,637 effectively ruling that consent was required only from owners
directly abutting and those diagonally located from the project.
This ruling was almost certainly wrong. None of the parties in Boaz
cited the decisions in Ward III and Ward IV, which upheld Montgomery
Ward’s right to enjoin the construction of the Field Museum.638 The
museum was to be located in the park at Congress Street, a full five blocks
south of Ward’s property at Madison Street. Thus, the Illinois Supreme
Court understood that Ward had standing to object even though his property
was neither opposite nor diagonal from the proposed project. If Ward had
standing to object, then his consent would be required under the consent
mechanism.
Similarly, when the Stevens Hotel sought to block
construction of the Chicago Yacht Club and an addition to the Art Institute,
the courts did not suggest that it lacked standing because the hotel was not
located directly opposite or diagonally from these structures. Again, if the
Stevens Hotel had standing to object, then its consent was required under
the consent mechanism.639
Given that the Boaz consent theory is inconsistent with Illinois
Supreme Court precedent, Millennium Park is vulnerable to a legal
challenge by nonconsenting owners abutting other parts of the park, such as
owners located farther south of Monroe Street.640 Now that Millennium
Park has been built, any such action would likely be met by a defense of
laches. Still, more thorough legal research would have been a good idea
before piling $370 million in improvements in the northwest corner of
Grant Park.
VI. ASSESSING THE PUBLIC DEDICATION DOCTRINE
It remains to consider some more-general lessons that can be drawn
from the story of Chicago’s premier public park. What accounts for the
decline of the public dedication doctrine, to the point where it is today
largely forgotten? How does the public dedication doctrine stack up against
the public trust doctrine? What does the public dedication doctrine tell us
about the merits of creating antiproperty rights to protect public spaces?

637

Boaz, No. 99L-3804.
Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909); S. Park Comm’rs v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1910).
639
It was stipulated in the Art Institute litigation that the “predecessors in title” of the hotel had
given their consent to the Art Institute. Stevens Hotel, 260 Ill. App. at 564. This stipulation is
inconsistent with the consents actually obtained by Caryl Young for the Art Institute. See supra note
622. The Stevens Hotel was 2563 feet (or almost five blocks) south of the Art Institute.
640
The consent procedure followed in obtaining approval for the Art Institute and Millennium Park
is also inconsistent with the Chicago City Charter of 1861 and of 1863, which provided that no
encroachments were to be permitted in the park “without the assent of all the persons owning lots or
land on said street or avenue” (emphasis added). See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
638
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A. The Decline of the Public Dedication Doctrine
Shortly before the first Ward case was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Illinois Central, launched the modern public trust doctrine.641 The
Court rejected the Illinois Central’s claim that it had acquired vested rights
under the Lake Front Act of 1869, which the State had taken by repealing
the Act in 1873. The submerged land under Lake Michigan was owned by
the State of Illinois in trust for the people.642 The conveyance by the
legislature of this land to the railroad was a breach of this trust.643 The
railroad’s claim of vested rights was thus without merit, because the State
had no authority to convey such extensive rights in the submerged land to
the railroad in the first place.
Given that the Ward cases and the public trust doctrine both emerged
in the same place at approximately the same time, the history of the
Chicago lakefront provides an instructive source of information about the
relative merits of these two public rights doctrines. Although the public
dedication doctrine and the public trust doctrine have not always been
sharply distinguished, they in fact rest on very different understandings.
The public dedication doctrine is a creation of the law of equity. It allows
persons who have purchased real property in reliance on a dedication of
nearby land to public use to sue to enjoin departures from the dedication.
The public trust doctrine is a doctrine about the legal title in which certain
public assets are held. It provides that these assets are held in trust for the
people, and hence cannot be transferred to nongovernmental entities for
purposes that would violate the trust.644
A well-informed observer, considering the way the two doctrines had
been applied on the Chicago lakefront up to, say, 1912, would likely
conclude that the public dedication doctrine was quite powerful, whereas
the public trust doctrine was relatively weak. As we have seen, the public
dedication doctrine had been used to defeat multiple proposals, enjoying
widespread political support, to build armories, libraries, and museums in
the landfill area of Grant Park.645 The public dedication had even been held
to be immune from condemnation under the power of eminent domain.646
The public trust doctrine, in contrast, presented little obstacle to
ambitious projects calling for further landfilling of the lake. To be sure, the
Illinois Central’s claim of right to construct and control an outer harbor had

641
642
643
644

Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 452–56.
Id. at 455.
See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 325–27, 786 N.E.2d 161, 169–70

(2003).
645
646

(1910).
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been thwarted in the name of the public trust.647 But in further proceedings
conducted on remand from Illinois Central, the local federal courts held
that the railroad’s improvements built on landfill in Lake Michigan up to
the time of the Court’s decision were all consistent with the public trust
doctrine since they did not interfere with the public’s access to the lake for
purposes of navigation or fishing.648 The Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed these holdings.649 In another decision of far-reaching consequence,
the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1896 that Chicago authorities could
construct Lake Shore Drive north of the river on landfill in the lake and
finance the project by selling the submerged land between the new roadway
and the shore to private owners.650 The project had the blessing of the state
legislature, and the court said that it would defer to the legislature’s
judgment as to whether this was consistent with the public trust in which
the land was held.651 As the twentieth century advanced, the public trust
doctrine remained relatively impotent. The Illinois courts had little trouble
approving projects to build a large water filtration plant on landfill in the
lake and a massive convention center on landfill just south of Grant Park
and the Field Museum, and further held that because of laches the public
had lost any claim to the air rights above the landfill on which the Illinois
Central had located its terminal facilities north of Randolph Street.652
The tipping point in the relative prominence of the two doctrines, at
least in Illinois, can be marked with precision. In Paepcke v. Public
Building Commission of Chicago,653 the Illinois Supreme Court was faced
with a challenge to a plan to use two city parks as sites for the construction
of new school buildings. The plaintiffs challenged the plan under both the
public dedication and the public trust doctrines. The court summarily
rejected the public dedication argument. A doctrine enforced by the Illinois
Supreme Court to protect public spaces in dozens of cases over a century
was effectively interred with the comment that “[t]he mere dedication by
the sovereign of lands to public park uses does not give property owners
adjoining or in the vicinity of the park the right to have the use continue
unchanged.”654 The Ward cases were distinguished on the ground that the
Chicago city charters of 1861 and 1863 gave abutting property owners of
Grant Park a statutory cause of action, whereas the plaintiffs in Paepcke had
647

Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 454–55.
Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 91 F. 955, 957–62 (7th Cir. 1899).
649
Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 184 U.S. 77, 99 (1902).
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People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 148–53, 45 N.E. 830, 834–35 (1896).
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See Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15 (1954) (water-filtration plant);
Fairbank v. Stratton, 14 Ill. 2d 307, 152 N.E.2d 569 (1958) (McCormick Place convention center);
Hickey v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966) (air rights over the Illinois Central’s
terminal facilities north of Randolph Street).
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Id. at 338, 263 N.E.2d at 16.
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no such special statutory right.655 This ignored the fact that the Illinois
Supreme Court, in the Ward cases, had rested on the general public
dedication doctrine, not on any statutory right peculiar to the lakefront.656
The public trust theory, in contrast, was treated by the Paepcke court
much more sympathetically. The court quoted at length from a recent law
review article by Professor Joseph Sax urging courts to look to the public
trust doctrine to protect the public interest in common resources, and
seemingly endorsed this conclusion.657 Overruling prior decisions, it held
that any taxpayer was entitled to sue to enforce the public trust.658 In terms
of the substantive content of the trust, the court adopted Wisconsin
precedents setting forth a five-part test for determining whether a diversion
in the use of public trust lands is permissible.659 The bottom line, however,
was disappointing for the plaintiffs: the court simply announced, without
any analysis, that the public trust was not violated by the decision to build
schools in public parks.660
After Paepcke, the public dedication doctrine disappeared in Illinois as
a tool for preserving public spaces such as parks and was replaced by the
public trust doctrine.661 The results have been mixed. Plans to landfill Lake
Michigan in order to expand U.S. Steel’s South Works plant were scuttled,
as was a plan to expand Loyola University’s Lakeshore Campus in Rogers
Park on the far north side of the City.662 But the Illinois Supreme Court had
no difficulty approving a complete reconstruction of the venerable Soldier
Field to meet the specifications of the Chicago Bears football team.663
Although the proximate cause of the demise of the public dedication
doctrine as a protector of public uses, at least in Illinois, was the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in Paepcke, no doubt there were deeper causes as
well. With the merger of law and equity and the general decline in the
655

Id. at 339–40, 263 N.E.2d at 17–18.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 409, 48 N.E. 927, 932 (1897).
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Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d at 336–38, 263 N.E.2d at 16 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 482–86
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M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998).
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See Paepcke, 46 Ill. 2d at 341, 263 N.E.2d at 18.
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Id. at 344, 263 N.E.2d at 19.
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Illinois courts continue to recognize the public dedication doctrine in the context of dedicated
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(1977); see also Harris Bank of St. Charles v. City of Geneva, 278 Ill. App. 3d 738, 663 N.E.2d 483
(1996); Terwelp v. Sass, 111 Ill. App. 3d 133, 443 N.E.2d 804 (1982). In effect, public dedication law
has reverted to the narrow scope that it enjoyed under English law. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
662
People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976) (U.S. Steel South
Works); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Loyola
Lakeshore Campus).
663
See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312, 786 N.E.2d 161 (2003).
656

1520

105:1417 (2011)

Private Rights in Public Lands

study of equity as a separate field of legal inquiry,664 the doctrinal
underpinnings of the public dedication doctrine in the law of equity have no
doubt seemed increasingly foreign to lawyers and judges.
The general understanding of public property has also changed. In the
nineteenth century, public property tended to be regarded as something akin
to “inherently public” property or open-access resources.665 The idea that
particular individuals might obtain special rights in open-access resources
did not seem strange, whether it was someone pulling a fish from a public
stream or discovering minerals on the public domain.666 With the growth of
government and the number of government employees who serve as
custodians of public resources, public property has come to be regarded as
largely equivalent to private property, except that government agents
manage and control it. The idea that private owners might have special
rights in government property in this stronger sense seems harder to sustain.
Private property and public rights have come to be regarded as
mutually exclusive in more fundamental ways as well. Preservationists and
environmentalists tend to see private property as a threat to public values.667
Private property, in the typical view, encourages self-regarding and
exploitative behavior. Effective protection of common and public resources
necessitates the extension of governmental control over resources. This
attitude is gradually becoming more nuanced, as the environmental
community increasingly sees value in market mechanisms based on novel
types of property or property-like rights.668 But the public dedication
doctrine entered its desuetude at a time when private property was viewed
as the enemy of public rights.
Finally, a generalized norm of citizen equality is relevant here. We
tend to think of public property as something open to all members of the
public on equal terms. The public dedication doctrine does not directly
contradict this understanding. But, as evidenced in the Ward cases, it seems
to say that some members of the public have a greater say about the way in
which public property will be used and managed than do other members of
the public. Just as the Supreme Court has tended to take a dim view of
664

See Lester B. Orfield, The Place of Equity in the Law School Curriculum, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 26
(1949) (discussing the debate then underway about whether to retain equity as a separate course of study
in law school). Orfield notes that only eight schools had abandoned the course in equity in 1949, but
three were in Illinois: Northwestern, the University of Chicago, and Illinois. Id. at 36–37. Since then,
principles of equity have generally been taught in courses in “remedies,” when they are taught at all.
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See Rose, supra note 11, at 762–66.
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For example, prospectors operating in the public domain could acquire rights to exclude other
members of the public under the pedis possessio doctrine. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith, 249 U.S.
337, 353 (1919).
667
See Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and the Politics of Environmental Protection, 28
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69 (2004).
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See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
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voting schemes that give the franchise to property owners and not to
others,669 so a legal doctrine that gives authority over public resources to
certain property owners and not others seems to run counter to the
democratic ethos.670
B. Public Dedication Versus Public Trust
Notwithstanding its general demise as a source of protection for public
uses, it is worth considering how the public dedication doctrine, at least as
elaborated in the Ward precedents, stacks up against the more-favored
public trust doctrine as a tool for protecting public spaces. Five potential
advantages of the public dedication doctrine can be cited.
First, the public dedication doctrine covers a much wider array of
resources. With the exception of Paepcke,671 which involved urban
parkland, all Illinois public trust cases have involved land that is or was
covered by navigable waterways.672 Illinois is not exceptional in this
regard. In virtually all states, the public trust doctrine remains tethered to
navigable waters, and courts have resisted extending the doctrine to public
lands having no nexus to navigable waters.673 The public dedication
doctrine, in contrast, applies to any and all lands that have been dedicated to
public uses, including streets, alleys, squares, landings, and parks.674 The
only requirement for enforcement in equity is that there be one or more
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See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating municipal voting scheme
granting only property tax payers the right to vote on elections to approve municipal utility bonds);
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private landholdings adjacent to the public space whose value is affected by
the public dedication.675
Second, the public dedication doctrine provides a much more objective
test for identifying the protected resources and the nature of the constraints
imposed on public authorities. This is especially true where the doctrine is
anchored in some kind of published plat or map, as was the case with the
Chicago lakefront. The area covered by the doctrine (e.g., Randolph Street
to Park Row) and the restrictions imposed by the doctrine (e.g., no
buildings) were set forth on maps in discernible markings and words,
although of course, as we have seen, disputes have arisen about the exact
meaning of these markings and words.676 Even absent an express marking
on a map or plat, longstanding public use serves as a relatively objective
indicator of what spaces are subject to the doctrine and in what respects
they have been dedicated. The public trust doctrine, in contrast, is mired in
uncertainty about what kind of nexus to navigable waters is required (if
any), and what kinds of trust obligations are imposed on the state when the
doctrine applies.677
Third, the public dedication doctrine incorporates a rule-like
understanding, which encourages judicial enforcement and facilitates
bargaining among affected interests. In the case of a specific dedication,
such as the “no buildings” restriction on the Chicago lakefront, the public
dedication doctrine grants abutting owners the power to insist on strict
compliance with the dedication. “No buildings” means no buildings. Even
in the case of a general dedication, such as an open space on a map, the
doctrine often enshrines the status quo as reflected in longstanding public
uses.678 The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, tends to reflect a
675

See supra notes 164–67, 175–76 and accompanying text.
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poorly defined standard, which confers considerable discretion on courts
and tends to make bargaining among interest groups more difficult. In
Illinois, the courts have searched for an enforceable rule and have found
only one: title to public trust lands must not be transferred to private
entities.679 This has done little to further the cause of preservation.
Fourth, the public dedication doctrine incorporates a standing rule that
identifies, in addition to public authorities, a finite group of virtual
representatives of the public who can enforce or waive the dedication:
abutting landowners. Abutting landowners will be motivated to monitor for
violations and to seek to prevent deviations from permitted uses, for they
have a direct financial interest in doing so. Part of the value of the public
dedication is capitalized in the value of their real estate holdings, and this
gives the members a powerful incentive to seek to preserve the
dedication.680 Thus, if momentary enthusiasms for development of public
spaces overcome civic leaders, abutting landowners can step forward to
resist the idea, and in so doing protect longer-run interests in conserving
public spaces.
In contrast, the public trust doctrine swings between one of two
extremes in terms of standing rules. In Illinois, before Paepcke, only the
Attorney General could sue to enforce the public trust; afterwards, any state
taxpayer had standing to sue.681 The former rule leaves enforcement of the
public trust subject to the vagaries of the political process; the latter rule
supplements public enforcement with enforcement activity by nonprofit
advocacy groups. Limiting enforcement to public officials may lead to
underenforcement, particularly if public officials are vulnerable to capture
by private interests that favor development. Expanding enforcement by
recognizing universal taxpayer standing may result in overenforcement,
insofar as the preferences of advocacy groups may not align with median
voter preferences. Moreover, allowing any advocacy group to bring an
enforcement action may mean in practice that the decision whether to
enforce particular restrictions on the use of public spaces is delegated to the
discretion of the courts, which raises difficult questions about whether this
is a legitimate judicial function.682
eventually agreed that the Chicago lakefront dedication was a specific dedication proscribing buildings
within the dedicated space. See Ward v. Field Museum of Natural History, 241 Ill. 496, 508–10, 89
N.E. 731, 736 (1909).
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Fifth, provided that the number of abutting owners is not too large, the
public dedication doctrine provides a mechanism for allowing
modifications to the dedication over time. Minor deviations that have a
minimal impact on abutting land values will not likely be challenged, and
once such projects have been completed, challenges will be barred by
laches. Major deviations that nevertheless enhance the value of abutting
property may also take place pursuant to the unanimous consent
mechanism. The public trust doctrine is also subject to the defense of
laches,683 but contains nothing like the unanimous consent mechanism for
achieving ex ante authorization to modify public uses.
No legal doctrine functions perfectly, of course, and our review of the
history of the public dedication doctrine in the context of the Chicago
lakefront also reveals some limitations of that doctrine. One clear
limitation is that the private interests of abutting landowners will often fail
to generate a level of enforcement activity commensurate with the total
value to the community of preserving public spaces. Almost by definition,
the value to abutting landowners will be a fraction of the total community
value. Thus, although it is quite possible that the public dedication doctrine
will generate more enforcement activity than the public trust doctrine, it is
unlikely that it will generate optimal levels of enforcement.
In the context of Chicago’s lakefront park, Montgomery Ward was by
no means the only enforcement agent. A variety of owners, ranging from
John Stafford to Warren Leland, Sarah Daggett, Clarence Marks, Levy
Mayer, Robert H. McCormick, and the Stevens family all took up the cause
of protecting the park.684 The public dedication doctrine generated a fairly
consistent level of enforcement activity by abutting landowners from 1864
until the new millennium, with the exception of the period immediately
after the 1871 fire that destroyed most of the structures along Michigan
Avenue.685
Nevertheless, Montgomery Ward unquestionably engaged in
enforcement activity at a higher and more sustained level than any owner
before or since. Other owners sought and obtained temporary injunctions.
But they usually dropped out of the picture after a few years. Rarely did
they persist in litigating to the point of securing a permanent injunction.
And only Ward was willing to fund litigation through repeated rounds of
appellate litigation.
This suggests that perhaps one or more abutting owners must have
unusually large stakes to obtain effective enforcement. If every abutting
deficit); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986) (arguing that public regulation is
inherently superior to judicial enforcement of a vague trust obligation).
683
Hickey v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966).
684
See supra Parts III and IV.B.
685
See supra notes 57–74 and accompanying text.
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owner has an equal and relatively small stake, then it will be difficult to
form a coalition to share the costs of litigation, because of familiar
problems in forging agreements for collective action.686 Only if one or more
owners have unusually large stakes—either because they have more land or
because their land is more sensitive to the preservation of public uses—will
the public dedication mechanism work.687 The Ward history also suggests
that effective enforcement may depend on one or more owners being rather
fanatical, either because they harbor unusually intense preferences for
preservation or because they are drawn into a grudge match with
proponents of development, or for some other reason. Obviously, the
conditions that call forth a champion who fights to defend a public
dedication will be somewhat rare.
Another limitation highlighted by the history is that the preferences of
abutting owners and of the general public may diverge, sometimes quite
significantly. On the largest question—whether to maintain a public space
or permit it to be privatized—there is likely to be a convergence of interests.
But on subsidiary issues, abutting landowners may harbor very different
preferences about how to manage public spaces. To simplify, abutting
owners are likely to prefer peace and quiet, whereas the general public may
want fun and games. As we have seen, Michigan Avenue owners tended to
oppose baseball stadiums, toboggan slides, armories used as venues for
prize fights, circuses, political conventions held in wigwams, and pavilions
for outdoor concerts. It is likely that a public referendum would yield
different views on these activities. Ward, who became the park’s most
important enforcement agent, may have harbored even more negative views
about public gatherings than most abutting owners.
C. The Feasibility of Antiproperty
Finally, our history allows us to offer some observations about the
proposal to confer antiproperty rights on abutting owners of public spaces
in order to encourage their preservation.688 This proposal closely conforms
to the public dedication doctrine, but with some significant qualifications.
One qualification concerns who has the burden of going forward in a
regime of unanimous consent. If public authorities must solicit consents,
then the costs of exercising a veto are very low. An owner merely has to
refuse to sign a form. If abutting owners must go to court and secure an
686
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injunction, then the costs of exercising a veto are much higher. Now
owners must incur substantial litigation costs in order to wield a veto.
The assumed burden of going forward implicitly shifted from time to
time during the history of the Chicago lakefront. During the heyday of
Ward’s reign as watchdog, city officials came to behave as if they had to
obtain Ward’s consent before they could do anything on the lakefront. This
also appears to have been the assumption during the thirty-year period in
which the Park District was frustrated in its efforts to build a new band
shell. But after the Chicago Fire, and perhaps more recently during the
planning for Millennium Park, city officials seem to have assumed that they
have the right to build, unless and until an owner obtains a court order
stopping them. Perhaps the assumption about who has the burden of going
forward depends on how clearly the dedication applies, and on how salient
the possibility of judicial enforcement is in the minds of those affected.
In any event, if one were to legislate an antiproperty rule, a critical
variable would be to determine the burden of going forward under a
unanimous consent rule. One could legislate a rule requiring owner consent
in all cases, which would make the costs of exercising the veto low.
Alternatively, one could legislate a right to object that would be effectuated
only by securing a judicial judgment, which would make the costs of
exercising the veto relatively high.
The history of Grant Park suggests that a costly veto is better. Any
activity as complex as managing a public park or similar public space will
entail many issues as to which reasonable minds can differ. Should public
lavatories be permitted in the park or not? Should temporary tents for
festivals be permitted or not? If public authorities must secure unanimous
consent for every decision, nothing will be permitted, and the park may
degenerate into an unruly or unused commons. One solution would be to
try to define the types of major decisions that require authorities to secure
unanimous consent, leaving minor issues to the discretion of public
authorities. But this would generate disputes about what is major and
minor. The public dedication doctrine partially solves the problem by in
effect imposing a tax on the exercise of the veto, equal to the legal fees that
must be expended to secure an injunction. Under the American rule that
precludes fee-shifting, this means that abutting owners will exercise the
veto only if the disutility of the proposed change is sufficiently severe to
warrant the investment in legal fees.
A second qualification concerns the number of parties who must
consent. The larger the number of parties, the higher the transaction costs
of securing unanimous consent. Bell and Parchomovsky write as if the
higher the transaction costs the better, because the public space will be
more effectively protected.689 This perspective, however, leads to the
689

See id. at 5–6.

1527

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

conclusion that consent should be required of everyone in the community,
since this would generate the highest level of transaction costs and hence
the most protection.
The history of Grant Park suggests that overprotection is a problem as
well as underprotection. Grant Park would be a less valuable public
resource without the Art Institute, and the Art Institute was made possible
only because it was feasible to obtain the consent of directly abutting
owners. Likewise, Grant Park would be less valuable without Millennium
Park, which was also made possible by the consent mechanism. This in
turn suggests that the number of abutting owners who wield the veto should
not be so numerous that unanimous consent can never be obtained for major
modifications of the public space.
If this conclusion is sound, then the understanding of the relevant
universe of parties who must consent that was followed in securing
approval of the Art Institute, the Public Library, and Millennium Park—
directly abutting plus diagonally situated owners—is a better rule than the
one implied by the decisions in Ward III and IV—all abutting owners
surrounding the park. Today, with commercial real estate located on three
sides of the park, and many of the structures organized as condominiums,
securing unanimous consent of all abutting owners would be virtually
impossible. Adopting the large universe of affected parties implied by
Ward III and IV would be tantamount to eliminating any realistic prospect
of securing a waiver of the dedication. History suggests that this is too
inflexible. The precedent embedded in practice may, at least in this context,
be superior to the one embodied in judicial decisions.
CONCLUSION
The public dedication doctrine has largely disappeared, at least as a
tool for protecting public spaces such as parks, squares, and commons. The
history of Grant Park suggests that this is regrettable. The park would not
exist today were it not for the understanding that public dedications create
rights in abutting owners, allowing them to insist on strict adherence to
public uses. The public dedication doctrine was called upon by generations
of property owners on Michigan Avenue, most prominently but not
exclusively Montgomery Ward, to fight off a seemingly endless series of
proposals for erecting structures in the park. The result of their efforts was
to create a spectacular public space in the center of Chicago, one of the
most dramatic urban spaces in the world today (see Figure 22). Various
fortuities entered into the story of how this happened, including large events
such as the Chicago Fire and the Columbian Exposition, and quirks of
personality such as the mysterious Mr. Ward. But the law was also a major
contributing force. If that law is forgotten, the odds of creating similar
public spaces in the future will be diminished.
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